Arms transfers to the Irish Republican Army by Schuetz, Laurence N.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
1987

















Thesis Advisor: Edward J. Laurance




SECURITY CLASSIFICATION Cjf- ThiS PagT
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE
id REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
UNCLASSIFIED
lb RESTRICTIVE MARKINGS
2a SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY
2b DECLASSIFICATION /DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE
3 DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF REPORT
Approved for public release; distribution
unlimited
4 PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S) 5 MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBERS;





7a NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION
Naval Postgraduate School
be ADDRESS (City. Stare and ZIP Code)
Monterey, CA 93943-5000
7b ADDRESS (C/fy. Hat*. and ZIP Code)
Monterey, CA 93943-5000




9 PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER









i HUE (include Security Claudication)
ARMS TRANSFERS TO THE IRISH REPUBLICAN ARMY
2 PERSONAL AUTHOR(S)
Schuetz, Laurence N,
3a type OF REPORT
Master's Thesis
1 3b TIME COVERED
FROM TO







18 SUBJECT TERMS (Continue on revene if neceisary and identify by block number)
KEY WORDS: Irish Republican Army, IRA, Arms Transfers,
Insurgency, Terrorism, Northern Ireland, Ulster,
Separatist
9 ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse if neceisary and identify by block number)
This paper describes the arms transfer relationship of a non-governmental organization,
the Irish Republican Army (IRA). Open source information is used to develop models
of munitions, financial and training relationships. These models are then explained
in terms of (1) systemic influences, (2) supplier rationales, objectives and interests,
D S"R'3UTiON/ AVAILABILITY OF ABSTRACT
(^LjN CLASSiFiEQ/UNLiMlTED D SAME AS RPT ODTlC USERS
21 ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
UNCLASSIFIED
2a NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL
Thesis Advisor: Edward J. Laurance




OFORM 1473.84 mar 83 APR •dition may be used until e«hausted
All other editions are. obsolete
SECURITY Classification OF r wiS PAGE
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (Whm\ Data Bntmrad)
and (3) recipient demand factors. Finally, the implications of these
relationships are briefly addressed in the summary and conclusions. The
closing section also includes suggestions for future research, based upon
an assessment of (1) possible sources of detailed arms transfer data, and
(2) methodological challenges.
S/N 0102- LF- 014- 0601 UNCLASSIFIED
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE(TTh«n Dmtm En(.r.d)
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited
Arms Transfers to the Irish Republican Army
by
Laurence N. ,Schuetz
Captain, United States Navy
B.B.A., University of Texas, 1960
M.A.I. R., University of Southern California, 1974-
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of






This paper describes the arms transfer relationships
of a non- governmental organization, the Irish Republican
Army (IRA) . Open source information is used to develop
models of munitions, financial and training relationships.
These models are then explained in terms of (1) systemic
influences, (2) supplier rationales, objectives and
interests, and (3) recipient demand factors. Finally, the
implications of these relationships are briefly addressed
in the summary and conclusions. The closing section also
includes suggestions for future research, based upon an
assessment of (1) possible sources of detailed arms
transfer data, and (2) methodological challenges.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This paper develops several preliminary models which
depict the arms transfer relationships of an insurgent group,
the Irish Republican Army (IRA). First, open source accounts
are compiled into a chronology of arms transfer reports
linked to the IRA. These accounts are then used to derive
models depicting insurgent sources of munitions, financing,
and training. Next, (1) systemic influences, (2) supplier
rationales, objectives and interests and (3) recipient demand
factors are examined in search of a better understanding of
apparent arms transfer patterns. The analysis concludes with
an assessment of the implications of the IRA's arms transfer
relationships
.
In the final section, which focuses on promising areas
for future research, the challenges of data availability,
validity and reliability are examined. A more rigorous
analytical approach appears to be feasible if an arms
transfer event data base can be constructed, at reasonable
expense, from existing data sources.
The assessment is limited to the current "troubles" in
Northern Ireland, which date from 1969. The principal focus
is on the physical movement of munitions; time and scope (and
the intuitive prospect of marginal return) dictate only a
cursory treatment of financing and weapons training. Before
8
turning to the specifics of arms transfers to the rebels in
Northern Ireland, it is appropriate to (1) identify some of
the players, (2) question the significance of munitions,
financing and training to insurgent movements, and (3) ask
precisely what is meant by "arms transfers."
A. SOME OF THE PLAYERS
Under the heading, "Who's Who in Northern Ireland" Warren
Richey writes,
The Provisional Irish Republican Army is a guerrilla
force determined to wage a joint military and political
battle aimed at ending Britain's rule in Northern Ireland
and eventually joining both the North and South of Ireland
into a united socialist republic. The group is outlawed in
both Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic, and member-
ship in the Provisional IRA is illegal in both states.
The "Provos," as they are called, were formed in 1969
and split away from the mainstream official IRA because
they felt the IRA was becoming a Marxist political organi-
zation to the point of neglecting guerrilla operations
against the British. The two groups constitute an extrem-
ist part of the Republican/Nationalist movement in
Ireland, which seeks to end the British presence in
Northern Ireland and to unite the North and South into a
single country.
Sinn Fein is the political wing of the IRA. It seeks
the same ends as the guerrilla force, but says it confines
its efforts to legal political activity. Sinn Fein
candidates have contested and won races in both the
Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland. Roman Catholics
constitute 37 percent of Ulster's population, and a major-
ity of them supports the Social Democratic and Labor Party,
which denounces the use of force as a means to end British
rule in Northern Ireland.
Although British troops were originally committed to
Northern Ireland in 1969 mainly to protect Catholic civil
rights demonstrators and to back up political and economic
reforms insisted on by London, many Republicans still view
Britain as trying to perpetuate the status quo, in favor of
Protestant "loyalists" (loyal to Britain).
Northern Ireland's Catholic minority suffered for
decades from economic deprivation and institutionalized
discrimination. It was frozen out of a political process
dominated by Protestants.
Republicans contend that life will be better for
Catholics if the North is united with the South. But most
of Northern Ireland's Protestant majority doesn't want to
unite with the overwhelmingly Catholic South. Britain's
position has been that Northern Ireland will remain a part
of the "United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland" (the U.K.) for as long as the majority of those
living in Northern Ireland want to remain so.
Other separatists players include the Irish National
Liberation Army (INLA), the military wing of the Irish
Republican Socialist Party, a Marxist faction that broke
2
away from the IRA in 1975. The term IRA, as used in this
paper, is synonymous with "armed separatists," as the open
source reports upon which it is based often do not distin-
guish among the parties to the dispute.
Other armed factions further confound the analyst,
because the IRA are not the only group engaged in transfering
arms to Northern Ireland. Armed "loyalists" include a
half-dozen Protestant paramilitary organizations, the largest
of which are the Ulster Defense Association (UDA) and the
Ulster Volunteer Force (UYF).
B. ARMS TRANSFERS AND INSURGENCIES
Arms transfers are not the cause of insurgencies, any
more than they are the cause of other types of warfare.
A more meaningful point of focus is the political movements
which use the technique and means of insurgency war to
achieve their ends. Arms transfers can contribute
10
decisively, however, to the conduct of insurgency war by
revolutionary political movements. Fuzzy thinking about
cause and effect persists — allusions to "the flow of men
and supplies" are all too frequently encountered in
references to settings as different as Northern Ireland and
Central America. These echoes of Vietnam should remind us to
examine carefully the assumptions which may be obscured by
the way we "frame the problem." In fact, there is no
guarantee that "controlling the flow of men and supplies"
will control the insurgency — they are not synonymous.
On the other hand, the weapons and skills available to
• the political revolutionary can clearly make his conduct of
"war" easier or more difficult, so they are far from
irrelevant. Arms transfers are perhaps best characterized as
a necessary (but not sufficient) precursor to a successful
insurgency. In A Framework for Analyzing and Predicting
Insurgency , Daniel Wagner describes the analyst's task,
Insurgency presents four successive challenges to the
intelligence analyst. Each involves evaluating a complex
array of data and calls for the prediction of specific
developments or events.
1. Prior to the existence of an insurgent movement, the
analyst must evaluate the country's vulnerability
and predict a group's appearance.
2. Once a potential insurgent movement exists, he must
anticipate an armed struggle.
3. Throughout the struggle, he constantly reevaluates
the prospects of insurgent success and tries to
predict the outcome.
4-. Finally, if the insurgents win, he must anticipate
the type of regime they will install.
11
Wagner outlines a procedure which will help the analyst "to
examine rigorously insurgent situations and to make use of
indicators that aid prediction,
Because organization, legitimacy, and coercion are so
telling, we propose to compare the government and the
insurgents — or any two sides in an insurgency — on the
basis of these three criteria. The relative "balances" of
organization, legitimacy, and coercion break down into
twenty-eight components or "factors." The rationale here
is simple: it is easier to evaluate each of the twenty-
eight factors one at a time, and then to recombine them,
than it is to assess the entire situation in all its
complexity.
The twenty-eight analytical factors Wagner identifies (see
Figures 1 thru 3, immediately following this page) describe
the society, the physical environment, the government, and
•the insurgents. Where do arms transfers fit in? Six of
Wagner's twenty-eight factors are directly related to arms
transfers — the relevant factors, as he describes them,
are
,
Situational Factors (Figure 1)
FACTOR S-8 Arms and Military Skills - calculates
the military skills and arms available within the
country. Although guns alone do not shoot people,
they are essential nonetheless. Even if the
government controls the skills bank and arsenal,
defections and raids can effect the transfers.
Government Factors ( Figure 2)
&
Insurgent Factors (Figure 3
^
FACTOR G-7 Armed Forces & Poiice/FACTOR 1-7
Guerrillas - estimates of government and insurgent
armed strength. Taken separately, they are less
meaningful than when combined into a ratio. The
direction and rate of change in the ratio is more
significant than its absolute level.
12
Toward the Left favors the Government; Toward the
Right favors the Insurgents
Organizational Factors
FACTOR S-1. Cultural Pluralism.
OR MANY 2 OR 3
I
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
I
FACTOR S-2. Mass-Elite Gap.
SAME % AS IN POPULATION 0%
I
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
I
FACTOR S-3. Urban-Rural Interaction.
MIN I MAL/ CON TROLLED EXTENS I VE/ UN CONTROLLED
I
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
I
FACTOR S-4. Peasant Mobilization.
EXIT OPTION VULNERABLE
I----1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 I
Legitimacy Factors
FACTOR S-5. Landlessness.
20% 30% 40% 60%
I
1 2 3 I ---4 I 6--- I 7 8 9 I
FACTOR S-6. Differential Modernization.
EQUITABLE HIGHLY POLARIZING
I
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
I
Coercion Factors
FACTOR S-7. Traditional level of Violence.
low HIGH
I
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
I
FACTOR S-8. Arms & Military Skills.
scarce abundant
I
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
I
FACTOR S-9. Borders and Sanctuaries.
impenetrable/ none porous/ plent i ful
FACTOR S-10. Terrain & Lines of Communication
open/good rough/poor
I
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
I
SOURCE: Daniel W. Wagner, A Framework for Analyzing and
Predicting Insurgency , Master's Thesis, Naval
Postgraduate School, December 1982, p. 4-4..
Figure 1. Situational Factors
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Toward the Left favors the Government; Toward the
Right favors the Insurgents
Organizational Factors
FACTOR G-1. Concentration of Authority.
UNITARY DIFFUSED
I— .1 2—— 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 I
FACTOR G-2. Regime Access.
OPEN BLOCKED
I





1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
I
Legitimacy Factors
FACTOR G-4. Origin & Indigenous Authority.
8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
I 1 | .--2-- I -3 I 5 I ---6-- I -7 8 I ---9 I
FACTOR G-5. Rural Services.
EFFECTIVE INEFFICIENT
I






1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
I
FACTOR G-7. Armed Forces & Police.
STRONG WEAK
| 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
I
FACTOR G-8. External Aid.
UNNEEDED PLENTY SOME NONE
I
1 2 I ---3 4 5 6 7 8 I ---9 I
FACTOR G-9. Repressive Violence.
legal/appropr i ate illegal/excessive
SOURCE: Daniel W. Wagner, A Framework for Analyzing and
Predicting Insurgency , Master's Thesis, Naval
Postgraduate School, December 1982, p. 4-6.
Figure 2. Government Factors
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Toward the Left favors the Government; Toward the
Right favors the Insurgents
Organizational Factors
FACTOR 1-1. Unity of command.
HOSTILE RIVALS COOPERATIVE UNITARY
I
1 2- I --3 4 5 6 7- I --8 9 I
FACTOR I -2. Upward Mobility.
BLOCKED OPEN
I
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
I
FACTOR I -3. Commitment.
"returnees" determined
I
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
I
Legitimacy Factors
FACTOR 1-4. Ideology & Appeal.
FRAGILE STRONG
I
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 I
FACTOR I -5. Administration in Rebel Areas.
INEFFECTIVE EFFECTIVE
I
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
I
Coercion Factors
FACTOR I -6. Liberated Areas.
none defended
I
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
I
FACTOR I -7. Guerrillas.
weak strong
I
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
I
FACTOR I -8. External Aid.
NONE SOME PLENTY UNNEEDED
I 1 2 I ---3 4 5 6 7--- I 8 9 I
FACTOR I -9. Tactics.
NONVIOLENT PARAMILITARY
SOURCE: Daniel W. Wagner, A Framework for Analyzing and
Predicting Insurgency , Master's Thesis, Naval
Postgraduate School, December 1982, p. 4-7.
Figure 3. Insurgent Factors.
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FACTOR G-8/FACT0R 1-8 External Aid - estimates of
the external support available to each side. The
"taint" of foreign association, and the patron's
constraints on one's actions, are among the
caveates here.
FACTOR 1-9 Tactics - paramilitary organization and
tactics imply the capability to field forces able^
effectively to challenge those of the government.
Wagner's framework puts arms transfers to an insurgent
group in context, not as the key variable, but as an
important component in assessing the setting, and the
relative strengths and vulnerabilities of both the government
and the insurgents.
In the case of the IRA, arms transfers (or, in several
instances, attempted arms transfers) include small arms,
heavy machine guns, anti-tank weapons, ammunition, mortars,
mines, hand grenades, rocket-propelled grenades, explosives,
detonators, a flame thrower, remotely piloted vehicles, and
shoulder-fired SAM's. The significance of these arms
transfers must, of course, take into account their utility to
the terrorist.
Any assessment of how various munitions translate into
"combat capability" depends, among other things, upon a model
(either explicit or implicit) of terrorist strategy and
tactics. Brian Jenkins provides an elegant model:
Terrorism is often described as mindte^* violence,
Aeju>ejtej>4 violence, or JjuicuLLonat violence. None of these
adjectives is correct. [Political] Terrorism is not
mindless violence. There is a theory of terrorism, and it
often works. To understand the theory, it must first be
understood that terrorism is a means to an end, not an end
in itself; in other words, terrorism has objectives.
16
(The terrorists themselves — those who carry out the
missions — do not always understand this, or sometimes
seem to forget it.)
The objectives may be obscured by the fact that
terrorist attacks often seem random and directed toward
targets whose death or destruction does not directly
benefit the terrorists. But the objectives of terrorism
are not conventional military ones. Terrorists do not seek
to take and hold ground, or physically destroy their
opponents' forces. Terrorist groups usually lack that kind
of power.
Individual acts of terrorism may be directed toward the
achievement of specific objectives that the terrorists
often make explicit: widespread news coverage, perhaps the
publication of the terrorists' grievances or demands, the
payment of ransom, the release of prisoners.
As opposed to the tactics of individual acts, the
strategy of terrorism is aimed at achieving broader goals,
which may range from attracting worldwide attention to the
terrorists' cause to the dissolution of society or of
international order. Terrorism aims at creating an
atmosphere of fear and alarm — of terror. Such an
atmosphere causes people to exaggerate the apparent
strength of the terrorists' movement and cause, which means
that their strength is judged not by their actual numbers
or violent accomplishments, but by the effect these have on
their audience. Since most terrorist groups are actually
small and weak, the violence must be all the more dramatic,
deliberately shocking; hence, they may choose innocent
civilians as targets. "Pure terrorism" is totally and
deliberately indiscriminate, because indiscriminate
violence gets the most attention, is the most alarming, and
is difficult to protect against.
Terrorist acts are often carefully choreographed to
attract the attention of the electronic media and the
international press. Holding hostages increases the
drama. If certain demands are not satisfied, the hostages
may be killed. The hostages themselves often mean nothing
to the terrorists. Terrorism is aimed at the people
watching, not the actual victims. Terrorism is
theater.
In addition to the military, or internal security
dimension, arms transfers involving an insurgent group
influence, and are influenced by a wide range of economic and
17
political factors. These will be addressed after the IRA's
arms transfer patterns for munitions, financing and training
are described.
C. WHAT IS AN ARMS TRANSFER?
Not surprisingly, the central question, "What is an arms
transfer?" is, if anything, somewhat more difficult to answer
when the level of analysis shifts from the familiar realm of
nation-to-nation relations to transnational arms transfer
patterns. Setting aside, for the moment, the challenges of
data availability, reliability and validity; the question
"What are we trying to measure?" is certainly no easier to
answer when the recipient is an insurgent group. As in
state-centric arms transfers, just where to "draw the line"
is far from clear. Foreign-made military hardware in the
hands of the insurgents is straightforward enough, however,
other munitions "in the pipeline," weapons training, and the
financing of arms purchases are also of concern.
If "significant data gaps" challenge the researcher
7probing state-to-state arms transfer relationships, is it
futile to attempt an assessment of arms transfers to an
insurgent group? It is certainly frustrating, but it may not
be entirely futile. Laurance identifies "the characteristics
of an arms transfer which need to be measured in order to
provide answers." These characteristics (with minor
modifications to adapt them to an insurgency) are shown in











7. Mode of Acquisition
8. Means of payment
9. Delivery stage
Examples of Values/Attributes
10 RPG-7, 1,000 detonators
U.S., USSR, Czechoslovakia
Shock value, media leverage
Attributes depicting rate of
degradation over time
Number of donor personnel to
accompany equipment/Number of
recipient personnel to be






end user certificate, theft,
over-the-counter purchase
Cash, credit, gift, barter
Rumor, agreement, delivery,
ready for use in insurgency,
operational use
SOURCE: based upon Edward J. Laurance, "The International
Transfer of Arms: Problems of Measurement and
Conceptualization," a paper delivered at the 1977
Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science
Association
Figure 4. Characteristics of an Arms Transfer
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Information is available regarding at least some of these
characteristics. There is, of course, little prospect that
the exact details of IRA arms transfer relationships will
ever be available. Many will remain, for all practical
purposes, "non-observable" attributes, therefore, indirect
measures are needed.
What kind of research might the available data support?
With few exceptions, open source reports do not contain the
level of detail (e.g., specific numbers and types of
munitions, including country of manufacture) needed to
conduct meaningful quantitative analysis. The most
appropriate use of open source reports appears to be as a
source of hypotheses. For example, in the sections which
follow, Figures 5 thru 7, which detail insurgent sources of
munitions, financing, and training, are preliminary models
based upon open source reports. Conversely, physical
evidence in the form of capture/cache discovery inventories,
enroute seizure inventories, explosive incident forensic
reports, and ballistic reports, may be sufficiently detailed
to test at least some of these hypotheses. The final section
of this paper explores the possiblities for future research.
Selected open source arms transfer reports have been
arranged chronologically in the first two appendices to this
paper. This "almost raw" data varies considerably in both
scope and detail, and its validity and reliability
20
undoubtedly range widely, not only from report to report, but
also from topic to topic within individual accounts.
This unwieldy mass of data on IRA arms transfer-related
activities since 1969 has been reduced to preliminary models
of arms transfer relationships, as a prelude to assessing
supplier rationales, objectives and interests and recipient
demand factors. The patterns associated with munitions,
financing, and training are described in the sections which
follow.
21
II. ARMS TRANSFER PATTERNS - MUNITIONS
Open source reports suggest that the arms transfer
patterns which have evolved during the Irish Republican
Army's current insurgency in Northern Ireland are varied and
complex. Figure 5, below, shows the group's principal
sources of arms, as reflected -in these reports.
• Indigenous Production
• In-Country Capture











Figure 5. Insurgent Arms Sources
22
A. INDIGENOUS SOURCES
The first arms source listed, indigenous production, is
of particular importance to the arms transfer analyst. In
assessing arms transfers to the IRA, he cannot begin to
estimate the extent and significance of transnational arms
transfers without first establishing the technological limits
of indigenous arms production capability and attempting to
gauge productive capacity.
While an early attempt at manufacturing rockets met with
little success, the IRA has fielded a serviceable mortar, as
well as the ubiquitous "improvised explosive device," which
q
has become their stock-in-trade. These devices range in
size from hand grenades and firebombs to virtual "block-
busters." However, they are not entirely "homemade." As
Lt Col George Styles, a British explosive ordnance disposal
expert, points out,
...the terrorist not only improvises his devices but the
explosive ingredients as well. Given a stringent control
on explosives, the terrorist has shown that he can revert
to commonly available substances, the control of which is
virtually impossible. This is not however true of the
detonator — the key of the explosive lock. Several
attempts have been made by criminals and terrorists alike
to improvise a detonator. Fortunately all attempts have
ended in disaster for the improvisor. The detonator




The technological limits of the IRA's indigenous
production base have left them no choice but to turn to
transnational sources for the remainder of the arms in their
current inventory — small arms, machine guns, anti-tank
23
weapons, ammunition, rocket-propelled grenades, night vision
devices, and radar detectors. Similarly, they will have to




The first transnational arms transfer category,
non-governmental criminal activity of one kind or another,
accounts for the greatest volume of munitions transfers, in
terms of both numbers and dollar value. Theft from U.S.
military installations, for example, may account for most of
1
1
the IRA's inventory of heavy machine guns, and U.S.




The IRA is a regular customer in the "underworld of
secret arms dealers" described by Peter Durisch in "How to
1 3Make an Illicit Arms Deal." Open source accounts mention
transfers arranged by American, West German, and South
African arms dealers. A U.S. government "sting" operation in
1983 netted a New York-based arms dealer who supplied
illicitly manufactured submachine guns to agents posing as
1 LIRA gun-runners. The IRA has also attempted, through
arms dealers, to acquire new capabilities, such as surface-
to-air missiles and remotely piloted vehicles capable of
-, , 15carrying explosives.
Bogus documentation has been linked to IRA arms transfer
1
6
attempts, as have bribes (or planned bribes) of customs
24
17
and export control officials. Ideologically-motivated
collusion has also been reported in both the U.S. and Irish
. . 18
customs services.
Both the Palestine Liberation Organization and ETA, the
left-wing Basque terrorist group, have also reportedly
19provided arms and explosives to the IRA, and, in 1983,
the U.S. Commissioner of Customs reported, "the IRA is
turning to the Mafia and other underworld crime organizations
20in the United States to buy arms and explosives."
C. STATE-SUPPORTED
Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union and Libya appear to have
provided arms covertly to the Irish Republican Army.
Czech involvement surfaced in 1971, when a 3 1/2 ton
shipment from Prague was intercepted at Schiphol airport, in
Amsterdam. Britain accused Czechoslovakia of attempting to
supply arms to the IRA; the Czechs denied sending or selling
the arms and canceled their Foreign Minister's scheduled
21
visit to London.
Soviet-made rocket launchers were introduced in mid-1972.
The British Foreign Office asked the Soviet Union to
cooperate in tracing how the rockets got to Northern Ireland;
the Soviet government denied involvement in Northern Ireland
and refused to help track down the source of the rockets. In
1983, three Soviets attached to the Embassy in Dublin
[Guenadi Saline, Viktor Lipassov and Irina Lipassov] were
expelled from the Irish Republic for spying. They were
25
allegedly involved in an "arms for information" deal with the
22
IRA. *
In March 1973, the Irish Navy captured a Cyprus-
registered coaster smuggling a 5 ton arms shipment, which was
later determined to have originated in Libya. The seizure
provided the first tangible evidence of covert Libyan arms
transfers, although Colonel Qaddafi had announced he was
supplying arms to the IRA in June of the previous year.
Britain suspended the sale to Libya of any arms that "could
conceivably be re-exported for use by the Irish Republican
Army," and asked the Libyans for an explanation of Libyan
23involvement in the aTfair. Qaddafi has continued to
voice support for the IRA, most recently in 1984., following
the seige of the Libyan Embassy in London.
State-supported transfers appear to be the sole source of
some capabilities, such as rocket launchers and rocket-
propelled grenades. Other munitions linked to state-
supported arms transfers include pistols, rifles, submachine
guns, ammunition, anti-tank and anti-personnel mines,
grenades, gelignite, TNT, fuses and detonators.
26
III. ARMS TRANSFER PATTERNS - FINANCING
IRA financing of arms purchases, as reflected in open













Figure 6. Insurgent Financing Sources
While IRA financing is said to come from all of these
sources, there appears to be little prospect that the
researcher can determine with confidence how much has come
from each source and how the pattern of support may have
27
varied over time. Open source accounts differ over the
relative importance of each source; most identify private
fund-raising as the primary source in the early years, and
report that criminal activities have recently moved into
first place.
A. PRIVATE FUND-RAISING
On the surface it may seem ironic that the Provisional
IRA's supply lines should originate in the United States,
close friend and ideological ally of Britain. But the US
is also home to 44- million Americans who claim at least
some Irish heritage, with roughly 10 million direct Irish
descendants. There are fewer than 5 million Irish men,
women, -and children in all of Ireland, both North and
South.
The success of IRA fund-raising efforts through organiza-
tions such as the Irish Northern Aid Committee (Noraid) or
its recent clone, the Irish American Fenian Society is
virtually impossible to assess. Estimates of the level of
support vary, with "something under $10 million a year" the
26highest figure. Some accounts say American support is
falling off, other reports say just the opposite. According
to an FBI spokesman,
There is no way we can check on their money-laundering
operation, because you never know how much they collect,"
says Donald J. McGorty, head of the division at the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in New York that handles
international terrorism.
He adds: "There's no wa# we can tell if they collected
$100,000 or $5 million...
Using currency regulations, the Reagan administration has
targeted possible Irish Republican Army couriers for special
28
attention. Because the financial instruments which
28
provide the fungibility essential to international trade are
also available to insurgent groups, the U.S. effort to




Criminal activity linked to IRA financing includes bank
robberies, kidnapping, extortion, protection rackets, and tax
evasion. Even the case of bank robberies, where information
should be readily available, is not as simple as it might at
first appear. The amount taken in bank robberies may be
relatively easy to establish, yet the analyst must determine
why specific thefts have been linked to the IRA, and assign
some kind of "confidence level" to each instance.
C. NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS
The Palestine Liberation Organization is the only non-
governmental organization alleged to have provided financial
30
support to the IRA.
D. STATE-SUPPORTED
The Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Libya and the Irish
Republic have all been mentioned as sources of state-
sponsored aid, however, the Irish case appears to be an
anomaly. While state funds were, in fact, diverted in 1970
to purchase arms for the IRA, the officials responsible were




As long as there is a viable "black market" for arms and
ammunition, both nation-states and non-governmental
organizations can provide covert financial support to
insurgent groups and maximize "plausible denial." Thus,
without access to the group's balance sheet, the analyst must
be alert to, and avoid, implicit assumptions regarding the
ultimate source of IRA munitions based solely on their
country of manufacture or mode of acquisition.
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IV. ARMS TRANSFER PATTERNS - TRAINING
...Above his [arms dealer Sam Cummings] desk hangs an ugly-
looking weapon, a rifle-propelled [sic] grenade called the
RPG 7, which specially interests him. It was captured in
Northern Ireland, one of a hundred which were imported from
Libya by the IRA, with instructions in Arabic: they did not
know how to~use it, it was said, until the BBC explained on
television.














Figure 7. Insurgent Training Sources
The unclassified reports suggest the sources of IRA
training shown above. It is difficult to judge what, if any,
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effect the reported training has on terrorist capabilities.
There is no shortage of accounts picturing IRA terrorists
honing their skills through rigorous training, however,
security force officials have thus far remained silent
regarding any increase in capability.
A. IN-COUNTRY ON-THE-JOB TRAINING
Open source reports indicate both Libyan and Palestinian
33
advisors have operated with the IRA in Northern Ireland.
A U.S. Army intelligence report released in 1975 reported
that the IRA was attempting to recruit members in the United
States Marine Corps, trained in communications and
crew-served weapons. Perhaps coincidentally , one of the
IRA gun-runners captured by the Irish Navy in 1984 was a
former Marine, an Irishman who joined the Corps when he lived
35in the United States.
B. FOREIGN PARAMILITARY TRAINING CAMPS
Terrorist training courses have been reported in the
Soviet Union, Libya, Jordan, and the ever-popular "unspec-
ified Middle Eastern country," and both the Libyans and the
PLO have allegedly been involved in training members of the
36
IRA. Appendix C contains selected open source reports
reflecting IRA links to international terrorism.
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V. THE INTERNATIONAL SETTING
A. AT THE START OF THE CURRENT "TROUBLES"
Edward Kolodziej characterizes arms transfers as a
subsystem of international relations, which can be thought of
as the product of four sets of actor relations: national,
37
subnational, transnational, and international. It might
appear that the influences which determined arms transfer
patterns for a non-governmental organization, such as the
IRA, would be concentrated in transnational actor relations.
Indeed, much of the popular literature has such a focus,
concentrating on the "phenomenon" of terrorism. That
perspective, however, often ignores complex interdependencies
and leads to the conclusion that the actions of insurgent
groups are "unpredictable."
At the start of the current "troubles," in 19&9, the
international environment included a number of factors, many
of which were beyond the control of the Irish rebels or their
arms suppliers, which helped to shape the IRA's arms transfer
relationships. Two intersecting international subsystems,
East-West and North-South, had evolved since World War II.
Many of the outputs of these subsystems, for instance, those
associated with East-West competition, decolonization, and
third world economic development, have influenced the pattern
of arms transfers to the IRA, as have the outputs of the
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principal actors at the national, sub-national, and
transnational levels. Several of these outputs are treated
briefly in the following paragraphs.
Britain's central position in the Western Alliance, which
dates from the very onset of the cold war, made the Soviet
Union a promising patron for the IRA. In the USSR's view,
the United Kingdom (1) had intervened during the Russian
Revolution, attempting to thwart the Bolsheviks, (2) was the
birthplace of exploitive capitalism, and (3) cleverly
entrapped her former colonies with economic imperialism, even
as she publicly dismantled her Empire.
The British were attempting to manage an orderly
transition to a post-colonial era. The process was largely
complete in Asia and the Middle East, and still underway in
Sub-Saharan Africa and the Western hemisphere. To the Irish
separatist-nationalists, the exclusion of Northern Ireland
from the policy of divestiture added insult to injury.
There were sharp increases in the late '60s in both arms
manufacturing and in the volume of international trade in
arms and ammunition. These increases have been attributed,
in large part, to the emergence of new "third world" states
38from former colonies. These conditions arose at the very
time that events in Northern Ireland renewed the IRA's
interest in arms transfers. Arms, ammunition and explosives
were being manufactured in more and more countries. Seeking
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economies of scale, both private and state-controlled arms
manufacturers in many countries turned to export sales to
improve their economic viability. In this intensely
competitive environment, manufacturers had every incentive to
avoid asking potential customers too many questions.
There was a spirited domestic debate in the United States
over proposed gun control legislation, in the wake of the
1968 inner city riots. The opposition, which rallied 'round
the constitutionally guaranteed right to bear arms, was led
by the National Rifle Association lobby. When the rhetorical
exchanges on this emotionally-charged "hot potato" were over,
arms and ammunition continued to be available over-the-
counter.
B. SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS
There have been many changes in the international setting
over the past 16 years, none having had a greater impact upon
IRA arms transfers than the image the media has created in
the public mind regarding "international terrorism." The
Irish rebels are no longer seen as the "brave boys at the
barricades," but rather, as members of a ruthless inter-
national conspiracy. Noel Koch (an OSD official whose
responsibilities include international terrorism) observes,
The terrorist looks out on a world which, not
universally, but in many quarters, romanticized him and
gave him a grudging respect; which often sympathized with
his motives, if not his deeds; which allowed him a measure
of tolerance, if not acceptance. Today, he is an object of
revulsion.
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In addition to worldwide changes, such as tightened
airport security and increased cooperation among Western
security forces, there have been major repercussions in both
the Irish Republic and the United States. The change in
public perceptions has made it possible to take concerted
actions against the IRA and IRA sympathizers — intelligence
exchanges, cooperation among law enforcement authorities, and
even extradition of terrorist fugitives from both the Irish
Republic and the United States to England.
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VI. SUPPLIER RATIONALES, OBJECTIVES AND INTERESTS
Arms transfers to the IRA involve nation-states, bureau-
atic players within various countries, non-governmental
organizations, firms producing arms, arms dealers, and
private individuals. The rationales, objectives and
interests that make them active players (and by inference,
others non-players) are outlined in the following
paragraphs
.
A. ILLICIT EXTRA-NATIONAL SOURCES
The principal incentive among most illicit extra-national
sources is economic gain. It is the engine that motivates
firms producing arms, arms dealers, and, to a some extent,
those popularly thought to be driven only by revolutionary
fervor. Their rationale, objective and interest is
corporate or personal gain.
Support from the Basque separatists and the Palestine
liberation Organization stems from the political and
ideological affinity of separatist-nationalist terrorists who
see analogies in their objectives and interests. Their
objective in providing munitions, financial support, training
or advisors is to continue the struggle, and to lend
legitimacy to one another's cause.
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Irish-American sources have historically responded to
sectarian appeals to both nationalistic and religious values.
Their objective is consistent, at least in part, with the
declaratory goal of the insurgents — to unite all of
Ireland. It is less likely that they support the IRA's
political goal of a united socialist republic.
B. STATE-SUPPORTED SOURCES
£2Michael Klare has identified six factors which
appear to be significant in motivating Soviet arms
exports: (1) political presence, (2) superpower
competition, (3) Sino-Soviet competition, (4-) acquisition
of basing facilities, (5) political insurance, and (6) source
of hard currency. The focus of Klare ' s analysis is arms
transfers to the third world, however, three of the factors
he puts forward — political presence, superpower
competition, and source of hard currency — also appear to
have explanatory power in the case of the IRA.
When the situation in Northern Ireland deteriorated to
crisis proportions in the late '60s, it was undoubtedly
perceived by the Soviets as a low cost, low risk opportunity
to shift yet another component of the "correlation of forces"
/ 3
against the '/Jest. The Politburo probably thought that
the split between the United Kingdom and the Irish Republic
would grow worse. Similarly, because of private American
support for the rebels, animosity between the United States
and the British portended problems for the NATO alliance.
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The Soviet's opportunity to play the "spoiler" and
attempt to weaken the NATO military alliance through arms
transfers to the Irish rebels coincided in time with several
relevant changes; (1) the coordination of Eastern bloc arms
transfer policies, and (2) "...the shifting of Soviet
arms sales from a strictly or mainly political basis to an
economic basis as well."
"Socialist camp" arms transfer relationships with the
Irish Republican Army reflect both of these trends. As the
SIPRI publication The Arms Trade With the Third World
pointed out in 1971
,
...in pursuing its arms supply policy, the Soviet Union *has
frequently relied on member countries of the Warsaw Pact.
In most of these other countries, however, the armaments
industries cannot produce either the type or quantity of
weapons which the developing countries need. So the role
for most other Warsaw Pact countries has been to provide
training and technical assistance, which has particularly
been the case for Poland. Czechoslovakia is an exception:
it had been a major arms manufacturer in the inter-war
period and continued to export significant quantities of
arms after World War II...
J
Open source reports suggest that economic interests were
an important consideration, at least in early Czech and
Soviet arms transfers to the IRA. Although virtually nothing
is available from open sources regarding the terms of direct
Soviet Union - Irish Republican Army arms transfers , the
involvement of an American arms dealer in the abortive 1971




The circumstances surrounding the September 1983
allegations of Soviet support to the IRA reinforce the view
that the Soviets do not feel that the conflict affects their
vital interests, yet they are willing to exploit the
situation in Northern Ireland "for what it's worth." They
were accused of offering the IRA arms in exchange for
information regarding British military installations in
/Q
Northern Ireland.
It is difficult to establish ideological grounds for
Soviet support to the IRA. The Provisionals could hardly be
described as a vanguard party, fighting a "just war" that it
was the Soviet Union's duty to support, as the leader of the
socialist camp. The separatist-nationalist struggle may have
50fit the definition of a "war of national liberation," yet
the Provisionals, while they might not be bourgeois, were
really not proletarian enough to be truly worthy. Although
many other movements were cited as participants in the
worldwide struggle, the Irish separatists were not mentioned
in Soviet pronouncements regarding national liberation
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movements during the years 1969 thru 1971. In a 1966 Orbis
article, Stephen Gibert's words predicted Soviet actions in
Northern Ireland .
In those cases where insurgents, whether communist,
leftist, of moderate nationalist-bourgeois, faced regimes
clearly hostile to the USSR, they benefited from Soviet
support, at least on a limitedcfeasis , even if they had
little probability of success.
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Conversely, anti-colonial ideology appears to be a more
significant factor in Libya's calculation of whether or not
to transfer arms. Colonel Qaddafi announced in June 1972,
We support the Irish revolutionaries fighting
Britain*. . .When we give weapons to the Irish revolution-
aries, it is not to kill innocent children, but to gain the
freedom of an enslaved people. We are doing this because
Britain has done much worse to the Arab nation. .
Colonel Qaddafi ' s public announcement of support for the
IRA marked the beginning of a new arms transfer relationship,
one of overt support by a nation-state, similar to the
Palestine Liberation Organization's relationships with a
number of arab countries. According to press reports,
Qaddafi accused Britain of handing over Palestine to the Jews
in 194-8 and of permitting Iran to occupy three Persian Gulf
Islands in 1971. Qaddafi reportedly vowed he would pursue
55British imperialism everywhere, even "in her own home."
Anthony Cordesman probably overstates his case when he
says,
The USSR has also succeeded in using Libya as a general
training ground for terrorist and revolutionary groups
throughout the Third World and increasingly as a proxy in
providing arms to Third World nations...;
It may be more appropriate to characterize the relation-
ship between the Soviet Union and Libya as a marriage of
convenience. Libya's anti-colonial crusade and the polit-
ical, military and economic interests of the USSR often
coincide.
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C. A STATE-SUPPORTED "SUPPLIER PROFILE"?
An attempt was made to construct a "supplier profile"
using content analysis of Foreign Broadcast Information
Service (FBIS) reports of Libyan, Czech, and Soviet media.
Soviet FBIS reports were supplemented with The Current Digest
of the Soviet Press . The assessment was focused on identify-
ing possible "leading indicators" of a covert state-supported
arms transfer relationship. All broadcast and press items
were examined for the period from 19&9, the start of the
current "troubles" in Northern Ireland, through the initial
appearance of evidence suggesting active state support.
Figure 8, on the following page, captures perhaps the
most significant result of the research, showing that even
though all three countries have been linked to arms transfers
to the IRA, only the Soviet media had more than a few
references to Northern Ireland.
The predominant themes used to characterize the
Northern Ireland situation in Soviet coverage were
imperialism (39 references) and colonialism (34- references).
There were a total of eleven allusions to facism, and
religious differences were mentioned eight times. All
references to religion as an issue were negative; Soviet
commentators either downplayed its significance or accused
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* as reflected in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) reports
and The Current Digest of the Soviet Press
Figure 8. Media References* to Northern Ireland
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Both Czech commentaries were precipitated by the British
expulsion of 105 Soviets on espionage charges. The theme of
these items is not surprising; they reflect extensive Soviet
involvement in all phases of Czechoslovakian life, to counter
the effects of the reactionary "Prague Spring" of 1968,
...The newspapers are breaking all records in nonsensical
fabrications so as to lay the responsibility for the events
in Ulster, for strikes all over Britain, and even for the
growing opposition of the English public to the plans for
British„entry into the EEC at the door of the Soviet
Union. ? '
Before Colonel Qaddafi openly acknowledged support to the
IRA, the Libyan media (as reflected in FBIS reports) did not
mention Northern Ireland.
With the benefit of 20/20 hindsight, the Libyan leader's
first interview with AL-AHRAM appears relevant,
...Concluding his interview, the Libyan revolution leader
explains his country's foreign policy during the revolu-
tionary era and says: In short, this policy is positive
neutrality, nonalignment , and support for all the cases of
liberation and freedom in the whole world. Al-Qadhdhafi
declares: The existence of one man under the yoke of
imperialism in our world is a restriction on the freedom of
the Arab man in Libya. The liberation of any man from the
imperialist yoke is another guarantee tg be added to the
credit of the Arab's freedom in Libya.
This unsuccessful attempt at detecting arms transfer
relationships through public policy statements is yet another
example of the difficulties facing the analyst charged with
clarifying the problem.
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VII. RECIPIENT DEMAND FACTORS
A number of factors affect the Irish Republican Army's
preferences for specific types of arms, sources of supply,
and financing arrangements. Like any arms transfer
recipient, the IRA must make choices between sometimes
conflicting demands. Some of the principal IRA demand
factors are:
A. DIVERSIFICATION
Perhaps the most apparent characteristic of IRA arms
transfers is the diversity of suppliers. With the possible
exception of rocket-propelled grenades (and even that is
problematic, because of the large number now in circulation),
no single supplier can cut off the IRA's access to additional
arms of the types already in their inventory. This affords
the insurgents maximum freedom of action and avoids
dependency upon any one supplier.
B. TERROR QUOTIENT
The desirability of certain types of munitions can be
linked to the terrorist's perception of their utility for his
unique application. The open source reports include obvious
examples — explosives, detonators, surface-to-air missiles,
remotely piloted vehicles capable of carrying explosives, a
flame thrower, and an "assassination kit" briefcase (complete
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with built-in machine gun). The "terror quotient" must be
considered a strong determinant, for as Walter Laqueur
observed,
...The real danger facing the terrorist is that of being
ignored, of receiving insufficient publicity, of losing the
image of the desperate freedom fighter and, of course, of
having to face determinedgenemies , unwilling to negotiate
regardless of the cost.
C. THREAT PERCEPTION
A number of observers attribute IRA arms transfers in the
early years of the current "troubles" to the Catholic
minority's inability to defend itself against roving bands of
Ulster Protestants when sectarian fighting first broke out.
The actions of the IRA are perhaps best understood in terms
of the perceptions of their popular support base. The
insurgents could not afford to remain on the sidelines, even
if it were possible for the British Army to control the
fighting and protect the Catholic enclaves. To do nothing
would destroy their credibility and fatally undermine their
raison d'etre.
The terrorists' perception of their immediate tactical
situation vis-a-vis the security forces also translates into
demand for certain arms transfers. For example, Thomas Green
observed a significant change in the Irish Republic's role,
...Increasing cooperation between governments in Dublin and
London in the 1970s helped to reduce the incidence of the
IRA terrorist activities in Northern Ireland, activities
that had depended on the sanctuary and supply routes
available from the south.
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The IRA responded to the changing security environment with
specific arms transfers designed to redress the new United
Kingdom-Irish Republic advantage and avoid technological
surprise — starlight scopes, radio intercept and radar
detection equipment.
Perceptions of the threat posed by security forces could
also influence insurgent decisions concerning how much they
should depend upon indigenous production of arms. There are
several considerations: What is the risk that in-country
manufacturing facilities will be discovered? (Maybe it's too
risky.) How much is likely to get through from outside
suppliers? (Maybe we have no choice but to make our own.)
If long storage in caches will be required, how does the
shelf life of indigenously manufactured arms and explosives
compare with the "perishability" of munitions transfered from
outside suppliers? ("Wooden" arms and explosives are
difficult to manufacture at home.)
D. ABILITY TO PAY
Throughout most of its history, the IRA has enjoyed
solid, if relatively modest, financial security, based
largely on support from sympathizers in the United States.
Financial independence has enabled the group to achieve the
degree of diversification outlined above. Open source
reports suggest that contributions from American donors may
have fallen in recent years, citing an upsurge in robberies
Kl
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and kidnappings. The evidence appears to be inconclu-
sive, however. Should these reports prove true, they could
presage either an increase in covert state-supported
deliveries or a reduction in IRA access to "open market"
arms, or both. Yet another possibility exists; greater
dependence upon non-governmental or state-supported grant or
loan aid, with continued access to the illicit arms market.
E. LEGITIMIZATION
The insurgents may feel that the relationship between
themselves and an arms supplier lends legitimacy to their
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cause. Nor must the rebels pledge themselves to a single
sponsor. It may be the best strategy to "play both ends
against the middle." Using what could be called the "driven
into the arms" argument, Richard Lawlor, a Noraid spokesman,
said at a Belfast press conference last year,
People often say if they (the IRA) get Soviet arms they
must be communists. If they get arms from Libya they must
be anarchists. It that is to be the case, it is a moral
duty of every average American to ensure they get American
guns to ensure democracy.
Legitimacy of another sort may account for the transfer
of large numbers of arms (rifles, pistols, and machine guns)
of only marginal utility to the terrorist. S.G. Styles made
the point,
Without the ability to use bombs any terrorist campaign
would quickly become an armed confrontation — on the one
side irregular, generally poorly trained and equipped
terrorists and, on the other, the organised security forces
of law and order. The violence in these circumstances
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could be confined to areas which least affect the general
public, until attrition or logistical defeat can be imposed
on the terrorists by the sheer weight of the superiority of
the security forces. (We have witnessed the principle of
these tactics being adopted by the Soviet Union in their
suppression firstly of the Hungarian revolt and later in
Czechoslovakia.) The introduction of explosives into
terrorism brings an entirely new and higher plane of
activity. It involves more people and organisations than a
purely shooting campaign and the degree of preventative
reaction that is called for can, in the limit, be extremely
costly and wasteful of time and resources. It cannot be
denied that bombing is cost effective...*
In order to foster and encourage the image Laqueur called the
"desperate freedom fighter," the revolutionaries may feel it
necessary to act as if there will be a popular "rising."
That could explain the discrepancy noted by an FBI spokesman,
There is no need to send 5,000 weapons over there.
They don't need that many. If you can keep a constant flow
of small numbers, maybe 50, 60, or 100 a/ year, they will
have enough to do what they want to do.
F. IDEOLOGY
The Provisional wing of the Irish Republican Army has
less in common with Marxist-Leninists than either the
Official IRA or the Irish National Liberation Army. In fact,
the Provos split away from the Official IRA in 1969 because
they felt that guerrilla operations against the British were
being slighted, and the IRA had become a Marxist political
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organization. After sixteen years, however, at least one
observer feels that may be changing,
The Provisional IRA's reorganization also reflects its
recent political swing to the left, led by a new generation
of young Marxists. Provisional IRA literature, like that
of the official IRA, now reveals an undisguised Marxist
philosophy, condemning all the elected parties in the
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Dublin parliament and calling for the supplanting/gf
parliamentary democracy by a "People's Republic."
Nonetheless, declaratory policy statements should always
be approached with appropriate misgivings, and compared
carefully with operative policy. Any contention that the
Provisional IRA is "going communist" will take a lot of
proving. Walter Laqueur provides a historical perspective,
Nationalist terrorist groups usually had no scruples in
looking for, and accepting, aid from foreign powers... IRA
leaders collaborated with Nazi Germany during the Second
World War, which did not prevent them from accepting help
from communist countries two decades later. . .Members of the
IRA... were not necessarily either Facist or Communist....
they acted according to the time-honored principle that the
enemy of their enemy was their friend.
Perhaps what some have called the "bizarre" alliance
between the IRA and Colonel Quaddafi of Libya is not as
"strange" as it is made out to be. They share a close
ideological affinity, an anti-imperialist view of England as
70
the embodiment of colonial exploitation, past and present.
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VIII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
A. IMPLICATIONS AND EFFECTS
...But the war in Northern Ireland, Cummings [the arms
dealer] stresses, was very petty in terms of the arms
business: 'just a few misguided nuts in America, and a few
guns from Libya; thank God Gadaffi didn't really support
them seriously....'
Arms transfers to the Irish Republican Army have been
sufficient to ensure the continuation of low-level violence
in Northern Ireland. In the past sixteen years security
forces have seized nearly 9,000 weapons, over a million
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rounds of ammunition, and more than 100 tons of explosives.
However, what has been shipped to the insurgents may be of
less significance that what has not. It has long been within
the capability of any of the states identified as covert
patrons — Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union or Libya — to
supply GRAIL shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles to the
IRA. The same could be said regarding SAGGER wire-guided
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antitank missiles. The inescapable conclusion: so far,
at least, state-sponsored arms transfers to the IRA evidence
restraint.
No supplier has achieved significant influence over the
IRA as a result of arms transfers, nor has the IRA garnered
influence over suppliers. In the future, however, one or
more suppliers may be in a position to exert pressure on IRA
leaders. The IRA's relative affluence in past years has
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enabled them to diversify their sources of arms and
ammunition, affording them a measure of independence from any-
one supplier. If reports of reduced income are correct, and
they are forced to depend upon covert financial aid from
either nation-states or non-governmental organizations, the
Irish insurgents may have much less latitude in the future.
Thus, the extent of covert financial support is a key
assumption in any arms transfer analysis. If, for example,
IRA leaders perceive their objectives to be unattainable
without such funds, comensurate leverage could accrue to the
donor (s )
.
Most of the IRA's arms and ammunition were manufactured
in free world arms factories, and somehow made their way to
Northern Ireland. Some of these transfers required export
licenses, which were obtained by criminal means —
misrepresentation, bribery, and forgery. Many of the small
arms were legally purchased in the United States, then
smuggled to Ireland in small lots. These small arms
transactions exemplify the difficulties inherent in
attempting to assess arms transfers to the IRA. Taxonomies
based upon country of manufacture are rendered almost
meaningless by the possibility of (to name a few"* Palestine
Liberation Organization, Libyan, or Soviet-supplied covert
financial aid. With that caveat very much in mind, the
closing section of this paper will include suggestions for
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future research, based upon an assessment of (1) possible
sources of detailed arms transfer data, and (2) methodo-
logical challenges.
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IX. SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
A. POSSIBLE SOURCES OF ARMS TRANSFER INFORMATION
This thesis can perhaps best be described as a "scoping"
exercise, based entirely upon open source information. It
seems apparent, even from the limited amount of information
which is available to the public, that the current "troubles"
in Northern Ireland may be the best-documented case of arms
transfers to an insurgent group in the post-war era.
Figure 9, on the following page, reflects a number of
potential data sources, which are suggested by the open
source reports. The categories shown are, of course, not
mutually exclusive; for example, press and broadcast reports
are often based upon the other sources listed. Much of the
data is, expectedly, under the purview of security forces in
either the United Kingdom or the Irish Republic. Yet,
because arms transfers to the IRA are worldwide in scope,
there may be many additional sources of information. For
instance, reports detailing enroute seizures should be
available through Interpol, or from the countries where
confiscations took place — the United Kingdom, the Irish
Republic, the United States, France, Belgium, Austria, and
the Netherlands. The principal United States government
information sources include the Federal Bureau of Investigation;
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Capture/cache discovery reports and inventories
Enroute seizure reports -and inventories
IRA and/or supplier financial accounts
IRA and/or supplier correspondence
Explosive incident forensic reports
Ballistic test reports








Munitions production intelligence reports
Foreign broadcast reports
Press reports
Figure 9. Potential Sources of IRA
Arms Transfer Information
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U.S. Customs Service; the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization
Service; the Central Intelligence Agency; and the State
Department's Office of Munitions Control.
B. METHODOLOGICAL CHALLENGES
In his treatment of the thought processes of the analyst,
Richards Heuer identifies one of the many problems facing the
arms transfer researcher,
Ideally, intelligence analysts should recognize what
relevant evidence is lacking and be able to factor this
into their calculations, estimating the potential impact of
the missing data and adjusting confidence in their judgment
downward in recognition that key information is
unavailable. Unfortunately, this ideal may not be the
norm. "Out of sight, out of mind" may be a better^,
description of the impact of gaps in the evidence. *
Because of the analyst's availability, anchoring and over-
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confidence biases, there is more than a little risk of
"looking under the lamppost," and drifting into the implicit
assumption that the available data is, in fact, representa-
tive. When significant gaps are the norm, it may be worth
the effort to consciously assess the potential impact of
missing data. One possible approach would be to assign a
validity "weight" to the principal types of information; a
weight which takes into account both the source and the
topic, or arms transfer "event." Weights could be assigned
using some variant of expert judging, such as Delphi or
76
multiattribute utility. With this data in hand, the
analyst could construct a Bayesian map of the entire realm of
possible information sources and their validity, a counter-
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measure which may help him to resist the siren call of
quantity over quality. This procedure will result in
meaningful measures of face validity only to the extent that
the chosen arms transfer "events" reflect the research
77questions to be addressed.
Is it worth the trouble? The complexity of the task can
be inferred from the size of the matrix. The previously
discussed potential sources of information regarding arms
transfers have been arbitrarily grouped under five headings
on the horizontal axis of Table 1, on the following page.
The vertical axis of the matrix consists of eight arms
transfer "events" it may be useful to consider, if and when
data is available. They include (1) financing, (2) shopping,
(3) purchasing, (4) shipping, (5) training, (6) interception
enroute, (7) in-country capture/cache discovery, and
(8) operational use. With this scheme, 4-0 weights are
required. If Table 1 included validity weights, it would
depict what the analyst wants to find out (the events), where
the information might come from (the sources), and how
confident he should feel when he receives information from a
particular source about a particular class of event (the
validity weights'). If the analyst conceptualizes his task in
this way, it provides two useful reminders:
• bad reports don't get any better
just because there are a lot of them, and
• the whole can be greater than the sum of the parts

































































CU +J >< c





-Poh •P tH a.
•H (0 c -a CD
-P°H a u
CO -4-> O CU M
P-tH O JZ CD
CD C 1 u -P






























«c or s cn t— orarzcnb-LJcr: cn
58
C. AN "ARMS TRANSFER EVENT" DATA BASE
A more rigorous treatment of arms transfer-related reports
would be possible if the existing material were transformed
into an arms transfer data base, tailored to accommodate the
relevant attributes of the IRA data set. Table 1 identified
eight arms transfer "events" suggested by open source reports
of Irish Republican Army activity. Before building a unique
data base structure around these events, it is appropriate to
ask whether an existing arms transfer data base could
accommodate the insurgent case. In fact, there appears to be
no need to "reinvent the wheel." In Comparative Foreign
Policy Notes , Llewellyn Howell and Joyce Mullen describe a
promising "event" focused analytical approach,
While the concept of an 'international political event'
is well known among international relationists , the concept
of an 'arms transfer event' may not be. The basic purpose
for the creation of an arms transfer events database is to
aid foreign policy decision makers at the national level as
they evaluate the patterns, purposes and effects of inter-
national arms transfers. The international transfer of
arms, a seminal event which has military, economic, polit-
ical, and diplomatic implications, is a central issue for
both the supplying and receiving countries, and certainly
for those not directly involved in the transaction but who
are threatened by it. The transfer of arms is becoming an
increasingly important phenomenon in a world marked by both
a superpower nuclear standoff and persistent conflict among
developing countries. An arms transfer data set allows
decision makers to assess past and current patterns of
international arms transfers, guiding them in their
attempts to influence others, providing for their own
and/or their allies security, and controlling transfers
which may create or exacerbate conflict.
An arms transfer is actually a process rather than a
single discrete event but it can [be] separated in such a
way that its components are events in the same sense that a
meeting, a critical comment, or an attack by armed forces
are international political events. For our purposes, each
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component is an event, with an arms transfer process
therefore being a series of events.
In our conceptualization, twelve event codes delineate
the stages of an arms transfer (see the graphic depiction
of these codes below). The actual activities of the
transfer are represented by the nine connected blocks. The
three blocks to the right represent relevant opinions and
comments expressed by governmental or industrial officials
or representatives of the opposition, which may occur at
any or all stages of the transfer. The event codes
represent the distinct elements of an arms transfer process
and each can be reflected in a separate event record.
The event record is divided into two sections. The
analytical section consists of several fields in which
alpha and numeric codes are entered. These codes provide a
skeletal description of the action and include the
following information: date of the event, actor country (or
initiator of the action), event code, target country (or
"recipient of the action), domestic actor/target (groups or
individuals acting within their countries), issues, terms
of payment, and weapons systems or equipment types.
Sources and coder ID are also recorded in this section and
are important for editing and quality control. These
analytical fields are essential to data management although
they may never be viewed by the end user.
The second section of the data record — the narrative
summary — documents and enhances the information entered
in the analytical fields with details such as names,
titles, and interesting elements of the transfer. Unlike
the analytical field, the narrative field will be viewed
directly by the end user and therefore must easily be
clear, concise and informative.
The fact that the arms transfer process has been
converted into discrete and codified elements permits
computerization and instant availability. Analyses of the
data may be displayed in the form of graphic presentations,
tables with frequency counts, trend lines, and narrative
summaries of events. Aspects of particular interest may be
highlighted with geographic displays, icons and strategic
simulations. A current data set can provide decision
makers with instant access to a picture of the capabilities
of the world around them and become a key ingredient in































Figure 10. The Arms Transfer Event
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The data set does not presuppose any specific
hypotheses about international arms transfers. The data
fields for each event are designed to allow policy analysts
to aggregate these data in a manner which deals
specifically with their questions or problems. If the
policy problem involves a particular country, pair of
countries, weapons systems, or any other combination, the
analyst can sort the data and construct indicators for that
specific purpose.
Appendix D contains selected extracts from the Third Point
Systems arms transfer event Coding Handbook which explain in
detail the criteria associated with each of the data base
codes. While this data base was designed for state-to-state
transactions, with only minor modifications the Third Point
Systems arms transfer coding scheme could accommodate the
insurgent case.
Necessary changes include:
ACTOR COUNTRY: Add codes for non-governmental
organizations and private individuals
(no known affiliation with nation
state, multinational or international
organization)
DOMESTIC ACTOR: Add codes for non-governmental
organizations and security forces
ISSUES: Add OPERATIONAL USE
Add a GEOLOCATION field to 27 CAPTURE
Use 06 EQUIPMENT TRANSFERS for
SHIP/SMUGGLE
SYSTEMS: Add fields for SERIAL NO. and
COUNTRY OF MANUFACTURE
How many entries would an IRA arms transfer event data
base entail? The number of weapons seized since 1969 —
nearly 9,000 — indicates building such a data base may be a
major undertaking.
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D. A RECOMMENDED APPROACH
The design, construction, and maintenance of an arms
transfer event data base at the individual weapon/incident
level of detail would entail both direct costs and opportu-
nity costs for the builders. The first decision on whether
or not to proceed should be based upon an assessment which
weighs these burdens against likely benefits. If the only
result would be "more than you ever wanted to know about the
Irish Republican Army," then it is probably not worth the
effort. The crux appears to be, can models be derived which
are applicable in other insurgent cases?
Students and faculty at the Naval Postgraduate School may
be able to make a significant contribution to the development
of (an) arms transfer model (s) applicable to other insurgen-
cies in open societies. Because some information regarding
IRA arms transfers is protected by security classification, a
comprehensive arms transfer event data base can only be
compiled by researchers at the cognizant government agencies,
government contractors, and/or institutions like the Naval
Postgraduate School.
1 . Test for Generality
The transferability of insights gained through the develop-
ment of an Irisn Republican Army "insurgent case" arms
transfer event data base to other insurgent cases should not
be assumed. Rather, the extent to which the results of
research in the relatively data-rich IRA case may be
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applicable to other. ..insurgencies
-warrants rigorous investigation
before proceeding. The first undertaking, therefore, is to
test the hypothesis that arms transfers to insurgent groups
evidence common attributes. The list of potentially
analogous movements includes, but is obviously not limited
to:
Germany - Baader-MeinHof Gang (Red Army Faction)
Wehrsportgruppe (Military sports group) Hoffman
Japan - The Red Army (Sekigun)
Palestine - Black September
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
As-Sa'iqa (Thunderbolt)
Democratic Front for the Liberation of
Palestine
National Arab Youth for the Liberation of
Palestine
Black June (The Corrective Movement for Al
Fatah)
Argentina - Ejercito Revolucionario del Pueblo
Montoneros
France - Front de Liberation de la Bretagne - Armee
Revolutionaire Bretonne
Holland - Republik Malaku Selatan - Independent Republic
of the South Moluccas
Spain - Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna - Basque Land and
Liberty
Grupo de Resistencia Antifascista Primo de
Octubre - First of October Anti-Facist
Resistance Group
Guerrilleros Del Cristo Rey - Warriors of
Christ the King
Turkey - Turkish People's Liberation Army
Italy - Brigate Rosse - Red Brigades
Nuclei Armati Rivoluzionari - Armed
Revolutionary Nuclei
Egypt - Al TakfirQWal Higra (Atonement and Holy
Fight) /v
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The research should result in reasonably high confidence that
(a) widely applicable insurgent case arms transfer model (s)
can be developed before proceeding.
2. Assess Data Availability and Derivability
If the initial research, effort, tends- to support general-
ity, the second project should be a thorough scoping exercise
to determine the availability and derivability of relevant
data, and the prospects for future maintainability. The
derivability question offers opportunities for additional
computer science research efforts, aimed at developing the
means to "translate" data stored on magnetic media in various




After all relevant data sources and form(at) s have been
identified, a strategy for updating the arms transfer event
data base should be developed. Recommendations should
address both update frequency and data accuracy, and identify
various means which could be used to accomplish updates. The
research should encompass, as a related issue, the tasking of
intelligence collection resources and the functioning of
associated feedback mechanisms.
L . Estimate Construction and Maintenance Costs
For -each data source identified by researchers in steps
2 and 3, an estimate should be made of the man-years,
hardware, software, and other resoures required to (1) code




Data gathering should proceed only after all previous
steps have been accomplished, i.e., the project has been
judged widely applicable, data availability and derivability
have been thoroughly researched, and costs have been
estimated.
6. Analyze Data
With the existing data available in the form of an IRA
arms transfer event data base, the analyst could pursue an
exceptionally wide range of research. If, for example, the
information derived from physical evidence were complemented
by (1) munitions production intelligence from law enforcement
and intelligence community data bases and (2) U.S. export
license data from the State Department's Office of Munitions
Control, the data base might make it possible, in some cases,
to establish an audit trail to the country of manufacture.
Other promising avenues for future research include:
o What is the pattern of transnational
arms transfers to the IRA?
o Are trends apparent over time?
o Are there "leading indicators" which preceed
the introduction of a new capability?
o Does the transfer of certain munitions
have an "accelerator" effect on insurgency?
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SELECTED OPEN SOURCE REPORTS
IRISH REPUBLICAN ARMY
ARMS TRANSFERS
Prime Minister John Lynch May 5 [1970] dismissed Finance
Minister Charles J. Haughey and Agriculture Minister Neil T.
Blaney on charges of attempting to ship arms across the
border to Roman Catholics in Northern Ireland. Another
cabinet member, Kevin Boland, minister for local government
and social welfare, resigned in support of his two
colleagues
.
Announcing his action to a reconvened session of the
Dail Eireann (parliament) May 6, Lynch said he had received
information Apri.l 19-20 that Haughey and Blaney had been
linked with "alleged attempts to unlawfully import arms" for
reported transhipment to Northern Ireland. He said the two
ministers had twice refused his request to resign and he was
forced to oust them after news of the charges had leaked
out. Lynch assured parliament that "this was the only
intended importation of arms of the two members. These arms
have not been imported and have not been landed in this
country.
"
Lynch won a parliamentary vote of confidence (72-65)
May 7 on his handling of the crisis...
Kevin Boland told parliament May 8 that he had resigned
because he could not serve a government "whose leader kept
members under Gestapo surveillance." Boland accused Lynch of
establishing a special force in the police to spy on cabinet
ministers. [ Facts on File , 1970, pp. 354-355.]
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The new wing of the IRA needed guns. They went to the
Irish government for them and created an scandal that led to
the fall of three cabinet ministers and the two top Irish
Army intelligence officers.
The Dublin arms scandal began with a committee of the
government party, Fianna Fail, which was set up in 1 969 to
provide relief for the Catholics in the north and to promote
a worldwide propaganda campaign arguing the case for a united
Ireland.
The committee wound up involved in a $75,000 arms deal
for 800 Lugar pistols, Browning and Biretta automatic rifles,
Sterling submachine guns and 250,000 rounds of ammunition.
The plan called for smuggling them from Vienna into Dublin
airport.
British intelligence got wind of the deal and tipped off
Austrian police, who prevented the weapons from leaving the
country.
Two trails followed. One ended when the judge dismissed
the jury after he was challenged by the defense for biased
behavior from the bench. The second trial ended after a
speech by one of the defendants, a Provisional IRA officer,
which was applauded by a member of the jury. All of the men
charged in the case were acquitted.
By the time the final verdict came through in the fall of
1970, the Provisionals had other sources for guns and money.
[Jim Landers, "Running Guns to Ulster," The Washington Post
,
8 September 1974., section 2, p. 3.]
Ireland is trying to recover from a West German arms
dealer about $70,000 voted for relief operations in Northern
Ireland but diverted to buy weapons and ammunition, a
Government report said today [23 August 1972].
The report, by the Department of Finance, charged
financial juggling arising from the turmoil in Northern
Ireland, where the illegal Irish Republican Army is trying to
force the largely Protestant British province to join
Catholic Ireland.
The report does not say whom the weapons were destined
for, but there was speculation that they were intended for
the I.R.A. Nor does the report say that the arms were
delivered, but since the department is trying to get the
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money back it was assumed that at least some of the arms were
not delivered.
The report followed an investigation ordered by the Irish
Parliament into the spending of relief grants of 105,000
pounds, or $262,500, earmarked for Catholic victims of
rioting in Northern Ireland.
It said only $75,000 of this money had gone to relieve
distress in Northern Ireland. "About $85,000 was possibly
spent in Belfast, the capital of Northern Ireland."
But $102,000 was "not spent on the relief of distress."
Captain James Kelly, an Irish Army intelligence officer
who figured in a recent Dublin scandal over arms-smuggling
that involved leading politicians, told the inquiry he had
negotiated a contract for weapons with Otto Schluter of
Hamburg reputedly one of Europe ' s biggest private arms
dealers
.
According to the report, Captain Kelly said that $81,250
was set aside for the arms deal, of which $70,000 went to the
West German arms dealer.
Witnesses who testified included the Minister of
Agriculture, James Gibbons, and three former ministers,
Charles Haughey, Neil Blaney and Michael 0'Morain. Mr.
Haughey and Mr. Blaney were ousted by Prime Minister John
Lynch before the arms smuggling conspiracy trial of 1970.
Mr. 0'Morain resigned because of ill health. ["Dublin Says
Relief Funds for Ulster Went for Arms," The New York Times
24 August 1972, p. 3.
]
...A house-to-house search by troops in the area [the Falls
Road district of Belfast] July 4-5 [1972] resulted in the
seizure of 20,000 rounds of ammunition, more than 100 guns
and rifles, 25 pounds of explosives, about 100 incendiary
devices and an unspecified number of grenades. [ Facts on
File, 1970, p. 507.]
Large caches of bombs and explosives believed destined
for use by a dissident Irish Republican Army faction in
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Northern Ireland and England were uncovered by British police
in raids in London Aug. 13-U [1970] [ Facts on File , 1970,
p. 633.]
Faulkner announced March 30 [1971] an amnesty period
until April 8 for people returning illegal arms and
gelignite. Faulkner reported April 6 that more than 34-0 guns
and 20,000 rounds of ammunition had been turned in,
representing only a small fraction of privately held arms in
Northern Ireland.
British troops and police found caches of illegal arms in
predawn raids in Roman Catholic areas of Belfast April 3.
[ Facts on File , 1971, p. 279.]
As part of a campaign to curb the activities of the
outlawed Irish Republican Army (IRA), the Dail Eireann
(parliament) unamimously approved a bill June 9 [1971]
restricting the purchase and carrying of arms. The law
specifically banned the holding of arms designed to be used
beyond Ireland's frontier. This was viewed as an attempt to
halt the illicit traffic of arms to Northern Ireland.
Justice Minister Desmond 0'Malley said the main purpose
of the bill was to authorize energetic government action
against armed clandestine groups. He said the police would
halt such IRA activities as recent marches through the
capital. The bill provided for an amnesty to arms holders
who yielded their weapons before the law's enforcement.
[ Facts on File , 1971, p. 4-56.]
Dutch police seized a 3 1/2-ton cargo of Czechoslovak-
made arms and ammunition on a Belgian charter plane at an
Amsterdam airport Oct. 16 [1971]. The arms were flown from
Prague and were thought to be destined for the Irish
Republican Army in Northern Ireland.
The Official Czechoslovak press agency CTK Oct. 18
described as "without foundation" reports that Czechoslovakia
had sent or sold the arms. [ Facts on File , 1971, p. 820.]
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According to the official Dutch News Agency, Mr. Winslow
[Special Branch Chief Inspector] and his colleagues flew to
Amsterdam to help question Mr. E.A. Konig , the American arms
dealer held by Dutch police, who was the only passenger on
board the Belgian-owned charter plane when it arrived at
Schiphol airport.
Had the arms consignment not been accompanied by
documents containing an irregularity, there would have been
nothing that the Dutch authorities could have done to stop
them passing through Holland on their way to their
destination. But the Dutch had been tipped off that there
was something odd about the consignment.
A scrutiny of the waybill revealed that the arms,
including sub-machineguns , rifles and rocket launchers, as
well as ammunition, were consigned to a British company with
an address in London. This information was flashed to
Scotland Yard, who checked out the firm — named as Wendamont
Ltd. of City Road.
The arms were to have been moved by lorry from the
airport to the coast, then by sea, ostensibly to Britain. It
is well known that Dutch coasters have been involved in
international arms smuggling.
Gelignite in the Republic of Ireland has been taken out
of private hands and is now held by the Army in a Dublin
magazine. The transfer has been effected by the Army and
police in secret over a number of days.
In future any firm or county council using gelignite will
have to obtain supplies from the Government and use it under
police supervision.
The round-up of gelignite coincides with the circulation
of a new Bill by the Government which provides much stricter
control over explosives.
The Bill, which will come before the Dail in the winter
session, provides that everyone importing, manufacturing,
storing or selling explosives must be licensed. [Peter
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Hopkirk, "Foreign Office Waits for Special Branch Report on
Arms Haul in Holland," The Times of London , 18 October 1971,
p. 2. ]
The incident bears all the hallmarks of an Omnipol job.
International arms dealers report that this is not the first
time that Czech arms have gone to Ireland. The supplies come
from the State-owned Omnipol organisation in Prague, who
specialise in supplying subversive organisations and
guerrilla groups.
Omnipol is the sales organisation for the Czechoslovak
arms factory at Brno. [Anthony Terry, "Arms Plane Held in





Irish Republic customs officials seized six suitcases of
weapons thought to be destined for Ulster's IRA from luggage
taken off the liner, Queen Elizabeth 2, in the port of Cobh
Oct. 19 [1971]. [ Facts on File , 1971, p. 820.]
Arms and ammunition, including rifles, machineguns, and
hand grenades were found in luggage brought ashore from the
Cunard liner Queen Elizabeth 2 at Cork today.
It was later learnt that the arms included at least eight
modern lightweight automatic rifles with telescopic sights.
There were also about 20 hand grenades and much ammunition.
[Christopher Warman, "Arms Are Found in QE2 Luggage at Cork,"
The Times of London
,
20 October 1971, p. 1.J
Another route out for the weapons he [McMullen] said,
"was through passenger luggage aboard the luxury liner QE2
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Two IRA men were crew members who took care of seven
suitcases every two weeks.
"An Irish customs agent in Cork would be given the claim
numbers on the tickets, and he would take care of them — put
them aside. But he could only watch them for a certain
period of time before he had to turn them in as unclaimed.
If he didn't, then he'd be implicated.
"Well Joe Cahill screwed that route up by simple neglect.
He didn't show to claim the suitcases. The weapons were
found, wrapped in New York Times newspapers, and of course,
they still had serial numbers on them. The guns were traced
to a store in New York and the buyers were traced from
there. That resulted in a well-known case in America known
as "The Fort Worth Five." [Andrew Blake, "The American
Connection: Running Guns to the IRA," The Washington Post
,
4. September 1979, p. 13.]
The army discovered arms caches throughout the province
in a series of raids Nov. 4-9 [1971]. Fifty-two persons were
detained for questioning in Belfast Nov. 4 during house-to-
house raids that also netted sizable quantities of arms,
ammunitions and explosives. The army reported Nov. 6 the
discovery of a bomb factory in Carrickmore in County Tyrone.
According to figures released Nov. 9, arms searches in
1971 had netted 62,121 rounds of ammunition and 369 weapons,
of which 124 were rifles and 10 were machineguns. [ Facts on
File , 1971, p. 877.]
Troops and policemen today [15 November 1971] made their
biggest and most successful arms raid in Northern Ireland on
a farmhouse in county Antrim.
Reports say their find included 54 weapons, an anti-tank
gun, and 11,000 rounds of ammunition.
Among weapons discovered today were an anti-tank gun, one
Thompson sub-machine gun, an M1 American carbine, 19 assorted
American carbine rifles, 28 shotguns and five pistols and
revolvers.
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The arms were ingeniously hidden. A furniture van with a
secret compartment capable of hiding up to six men was found.
The discovery included many Belgian-made shotgun cartridges
capable of killing at up to 100 yards. ["Army Find 54-
Weapons in Raid on Farmhouse," The Times of London , 16
November, 1971), p. 2.]
Britain, meanwhile, has accused Czechoslovakia of
attempting to supply arms to the Irish Republican Army in
Northern Ireland. As a result, the Czechoslovak Foreign
Minister, Jan Marko, has called off an official visit to
London. [James Feron, "Prague is Uneasy on Election's Eve,"
The New York Times , 26 November 1971, p. 20.]
The flow of information to the army has steadily
increased, with the result that more caches of explosives and
arms have been discovered. Much of the information,
anonymous but accurate, comes, intelligence believes, from
Roman Catholics weary of the fighting.
The chief logistics advantage of the I.R.A. is the state
of the border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of
Ireland to the south.
The border could be closed on the northern side as the
Communists have closed the border between Eastern and Western
Europe. But the idea of a frontier guarded by watchtowers,
minefields and pillboxes is repugnant to the British.
The army contends that adequate cooperation from the
south would greatly reduce the traffic in explosives and
arms. But the Republic has shown no willingness to provide
adequate security on its side of the border. [Drew
Middleton, "British Army Feels Tactics in Ulster Are
Succeeding," The Iflew lork Times , 24 December 1971, p. 3.
J
The Minister of Justice, Desmond O'Malley, announced
today [20 February 1972] that the Attorney General would
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order certain persons who had been freed by "inexplicable"
court decisions to be placed on trial.
This was seen here [Dublin] as a reference to the case of
seven men, allegedly members of the illegal Irish Republican
Army, who appeared before a court at Dundalk on
arms-smuggling charges last week. The charges were dismissed
because of insufficient evidence.
The Prime Minister, John Lynch, confirmed in a radio
interview that the Attorney General had decided to intervene
in certain cases. He declined to identify the cases but said
he thought most people would know which they were. ["Ireland
to Order Arms Case Trial," The New York Times , 21 February
1972, p. 8.]
British soldiers raided a house in the Roman Catholic
Ardoyne district of Belfast and uncovered an arms cache that
included 16 pounds of gelignite, 29 detonators, fuses, timing
devices and a number of rifles, shotguns and pistols.
["Northern Ireland Pushes Hunt in Restaurant Blast Fatal to
2," The New York Times , 6 March 1972, p. 8.]
Three men were expected to appear before the Special
Criminal Court in Dublin today [30 April 1972] after the
discovery of a big Provisional IRA arms dump about 18 miles
north of the city. Police said it was the largest arms
discovery in the Irish Republic during the present troubles
It included mortars, rockets, grenades and complex
machinery apparently used to manufacture all three types of
weapon. The haul is so big that police say it will take a
few days to categorize it and disclose the details.
It was discovered by a police patrol in the shed of an
old farmhouse in the remote hamlet of Donabare.
Although the discovery is understood to have been made
late on Monday afternoon, for security reasons no details
were disclosed until a brief statement yesterday. The
factory appeared to have been one of the Provisional IRA's
main manufacturing and transport points for its guerrilla
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campaign in the North. [Christopher Walker, Eire Police Find
Big IRA Arms Dump," The Times of London , 30 April 1972,
p. 1.]
Qaddafi announced June 11 [1972] that Libya supported the
Irish Republican Army (IRA) and was supplying it with money,
arms and volunteers to fight British occupation forces in
Northern Ireland. He supplied no further details on the
nature of the aid. Qaddafi made the disclosure in a speech
marking the second anniversary of the evacuation of U.S.
forces from Wheelus Air Force Base in Libya.
Accusing Britain of handing over Palestine to the Jews in
194-8 and of permitting Iran to occupy three Persian Gulf
Islands in 1971, Qaddafi vowed he would pursue British
imperialism everywhere, even "in her own home." [ Facts on
File , 1972, p. 439.]
Attorney General Richard G. Kleindienst has ordered a
Federal grand jury investigation here [Fort Worth] into the
alleged smuggling of American arms into Northern Ireland to
supply the Irish Republican Army.
The inquiry reportedly focused here because of reports
that some of the weapons supplied the I.R.A. were purchased
in north-central Texas and because of the high regard in
which Attorney General Kleindienst holds Mr. Mahon and Judge
Brewster. ["U.S. Jury Focuses on Guns for I.R.A.," The New
York Times , 25 June 1972, p. 17.]
The tide of illicit armaments and explosives for sale
throughout the world to any terrorist or fanatic is becoming
a genuine menace. It is particularly difficult to control in
Europe where smuggling is relatively easy and one country's
gun control laws can be undermined by its neighbor's laxity.
In one of the more bizarre alliances of current politics,
President Qaddafi of Libya claims to have supplied the Irish
Republican Army with guns. On present evidence, that claim
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can neither be proved nor disproved. Perhaps the real point
of the episode is that automatic weapons are now sufficiently
available in Europe that no Irish terrorist need depend on
North Africa for supplies.
Most of the small arms now in commerce among illegal
dealers can, regrettably, be traced back to one or another of
the great power blocs. In Northern Ireland, the IRA is well
equipped with, chiefly, British and American weapons. At
Lydda airport, in Israel, the Japanese assassins had Czech
submachine guns.
Although current terrorism in Europe has been far more
limited than in Ireland or in the Middle East, there has been
enough of it to make law and order a very sensitive political
issue. After the most extensive manhunt in their postwar
history, the West Germans have succeeded in arresting the
leaders of the small but spectacular Baader-Meinhof group, a
band of well-armed political radicals who for two years
pursued a wild campaign of explosions and robberies. The
anarchist with a bomb is not currently considered a joke in
Germany. In Italy, police have been carrying out an
unprecedented series of raids on political movements of the
far right and left, seizing a remarkable array of armaments.
In addition to machine guns and submachine guns, the
inventory runs to thousands of rifles and pistols, and tons
of explosives. Most of the weapons are of obvious military
design.
Some European countries have been permitting the open
sale of semiautomatic weapons under the fiction that they are
sporting arms. Some arms factories sell only to governments
but avoid the questions of whether, or to whom, those
governments might resell the goods. As for bombs, modern
explosives are easy to manufacture and they are sufficiently
widely used in industry that they are very easily obtained.
The current market in contraband military armaments has a
good deal in common with the traffic in drugs. For many
years a few governments covertly encouraged the distribution
of drugs, and many tacitly tolerated it. There is always a
certain profit, political or otherwise, to be extracted from
the vices of other people who live in other places. But
suddenly over the past decade the use of drugs spread vastly
and the danger began to compel governments to undertake
serious enforcement.
Even very vigorous policing probably cannot entirely stop
the illegal traffic in military weapons, for a great many are
already in circulation. But policing can make it much harder
and more expensive to find them. It would be ironic if, when
nations could agree on controlling nuclear missiles, they
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could not cooperate to disarm terrorists. For guns, as for
drugs, control begins with the manufacturers. In the case of
guns, the manufacturers are well known. ["Arms and the
Terrorists," The Washington Post , 27 June 1972, editorial,
p. 16.]
Explaining his resort to stronger military action,
William Whitelaw, British administrator for Northern Ireland,
announced July 14. [1972] that rocket launchers had been used
for the first time in the area the previous day. He said he
had ordered the soldiers to "respond with action to control
the areas from which the attacks were launched and to protect
themselves and the civil population." Defense Secretary Lord
Carrington also said July 14 that the use of rocket launchers
represented a "considerable escalation of violence" and
warned that Northern Ireland was on the brink of disaster.
[ Facts on File , 1972, p. 560.]
Although officials in the Justice, Treasury and State
Departments are reluctant to talk about the investigation in
any detail, several have indicated that it began in Northern
Ireland recently with the appearance of a semi-automatic
rifle called the AR-180 in the hands of I.R.A. terrorists.
The AR-180 is manufactured in Japan for the Armalite
Corporation of Costa Mesa, Calif. The entire Japanese
production is reportedly shipped to the United States, where
the light-weight, aluminium-frame weapon has a ready market
among sportsmen and, to an extent, police departments.
According to the Office of Munitions Control in the State
Department, only 138 foreign export licenses have been issued
to Armalite for shipping the AR-180 outside the country.
About half of these licenses were for shipment to gun dealers
in Italy, 22 were for Britain, and the rest were scattered
among dealers in a handful of other nations.
Since the bitter, triangular hostilities erupted in
1969 — involving I.R.A. gunmen, the British Army and
Protestant extremists — 11 AR-180s have been seized from the
I.R.A. by British troops and the Royal Ulster Constabulary.
Several of the seized Armalites were traced back to purchases
made from local gun dealers in the United States, according
to the Constabulary headquarters. [James M. Markham,
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"Gun-Running Case in U.S. Embitters I.R.A. Supporters," The
New York Times , 17 July 1972), p. 1.]
...Troops of the Gordon Highlanders uncovered a cache today
[29 July 1972] in woods near Lurgan and confiscated 100
pounds of explosives, 12 grenades, 1,500 rounds of
ammunition, two rifles, a shotgun and a ,4.5-caliber
revolver. ["Hotel Man Killed in Belfast; Senator's House Set
Afire," The New York Times , 29 July 1972, p. 3.]
The army claimed Aug. 1 [1972] that arms searches since
the assaults on the "no-go" areas had netted massive amounts
of IRA weapons in Belfast and Londonderry, including an
antitank gun, a heavy machinegun, rifles, shotguns,
ammunition and materials used to make bombs. [ Facts on
File , 1972, p. 598.]
The 5th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals Aug. 3 [1972]
upheld contempt of court sentences imposed in June on five
witnesses [Kenneth Tierney, Paschal Morahan, Daniel Crawford,
Thomas Laffey and Mathias Reilly] for refusing to testify to
a Fort Worth grand jury about alleged gun smuggling to the
IRA in Ulster. The five had been jailed in June. [ Facts on
File , 1972, p. 617.]
A federal grand jury in New York City Aug 29 [1972]
indicted a gun dealer, Edward Agramonte, for illegally
possessing, selling and dealing in guns, ammunition and other
weapons. Unidentified sources said Agramonte was under
investigation in connection with the alleged IRA gun
smuggling plot, the New York Times reported Aug. 30. [ Facts
on File , 1972, p. 794-]
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Five men known as the "Fort Worth Five" [Kenneth Tierney,
Paschal Morahan, Daniel Crawford, Thomas Laffey and Mathias
Reilly] were freed from a Texas jail Sept. 24 [1972] after
being imprisoned since June for refusing to testify before a
Fort Worth grand jury about an alleged plot to smuggle guns
to the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in Northern Ireland.
[Facts on File, 1972, p. 794-1
At least half of the 16 anti-tank rockets fired by the
Provisional IRA within the past 48 hours were manufactured in
the Soviet Union, but the Army is by no means certain that
the Russians or even Soviet block countries sent them to
Ireland.
The IRA went to some lengths to obliterate the markings
on the 14 1/2 lb RPG-7 launchers before using them. Thick
black paint covered code letters.
Most Eastern European countries are unlikely to
incriminate themselves directly with the transport of arms to
Ireland. It seems more likely that they were sent from one
of the North African countries such as Egypt or Libya, which
are known to have used Russian weapons. Colonel Gaddafi, the
Libyan President, said in June that his country was sending
arms, money and equipment to the IRA.
The Army today exhibited the Soviet launcher and
projectile captured at a road checkpoint in Londonderry
yesterday. They were made in 1970 in the Soviet Union
although the manufacturer's name had been filed off. [Robert
Fisk, "IRA Rockets are Made in Russia," The Times of London
,
30 November 1972, p. 1.]
...For all that, the IRA was able to mount a new rash of
rocket attacks in Ulster last week. Angry British
intelligence sources accused Soviet agents of supplying the
rocket launchers, and the British Foreign Office made a grim
request for Russian cooperation in tracing how the Soviet
rockets got to Northern Ireland.
...Even weapons and gelignite now can no longer be safely
stored in friendly homes, and they are often buried in fields
instead.
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...IRA insiders already concede that their sources of money
and support from conservative Irish-Americans have dried up,
and doors are slamming shut throughout Ireland as well.
"There was once a saying that an Irishman might not vote for
the IRA man but he would give him food, shelter and pray for
him," observes one IRA watcher, "Now it's an open question
whether he'd even pray for him." ["Dublin Puts the Squeeze
on the IRA," Newsweek , 18 December 1972), p. 47-4-8.]
The official Soviet news agency Tass Dec. 11 [1972]
denied reports of Moscow's involvement in the Northern
Ireland conflict. The statement, however, did not disclaim
the specific charge that Soviet-made RPG-7 rocket launchers
had been supplied to the IRA. The Soviet Government Dec. 20
refused a British request to help track down the source of
the rockets. [ Facts on File , 1972, p. 1063.]
The official Soviet news agency Tass Dec. 11 [1972]
denied reports of Moscow's involvement in the Northern
Ireland conflict. The statement, however, did not disclaim
the specific charge that Soviet-made RPG-7 rocket launchers
had been supplied to the IRA. The Soviet Government Dec. 20
refused a British request to help track down the source of
the rockets. [ Facts on File , 1972, p. 1063.]
The current IRA campaign carried on by the Provisional
wing of the revolutionary underground is particularly notable
because of the way it reveals distinctive Irish factors
against the background of the widespread guerrilla phenomena
of our times. It is an example of how quickly and with what
little input of ordnance a guerrilla tradition can be made
operational where that tradition has a long history and
strong emotional supports
.
In terms of weaponry, the IRA has until recently worked
with the traditional pistols, rifles and gelignite
memorialized in the fights of the 1920s. Some newer machine
guns have replaced the venerable Thompson sub-machine guns
88
first acquired from the earliest production in the U.S.
High-powered rifles with telescopic sights have added to the
deadliness of sniper fire. The recent addition of rockets,
however, represents a breakthrough in ordnance of great
significance. The rockets, probably procured via Eastern
Europe, are the most radical and effective innovation in
guerrilla armament in this century. They place the IRA on a
footing with the Viet Cong and the Arab commandos in
firepower, and make possible the striking of compounds in
which the massive counter-insurgency forces hole up between
sweeps.
On the strength of its successful bombing campaign, and
its relatively successful mining of roads, the IRA came very
close to dominating the major urban areas of Northern
Ireland. Its limitations have been largely technological,
having to do with the kind of explosives available and the
minimal weaponry it could use. [Dennis Clark, "Which Way the
I.R.A.?" Commonweal
, 5 January 1973, pp. 294-297.]
Five Irish-born New Yorkers [Kenneth Tierney, Paschal
Morahan, Daniel Crawford, Thomas Laffey and Mathias Reilly]
resumed their indefinite sentences in a Fort Worth, Texas
jail Jan. 29 [1973] with a warning from U.S. Attorney Frank
McCowan that they would remain there until they cooperated
with a grand jury investigation into alleged gun smuggling to
Northern Ireland. The five had been jailed for several
months in 1972. According to the New York Times Jan. 31 » the
U.S. Supreme Court had refused to hear the appeal of an
appellate court decision against the defendants. [ Facts on
File
, 1973, p. 123.]
The Irish Republic Navy intercepted a West German-owned
Cyprus-registered ship off County Waterford on the southeast
coast of Ireland March 28 [1973 J and seized five tons of arms
and ammunition destined for the Provisional Irish Republican
Army (IRA)
. Security forces called the incident the biggest
arms smuggling plot uncovered in the Irish Republic during
the civil unrest that started in Ulster in 19o9.
The ship, the 298-ton coaster Claudia, had begun its
voyage at Cyprus. Most of the arms and ammunition were of
Russian and East European manufacture.
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The government did not disclose the actual port of
loading, however, Guenther Leinhaeuser , a convicted West
German arms smuggler who identified himself April 2 as the
"middle man" in what he said was an arms deal between Libya
and the IRA, said the arms had been loaded off the Libyan
coast outside Libyan territorial waters. He said the deal
had involved 100 tons of arms worth more than $1 million, but
disclaimed knowledge of what happened to the missing 95
tons. Leinhaeuser and his wife owned 90% of the Claudia.
[ Facts on File , 1973, p. 368.]
On March 15, 1973, Captain Hans-Ludwig Fleugal, master of
the 289-ton Cyprus based coaster Claudia, watched from his
ship's rail as nine soldiers in uniform of the Libyan Army
staggered under the weight of five tons of arms and
explosives
.
The weapons, including Russian A/+7 service rifles, were
loaded into the Claudia's hold — ironically only a few
hundred yards from where the Union Jack fluttered over the
British embassy on the Tripoli waterfront — under the eyes
of Mr. Joe Cahill, one of the Provisional IRA's Army Council
from Dublin. In the hot afternoon, with Mr. Cahill aboard,
the Claudia chugged out into the Mediterranean, escorted by
naval vessels of the Libyan Arab Republic on the first stage
of its highly illegal voyage to Ireland.
That, at least, is Captain Fleugal 's account of the start
of the Claudia affair, and is remarkable because it is the
only eyewitness evidence to be made public of Colonel
Gaddafi's involvement with the IRA. British submarines
apparently shadowed the Claudia all the way to Ireland where,
two miles off Helvic Head in Co. Cork, she was stopped by
minesweepers of the Irish Naval Service. [Robert Fisk, "The
Role Libya Sees for Itself in the Irish Struggle," The Times
of London , 21 April 1975, p. H.]
The Claudia's voyage to Ireland began at Cyprus and
included calls at Tunis, Cadiz and Gibraltar. Though most of
the arms and ammunition were of Soviet and East European
make, the actual port of loading has not been disclosed.
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The cargo, under Army supervision at Cork, Ireland,
included 250 rifles, 250 pistols, 25,000 rounds of
ammunition, 200 anti-tank and antipersonnel mines, 500 pounds
of gelignite, 300 grenades and quantities of TNT, fuses and
detonators
.
It was reported from Cork that some of the cases were
marked "Tripoli." ["Ireland's Navy Seizes Vessel with Arms
for I.R.A." The New York Times, 30 March 1973, p. 3.]
...The vessel was carrying 15 tons of arms from Libya.
[Bernard Weinraub, "I.R.A. Aid Unit in the Bronx Linked to
Flow of Arms,"
p. 16.]
The New York Times , 16 December 1975,
The last dramatic seizure of a gun-running vessel in
Irish waters occurred in 1973 when the motor vessel Claudia,
carrying five tons of arms from Libya, was intercepted off
the southeast coast.
The Libyan source of supply to the IRA dried up soon
after, and since then the overwhelming bulk — perhaps 80
percent — of IRA arms has come from the U.S., which is also
the organization's main source of funds.
However, the authorities know that shipments like these
represent only a small proportion of the arms and ammunition
brought in illegally over the past 14- years. Usually they
are smuggled in cargo containers into ports in the Irish
Republic and later transferred in small lots across the
border into Northern Ireland. [James Downey, "Ireland Deals
Blow to U.S. -IRA Connection," Christian Science Monitor
,
4 October 1984, p. 9.
]
...The army also uncovered caches of arms and explosives in
Belfast and detained three men.
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The army said Mr. Hughes [the second member of the
Officials killed in three days] was in a group of men found
loading weapons into a car. ["Explosion Damages a Church in
Ulster; Soldier is Wounded," The New York Times , 11 April
1973, p. U.]
Britain has suspended the sale to Libya of any arms that
"could conceivably be re-exported for use by the Irish
Republican Army."
A German vessel, the Claudia, was intercepted off the
Irish coast two weeks ago with five tons of arms loaded in
Tripoli, Libya, for use by the I.R.A.
The British Ambassador, Peter Tripp, informed Foreign
Ministry officials in Tripoli yesterday that London wanted a
satisfactory explanation of "circumstantial reports" of
Libya's involvement in the affair. ["Britain Cuts Arms to
Libya," The New York Times
, U April 1973, p. 3.]
Security forces seized almost a ton of arms, ammunition
and explosives from a British ship that arrived in Dublin
harbor from Montreal, Canada July 16 [1973]. The arms,
mostly U.S. or Swedish-made, were thought headed for the IRA
in Northern Ireland. An Irish Canadian, John P.D. Murphy,
was charged the following day in Dublin's Special Criminal
Court with illegally importing the arms. [ Facts on File ,
1973, p. 657.]
Policemen and troops seized almost a ton of arms,
ammunition and explosives on a British ship that arrived here
[Dublin] from Montreal today.
The arms — 17 rifles, 29,000 rounds of ammunition and
about 60 pounds of gunpowder — were found in one of 51
containers aboard the cargo vessel Manchester Vigor. The
police picked out the container with the arms as soon as they
boarded the ship.
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Police sources said that the consignment was believed to
be intended for the militant Provisional wing of the Irish
Republican Army and had probably been sent by Irishmen in the
United States or Canada. Most of the rifles were made in the
United States or Sweden. ["Ton of Arms Seized from Ship in
Dublin," The New York Times, 17 July 1973, p. 17.]
The "Fort Worth 5" [Kenneth Tierney, Paschal Morahan,
Daniel Crawford, Thomas Laffey, and Mathias Reilly]
imprisoned in a Fort Worth, Texas jail, were freed on bail
for the second time and returned to New York City Aug. 14.
[19731.
The five, who had refused to testify to a grand jury
about alleged gun smuggling to Northern Ireland, were
released on bonds of $5 , 000-$1 5 ,000. Bail had been ordered
set by U.S. Supreme Court Justice William 0. Douglas Aug.
10. [ Facts on File , 1973, p. 740.]
U.S. Federal Judge Leo Brewster dismissed contempt
charges against the five Irish-Americans known as the "Fort
Worth 5" [Kenneth Tierney, Paschal Morahan, Daniel Crawford,
Thomas Laffey, and Mathias Reilly] Nov. 7 [1973], one day
after the term of the grand jury before which they had
refused to testify had expired. [ Facts on File , 1973,
p. 1028.]
A Federal judge has denied motions urging the release of
a Vietnam veteran [Robert K. Meisel, Jr.] held in custody
since June 25 for refusing to testify before a Federal grand
jury here [San Francisco] on alleged gun-running to the Irish
Republican Army.
Mr. Meisel, a house painter, was originally called to
testify along with 10 other persons in October 1972, shortly
after a trunk of arms and ammunition was discovered at London
airport.
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In the interim, Charles Malone, in whose house Mr. Meisel
had lived for a while, was indicted for Federal firearms
violations in connection with rifle shipments to the I.R.A.
He pleaded guilty and received a suspended sentence and a
year's probation.
Da°vid P. Bancroft, Assistant United States Attorney,
said, however, that the grand jury was still interested in
asking Mr. Meisel questions about an August, 1972 trip he
allegedly made to New York with two other individuals to
deliver guns and explosives, and about whether he "ever, wit:
others, received any explosives from Butte, Mont." ["I.R.A.
Case Suspect Denied Release," The New York Times , 7 October
1973, p. 80.]
The five individuals subpoenaed from Butte to testify
here [San Francisco] a year ago denied any involvement in
illegal activities.
Their attorney, William Murphy of San Francisco, said
Lieut. Michael Sullivan and Deputy Lieut. Morris Mulcahy of
the Butte Police Department "were asked if they planned to
rob the National Guard Armory in Butte" and ship the
confiscated weapons to Ireland.
Mr. Murphy said Mr. Sullivan was also asked if he had
talked with Ken Cunningham, sheriff of Silver Bow County,
"about getting machine guns from the sheriff" for shipment to
Ireland. Mr Murphy said that Mr. Cunningham was asked "if
packages of arms had been shipped by him and if he had ever
discussed machine guns" with a man Mr. Murphy declined to
name
.
The investigation originated when a trunk full of arms
broke open at London's Heathrow Airport, on June 1, 1972.
According to the Malone indictment, the trunk was addressed
to Maumeen, Letermore, County Galway, Ireland and contained
two rifles, three pistols and 350 rounds of ammunition. One
of the rifles, a .44 caliber Luger carbine, was traced to Mr.
Malone, who had purchased it on May 23. ["Arms Query Grand
Jury Role," The New York Times , 28 October 1973, p. 9.]
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A Federal grand jury here [Baltimore] indicted five men
today [2 April 1974] on charges of conspiring to smuggle arms
and ammunition to the Irish Republican Army.
The men, three from Maryland [Kiernan F. McMahon, William
Westerlund, and Francis M. Larkin] and two from Ireland
[Henry Hillick and James Conlon], were charged on 23 counts
with shipping 175 semi-automatic rifles, several thousand
machine guns, and 20,000 rounds of ammunition to the
underground I.R.A.
The operation took place, according to the indictment,
between March 1973 and Feb. 14 of this year. ["5 Said to
Attempt to Run Arms to I.R.A.," The New York Times , 3 April
1974, p. 30.]
The British Army announced yesterday [23 October 1974]
that it had captured a two-truck arms convoy in what it said
was a major blow to the Irish Republican Army. Discovery of
the trucks, which contained mortars, primed incendiaries,
submachine guns and explosives, coincided with the opening of
a major security operation by police and soldiers to protect
Catholic neighborhoods from roving Protestant militants.
[ The New York Times , 24 October 1974, p. 3.]
US Army field manuals which describe in detail how to
construct dozens of different types of terrorist weapons are
openly on sale in Britain. Army intelligence has confirmed
that these books form the basis of IRA terrorist training in
Ireland
.
The books give details on explosives, timing and delay
devices, incendiaries, booby traps, corrosive materials,
basic doctrines and planning. They include full construction
details, with diagrams, on many weapons already familiar to
the British through the IRA campaign, including letter bombs,
pipe bombs, nail bombs, wristwatch timing devices and
"come-on" bombs (where a small explosion is followed shortly
after by a larger one designed to explode when the area is
crowded). [Peter Chippindale, "Do-it-Yourself Bomb Manuals,"
The Manchester Guardian , 11 January 1975, p. 5.]
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Belgian police will this week ask British, authorities to
provide the missing link in the evidence against two men
suspected of arms trafficking from Brussels to Northern
Ireland. The men, Cesaire Dauwe and Simon Wanjtal, were
arrested this month after buying large quantities of arms
from a highly respected Brussels dealer.
The link would be established if numbers on pistols,
seized in recent Belfast raids, correspond with those
recorded in the Brussels shop.
Last June Paul Binet, arms dealer in the fashionable Rue
Royale, had a visit from a man calling himself Rouvrier, but
who was in fact 4-4-year old Dauwe, who had once been in
prison for gun-running from France to Germany. Dauwe ordered
12 pistols and said he represented the African Ambassador of
Mali. "I often get requests for guns to defend embassies,"
said Binet.
"Rouvrier" returned a few days later with the cash and
papers needed for buying the guns, complete with the seal of
Mali. With him was the "embassy chauffeur," Simon Wajntal, a
Pole aged about 50, retired coal miner from Leige where he
was known in the underground as a blower of safes
.
...But by then the two arrested men had bought 600 guns, most
of which police believe were sent to the IRA. [Denis
Herbstein, "Continental Gun-Running Clues Sought in Belfast,"
The Times of London , 19 January 1975, p. 6.]
An Army judge today [11 March 1975] ordered a psychiatric
examination of a young lieutenant accused of plotting to
murder a fellow officer and steal six tons of Army weapons
for sale to the Irish Republican Army.
Col. Thomas Nichols ordered the examination of Lieut.
Mark Kohn, 22 years old, of Queens, as the military court
considered several pre-trial motions to dismiss the charges.
The court was to consider the defense motions and then
postpone trial pending completion of the mental examination.
Lieutenant Kohn is charged with soliciting a fellow
military policeman, Sgt. Emmett Snellgrove, during a taped
telephone conversation Jan. 9 to join him in blasting into
the arms cache at Fort Myer, Va. — where both were station-
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ed — steal arms and kill the officer in charge with an ice
pick.
Colonel Nichols read into the record the conclusion of a
private psychiatrist, Dr. Eric Reinhardt, who examined
Lieutenant Kohn after the conversation.
The psychiatrist said that the officer's remarks during
the taped conversation were "fantasies in the average range
of people hurt, left out, cheated or treated unfairly. These
fantasies of revenge read like a bad movie script and are
totally incapable of being carried out," he said. ["Mental
Test Asked in Army Plot Case," The New York Times , 12 March
1975, p. 35.]
BALTIMORE. May 23 — Four men, three of them from the
Washington area, [Henry Hillick, James Conlon, Kiernan
Francis McMahon, and Francis Michael Larkin ] were convicted
in U.S. District Court here today of conspiring to smuggle
weapons to the Irish Republic Army and of violating federal
gun control laws.
Among the items the men purchased for shipment to the IRA
in Northern Ireland were 158 AR-15 semi-automatic rifles,
which are capable of firing single shots or short bursts.
The AR-15 has many similarities to the M-16, the basic
infantry weapon used by U.S. troops in Vietnam.
In addition to purchasing the AR-15 rifles, the four were
convicted of buying seven handguns, more than 10,000 rounds
of ammunition and six blasting caps. [Jim Landers, "4 Guilty
in IRA Gun Case," The Washington Post , 24 May 1974, section
3, p. 1.]
BALTIMORE. July 9 (UPI) — Four men [Henry Hillick, James
Conlon, Kiernan Francis McMahon, and Francis Michael Larkin]
accused of smuggling guns to the Irish Republican Army were
sentenced to six years in prison today, despite pleas that
the men had committed no crimes against the United States.
[ The New York Times , 10 July 1974, p. 6.]
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Police also raided a house in the Roman Catholic Lower
Falls Road area [of Belfast] and uncovered what they claimed
was a central I.R.A. "factory" for explosives: fire bombs
wired to watches and American-made booby traps as well as
arms and ammunition. ["Northern Ireland: Crackdown on the
I.R.A. ," Time , 23 December 1974, p. 38.]
Police had found April 28 [1975] what they described as
the biggest arms discovery in the Irish Republic, authorities
disclosed April 29. The arsenal, which included mortars,
rockets, launchers, grenades and explosives, was believed
owned by the Provisional IRA. [ Facts on File , 1975,
p. 335.]
Sixteen members of the Dail (lower house of parliament)
had held four days of talks with senior Libyan government
officials in Tripoli but failed to receive assurances that
Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi ' s government would halt its weapons
aid to the IRA, it was reported April 20 [1975]. Qaddafi was
believed to have provided the IRA with Soviet rocket
launchers and other weapons, according to a London Times
report April 20. [ Facts on File , 1975, p. 54-9. ]
The outlawed Irish Republican Army has stolen weapons
from United States military bases for shipment to Northern
Ireland, according to a Defense Department document made
public today [1 September 1975].
The charge was reported in a previously classified
document released by Representative Les Aspin, a Wisconsin
Democrat.
He said that, the Department of the Army report asserted
that various extremist groups and unknown individuals stole a
total of 6,900 weapons and 1.2 million rounds of ammunition
from 1971 to 1974- -- enough to supply 10 battalions, or 8,000
men.
A portion of the 368-page report said that the Irish
Republican Army was also reported to be attempting to recruit
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members of the Marine Corps who were qualified with machine
guns and communications equipment.
The Army's report said the I.R.A. Provisionals were
engaged in the acquisition of weapons for eventual shipment
to Northern Ireland. It quoted a confidential naval
intelligence service source as charging that military weapons
had been stolen from the Marine Corps base at Camp LeJeune,
N.C., and shipped to Ireland.
Another such charge was that an I.R.A. contact was
operating in the area of Fort Bragg, the Army base in North
Carolina.
Furthermore, the report said, about 75 per cent of the
money used by Irish militants to purchase arms, ammunition
and explosives is from American sources. ["Pentagon Says
I.R.A. Stole Arms at U.S. Bases," The New York Times
,
2 September 1975, p. 21.]
BRUSSELS. Oct. 16 [1975] Authorities here are
investigating possible links between Belgian dealers of
illicit weapons and terrorist organizations throughout the
world.
Reports of widespread gun-running have circulated here
for several months. This week, a fatal explosion lead to the
discovery of a vast ring with sizable arsenals and
international connections.
So far no definite connections to terrorist groups have
been proved, but police say there are strong indications of
sales at least to Basque and Portuguese radical elements.
This week's arrests and incidents have renewed rumors
that such groups as the Irish Republican Army and the West
German radical Baader-Meinhoff gang do their shopping at what
is being described as "arms department stores" in Belgium.
There has been a report that an attempt was made a few months
ago to purcnase weapons here to ransom French anthropologist
Francoise Claustre, long held by rebels in Chad.
This week's bizarre chain of events began in Bastogne,
when a man was blown up while working with a bomb from World
War II.
Investigations at the explosion site uncovered a
veritable armory there and links to other depots in Leige, a
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nearby city with a centuries-old tradition in arms
manufacture. There more weapons were found, three persons
were arrested and other links were made with earlier
gun-smugglings and thefts. A manhunt is underway for the *
suspected leader of this operation.
This episode is "but the latest of several in recent
months involving the illicit arms trade here. Trucks with
secret compartments, numerous thefts and attempted purchases
by persons posing as Mali diplomats have surfaced.
Thefts from gunsmith shops, military installations and
arms factories have been used to obtain illegal weapons for
sale. Large quantities of American, German and Israeli
weapons are also involved. [David Fouquet, "Belgians Probe
Illicit Arms Trade," Washington Post , 17 October 1975,
p. 22. ]
There are estimates that 75 to 90 percent of I.R.A.
firepower is of American origin. Though serial numbers are
usually filed off gun barrels before they are shipped to
Ulster, one source in Belfast says that weapons have been
traced to nine separate dealers in the United States.
Perhaps the case that touches Noraid closest involves
Frank Grady, a 42-year-old former Westchester County Chairman
of Northern Aid who was indicted in May with John Jankowski,
a Yonkers gun dealer, on charges of having violated firearms
laws and illegally exported weapons. Several of the weapons
were reportedly seized by British troops in Belfast and were
traced to the gun dealer. The case is awaiting trial.
[Bernard Weinraub, "I.R.A. Aid Unit in the Bronx Linked to
Flow of Arms," The New York Times , 16 December 1975, p. 16.]
Five Americans of Irish descent [Daniel Duffy, Daniel
Cahalane, Neil Byrne, Vincent Conlon, and Thomas Regan] were
indicted today [22 December 1975] on charges of smuggling
guns and ammunition to the Irish Republican Army in Northern
Ireland, the Justice Department announced.
The indictments were handed down by a Federal grand jury
in Philadelphia. The five men were charged with shipping 378
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rifles and 14-0,000 rounds of ammunition to the I.R.A. from
August 1970 to the present date.
The indictment also charges the men with attempting to
buy rocket launchers, mortars and machine guns for use by the
I.R.A.
The guns purchased by the men included .30-caliber
carbines and rifles, .303-caliber British Enfield rifles and
automatic rifles.
Some of the ammunition purchased was armor-piercing to
penetrate the body armor worn by British soldiers, according
to the indictment. ["5 Indicted in Philadelphia in Ulster
Gunrunning , " The New York Times , 23 December 1975, p. 8.]
A group of American customs agents arrived here [London]
today [4. April 1976] for talks with British officials on how
to stop the flow of arms and money from the United States to
Irish Republican Army guerrillas. ["Talks Seek to Curb
I.R.A.," The New York Times
, 5 April 1976, p. 61.]
The New York Times July 15 [1976] quoted diplomatic
sources as saying that Libya's leader, Col. Muammar
el-Qaddafi, was financing, training and arming a widespread
network of terrorist gangs ranging from the Middle East to
Africa and Europe.
Qaddaf i ' s drive was said to stretch far beyond the Middle
East. He was believed to have dispatched Soviet-made weapons
to the Irish Republican Army in Northern Ireland, to Moslem
guerrillas in the Philippines and Thailand and to insurgents
in Chad and Ethiopia. [ Facts on File , 1976, p. 531.]
Mortars and mortar bombs evolved quickly from a
comparatively crude launcher and bomb to a serviceable
military replica which was dubbed the 'IRA Mortar Mk 5 ' . The
bomb for this model had two turned obturating surfaces at
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each end of the bomb body and was quite impressive in its
performance. Considering the time it takes to develop a new
military weapon from design to production stage, the IRA
achievement of Mk 1 to Mk 5 in twelve months is noteworthy.
In the rocket field some early attempts were made to fire
3.5 inch anti-tank rockets at police and military posts
without great success. Diagnostic examination of the
recovered projectiles showed a lack of knowledge of this
weapon, but within weeks the appearance of Russian RPG-7
rockets and launchers occurred. The successful employment of
Service weapons depends entirely on training and practice,
and it is apparent that the terrorist generally lacks the
resources to achieve a high standard of handling and firing.
...The explosive used is generally one improvised from
agricultural fertilizer but is commonly found to be boosted
with a small amount of commercial explosive and always
initiated by the inevitable commercial detonator. [S.G.
Styles, "Bombs and Bomb-Beaters" International Defense
Review , October 1976, pp. 817-8197]
Without the ability to use bombs any terrorist campaign
would quickly become an armed confrontation — on the one
side irregular, generally poorly trained and equipped
terrorists and, on the other, the organised security forces
of law and order. The violence in these circumstances could
be confined to areas which least affect the general public,
until attrition or logistical defeat can be imposed on the
terrorists by the sheer weight of the superiority of the
security forces. (We have witnessed the principle of these
tactics being adopted by the Soviet Union in their
suppression firstly of the Hungarian revolt and later in
Czechoslovakia.) The introduction of explosives into
terrorism brings an entirely new and higher plane of
activity. It involves more people and organisations than a
purely shooting campaign and the degree of preventative
reaction that is called for can, in t,he limit, be extremely
costly and wasteful of time and resources. It cannot be
denied that bombing is cost effective. It can be shown by
costing out an Improvised Explosive Device of the type used
to destroy the Main Belfast Cooperative Store (damage
estimated at 14- million pounds) or the New Daily Mirror
Printing Works, Belfast (estimated damage 3 million pounds).
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Cost (in pounds)
1 detonator (about) .09
1 battery .60
1 clothes peg and sundries .10
Small amount of commercial
explosive as booster .10
10 lbs. sugar* 1 .20
1 tin weedkiller* .30
2.39
* The last two items could be substituted
for about 3 1/2 pounds worth of
commercial explosives.
For ease of argument let us say the carrier bag/duffle
bag hand carried bomb costs about 5 pounds. For an
investment of 50 pounds, therefore, 10 devastations can be
caused with a financial impact upon the economy of probably
several million pounds. Give the 50 pounds to the
procurement of a pistol and ammunition and one would probably
obtain a pistol and about 100 rounds of ammunition with it.
It is difficult to see how a comparable effect could be
achieved.
As has been discussed earlier, the terrorist not only
improvises his devices but the explosive ingredients as well
Given a stringent control on explosives, the terrorist has
shown that he can revert to commonly available substances,
the control of which is virtually impossible. This is not
however true of the detonator — the key of the explosive
lock. Several attempts have been made by criminals and
terrorists alike to improvise a detonator. Fortunately all
attempts have ended in disaster for the improvisor. The
detonator therefore becomes vital in the control of the
explosives situation... [S.G. Styles, "Defeating the
Terrorist Bomber" International Defense Review , January
1977, p. 121.]
The most heartening aspect of the figures, from the
military point of view, is the continuing success of the army
in seeking out hidden arms and explosives. The quantity of
death-dealing equipment captured over the past eight years is
truly colossal: some 4-3 tons of assorted ammunition, for
example, and more than 100 tons of explosives.
103
FINDS 1974 1975 1976 total
machine guns 54 43 41 279
rifles 465 226 274 2,458
pistols 558 416 338 2,819
shotguns 126 135 79 841
rocket launchers 4 1 16
rockets 9 7 49
mortars 20 5 100 402
mortar bombs 155 26 122 418
ammunition U7 ,202 73 ,604 70 ,264 862,918
explosives (lbs.) 53 ,214 22 ,174 37 ,810 252,029
bombs neutralised 428 236 440 2,716
explosions 685 399 849 5,367
shootings 3 ,206 1 ,803 1 ,858 24,482
However, the figures cut both ways. The army and police
continue to be efficient in finding arms stores, but the
paramilitary organizations continue to be efficient in
supplying themselves.
Their basic sources of materiel remain the same: firearms
smuggled from North America, gelignite pilfered from quarries
in the Republic, and home-made explosives improvised from
weedkiller, fertiliser, firelighters and petrol. There have
been no significant new imports of hardware, but the
ingenuity of the bomb makers has continued to improve.
[Derek Brown, "Ulster's Dismal Balance Sheet," The
Manchester Guardian
, 9 January 1977, p. 5.]
The Provisional IRA now has at least two modern
high-powered, belt-fed machine guns, the Browning .3 and the
much larger Browning .5. Photographs of the weapons were
distributed by the organization and published yesterday [13
February 1977] in the Belfast Sunday News.
An accompanying article said the photographs were taken
recently during training close to the border but inside
Northern Ireland. It said the general-purpose machine guns
were part of a consignment which the IRA says was smuggled
into Northern Ireland earlier this year. [Christopher
Walker, "IRA Now Has Modern Machine Guns," The Times of
London
, 14 February 1977, p. 2.]
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...But the experts — the security authorities in Britain and
Ireland — believe that at least six and perhaps as many as
eight of every ten illegal weapons brought into Ireland came
from the U.S. Most of them were probably bought out of funds
donated, in large part, by unsuspecting or naive Americans in
the belief that the money was being used to relieve the
sufferings of innocent victims in Northern Ireland.
Time and again, Irish politicians have warned their
American opposite numbers about the traffic. Time and again,
they have pleaded with political leaders to be more careful
about what they say on Northern Ireland because their
statements can give a wrong impression and result in loss of
lives. Dr. FitzGerald's mission in mid-March was the latest
attempt to drive home the lesson.
In Ireland, his journey was regarded as a success — at
least up to a point. Irish people, North and South, were
pleased that he appeared to have cleared up President
Carter's woolly thinking on the problem and enlisted his
active support in stopping the illegal arms traffic.
They were even more pleased that he got the four leading
"Irish" politicians in the U.S. — Senators Edward Kennedy
and Daniel Moynihan, House Speaker 'Tip' O'Niell and Governor
Hugh Carey of New York — to abandon what had seemed to be
their sneaking regard for the IRA. On St. Patrick's Day,
they issued a joint statement calling on Americans "to
renounce any action that promotes the current violence or
provides support or encouragement for organizations engaged
in violence."
...Their view was that, despite Dr. FitzGerald's best
efforts, the illegal arms traffic from the U.S. to Northern
Ireland would not be cut down appreciably as long as guns and
ammunition could be bought across the counter in many
states. One source estimated that some 4-0 percent of the
guns brought into Northern Ireland from North America are
obtained in this way.
Part of the trouble is that it has proved impossible to
trace how the arms reach Northern Ireland. In the last few
years, especially, substantial quantities of guns and
ammunition have been captured. Some of it was found in ships
and boats, especially in the narrow channel between Scotland
and Northern Ireland. Police on both sides of the Border
have captured some big caches.
But there seems to be no one special route from the U.S.
to Ireland. Security experts believe that arms and
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ammunition are smuggled through in small lots, one handgun or
rifle or even separate pieces of rifle or submachine gun at a
time. The Armalite rifle, the favorite weapon of the
Provisional IRA sniper, when fitted with a telescopic sight,
is particularly easy to smuggle. It is light and it can be
broken down into separate bits easy to conceal. With
millions of American tourists coming into Britain and Ireland
every year, it is physically easy, though decidely risky, to
bring in the pieces in a suitcase. Goods containers, cabins
and even coffins containing corpses for burial in Ireland are
said to be some of the hiding-places used.
What the Irish government hopes for is that, by a
combination of methods, the U.S. authorities will be able to
reduce the traffic to the point where the IRA will begin to
feel the pinch. At present, the Provisionals have all the
arms they want: the best estimates suggest that in Belfast
alone the extremists of all kinds have enough to keep up the
present level of fighting for years. But if the traffic
could be significantly reduced and the discovery of arms
caches stepped up, the situation would be better. Apart from
tracing and stopping the arms leaving the U.S., the Dublin
government is hoping that the American authorities will stop
the traffic at the source... [Desmond Fisher, "Guns and
Money: Exporting Death to Ireland" Commonweal , 10 June 10
1977, pp. 356-358.]
Dublin police believe they may have cut a major route
used by the Provisional Irish Republican Army to ferry arms
to Northern Ireland, police said today [28 August 1977].
The police discovered an arms cache last night that
contained nearly 200 pounds of explosives, as well as rifles
and revolvers.
They later detained two men under the Irish Republic's
tough anti-terrorist laws, the sources said.
The police are examining the possibility that Lhe Dublin
hiding place of the weapons may have been a stop on the
weapons route leading from Europe to I.R.A. strongholds in
British-ruled Northern Ireland, the sources said. ["Irish
Police Believe Arms Route to Ulster May Have Been Broken,"
The New York Times , 29 August 1977, p. 7.]
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A five-ton secret shipment of sophisticated weapons, sent
to Irish Republican Army militants in Northern Ireland, had
been seized in November 1977 by Belgian customs officials, it
was reported Jan. 6 [1978]. According to Ulster military
sources, the arms had been sent from Lebanon where the
factions that had fought the 1975-1977 civil war were selling
their surplus weapons. [ Facts on File , 1978, p. 7.]
The Provisional IRA set up a roadblock Jan. 29 [1978]
near Londonderry where it displayed its newest and most
powerful weapon, the U.S. -made M60 belt-fed machine gun. The
weapon was able to fire 550 rounds a minute and was accurate
up to a distance of 1,800 meters (1,968 yards). According to
press reports Jan. 24-, the weapon had been used to attack two
police cars near Londonderry Jan. 19. The IRA was believed
to possess six M60s, which had been obtained in the Middle
East and shipped through the Irish Republic to Ulster.
[ Facts on File , 1978, p. 71.]
Police in Londonderry Feb. 3 [1978] discovered 200 rounds
of ammunition for the U.S. -made M60 machine gun. Weapons and
bomb-making devices were also found.
The M60 was the most powerful weapon in the IRA's arsenal
and had been displayed by IRA soldiers and used against
British security forces. Airey Neave, Conservative spokesman
on Ulster, said Feb. 1 that the IRA had 12 of the weapons in
its possession. He said the guns had been stolen from U.S.
Army bases in West Germany and shipped to Ulster via the
Middle East. Neave said the M60s were a threat to British
forces and had to be found. [ Facts on File , 1978, p. 132.]
The Provos have indeed suffered some stunning setbacks.
An intensive anti-IRA lobbying campaign among the Irish
community in the U.S. caused American contributions to the
terrorists to fall off dramatically last year. At the same
time, the British Army and the police made tremendous headway
infiltrating both Catholic and Protestant paramilitary
organizations. More than 1,300 terrorists were arrested in
1977, and in December, authorities in Antwerp seized U tons
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of arms, ammunition and explosives destined for IRA
arsenals.
...They also seem to have made new supply connections. "Last
year, we made no bones about the fact that our sources of
supply had dried up," says an IRA insider, "Well, now we have
new sources." As proof, the Provisionals last month
displayed for the press a new American-made M60 machine gun,
the most lethal weapon yet to fall into IRA hands and one of
a half-dozen that intelligence experts believe they recently
acquired from suppliers in the Mideast. [Allan J. Mayer,
"Northern Ireland: The IRA Reborn" Newsweek , 27 February
1978, p. 40.
]
Police found an IRA arms storehouse April 3 while
searching a house in Belfast. One of the weapons found was a
U.S. -made M60 machine gun with its ammunition. It was the
first of the sophisticated machine guns to be captured from
the IRA. [ Facts on File , 1978, p. 268.]
Seamus McCollum, an Englishman, was sentenced to 10 years
imprisonment July 18 [1978] by an Irish court in Dublin for
involvement in arms smuggling and for membership in the IRA.
[ Facts on File , 1978, p. 630.]
The Madrid weekly El Pais said Jan. 28 [1979] that ETA
[the left-wing Basque terrorist group] was working closely
with the Irish Republican Army. The two terrorist groups
reportedly exchanged men, arms and explosives and trained
together in an unspecified Middle Eastern country. [ Facts
on File
, 1979, p. 100.
j
At first, McMullen said, it was his job to screen weapons
buyers and sellers to make sure they were not agents of the
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U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (BATF) or FBI
agents.
He would then examine the weapons offered for sale to
make sure they were in good working order and were of a type
preferred by the IRA, "like any kind of assault rifle,
Armalites especially. Ar15s, M16s, Ar18s, but almost any
kind of high-powered, self-loading weapon would do, as well
as shorts (short arms, handguns)." Then he began buying
weapons in upstate New York, Connecticut, Vermont and as far
away as the Carolinas.
Where did he get the money?
"A bartender at the night club was skimming as much as
$3,000 a week, most of it on weekends. The owner knew
nothing about it," he said.
McMullen said that weapons were stored at his
(McMullen's) apartment on 72nd Street in Jackson Heights,
Queens. When he had a dozen or so weapons on hand a
confederate would pick them up "and take them to a guy who
was an officer in one of the transport unions."
The way the weapons got out [of the country] was in
household and office furniture. They'd strip the furniture
down and fill it with weapons. Guns would go inside
everything, cabinets, beds, sofas, chairs — everything."
The shipment was then loaded aboard a sealed container
bound by ship from New York to Dublin. There was never a
problem with U.S. customs. Someone took care of that here
and on the other side, too. Telephone calls would be made to
a contact in Dublin giving the date of arrival of the
container, the numbers and so forth, and it would be let
through customs," he said.
A union official in New York, McMullen says, perfected
the smuggling routes years before, "when the Queen Mary was
still making runs across the Atlantic. He was amazing, this
union man. I mean, he could get anything. I once carried
two cases of hand grenades for him." [Andrew Slake, ''The
American Connection: Running Juns to the IRA," The
Washington Post
, 4. September 1979, p. 1.]
The guns that McMullen purchased were smuggled to Dublin
in household and office furniture, he said. Labor union
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contacts made the arrangements, McMullen explained, and other
sympathizers ensured smooth passage through U.S. and Irish
customs. From Dublin it was easy to spirit the weapons into
Ulster in cars often driven by women with children on busy
Sunday afternoons
.
New leadership, under Gerry Adams, has regrouped the
I.R.A. into smaller cells and tightened screening against
informers. It has negotiated alliances with the Palestine
Liberation Organization, which supplies arms, money and
training, and the Libyan government of Muammar Gaddafi,
which, McMullen says, provides loans, arms and
transportation
.
...U.S. authorities say that whatever may have been the case
in 1972, the I.R.A. in the U.S. now limits itself to fund
raising. ["Tantalizing Tales from the I.R.A." Time
,
17 September 1979, p. 39.]
On November 2 [1979] the Irish police seized 156 weapons
and 4-0,000 rounds of ammunition from a ship in Dublin harbor.
These items were hidden in containers, and all were of
American manufacture, including two M60 machine guns. They
were intended for the Irish Republican Army. [Richard
Clutterbuck, "Ireland's American Enemies," The New Republic
15 December 1979, p. 17.]
Irish Republic security forces Jan 3 [1980] discovered a
bomb factory operated by the Irish Republican Army near
Drogheda, about 2$ miles (4-0 kilometers) south of the border
with Northern Ireland. The raid netted a large cache of
explosives. In a later raid reported Jan. 14-, police in the
republic found explosives, bombs, several mortars and JC
Soviet-made rockets in an abandoned house near Dundalk, a




...Also on April 2J+ [1980], police in Ireland discovered a
cache of rockets, rocket launchers, a machine gun and
ammunition close to the border with Northern Ireland.
[ Facts on File , 1980, p. 619.]
A police spokesman in Dublin said Aug. 5 [1980] that
police had raided an IRA training camp in the republic a few
miles from the border with Northern Ireland. The police had
taken some weapons and ammunition, but had not captured any
IRA members. [ Facts on File , 1980, p. 619.]
Policemen searched a farm with metal detectors today [13
September 1980] after finding a big guerrilla arms cache
containing rocket launchers, mortars and home-made bombs.
The arms were hidden in tunnels at the farm near
Carrickmacross , four miles from the border with British-ruled
Northern Ireland, and were believed to belong to the
Provisional wing of the Irish Republican Army. ["Arms Cache
is Found in Ireland," The New York Times
, H September 1980,
1980, p. 10.]
As for the Provisionals, they are continuing to affirm
the Army's 1978 judgment that they have an "adequate supply"
of members with skilled technical expertise.
Besides their demonstrated command of radio-controlled
bombs, and their rather less successful attempts at rocket
mortars, they have been conducting a technological war to
counter the sophisticated surveillance equipment used by the
Army.
The man-detecting radar, used by the Special Air Services
at observation posts on the border, can now be detected by an
American-made cheap receiver openly available in Dublin.
Infrared torches which illuminate the countryside at night,
but are invisible to the naked eye, have been made worthless
for undercover work since the Provos acquired some stolen US
Army electronic binoculars which can see the beams.
The Provisionals have also been able to intercept Army
communications from their helicopter mounted television; and
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when they were confronted with devices like Carabel, which
detected a sniper's position by microwaves, they simply
changed their tactics.
New developments in night vision using light intensifiers
and thermal image enhancers, have been more difficult to
neutralise. But they have a limited field of view and the
Provos have discovered that these devices can be blinded by
car headlights. Volunteers have also been trained to use
cover in the rural areas where they are used. ["Why the IRA
Remains a Potent Rival to the Army," The Manchester Guardian
,
19 October 1980, p. 5.]
Noraid's own financial records are one indication of
flagging support among Irish-Americans. Last year, the group
says, it received $195,180, less than half the amount
recorded in 1972. Gun traffic across the Atlantic also is
down. U.S. officials say they have virtually no active cases
of arms smuggling to Ulster — and in fact haven't picked up
any IRA-related gun activity in more than a year. [John
Brecher, "The IRA's Angels" Newsweek , 18 May 1981, p. 53.]
Three New York men, who reportedly told undercover agents
they were interested in "social justice" in Northern Ireland
were arrested by Federal authorities Friday night and
yesterday morning on charges of supplying weapons to the
Irish Republican Army.
Two of the men — Thomas Falvey...and George Harrison...
— were seized outside Mr. Falvey's home Friday evening,
hours after they had paid an undercover agent of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation $16,000 for 4-2 automatic rifles,
submachine guns and handguns. Both were born in Ireland, the
FBI said.
The third man, Patrick Mullin...was taken into custody...
yesterday at his home... where the authorities found seven
automatic rifles, similar to the M16's used in Vietnam, a
machine pistol, a pre-World War II 20-millimeter cannon and a
flame thrower.
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He said the agents had been unable to determine where Mr.
Falvey and Mr. Harrison had obtained the money to buy the
weapons, whose serial numbers had been obliterated. [Joseph
B. Treaster, "3 New Yorkers Accused of Buying Arms for
I.R.A.," The New York Times , 21 June 1981, p. 40.]
Police in Belfast Sept. 11 [1981] discovered a cache of
more than 1,300 pounds (over 590 kilograms) of explosives in
a furniture store in the Falls Road area in the west part of
the city. On Sept. 10, police had found 300 pounds (over 130
kilograms) of explosives in the back of a van. The seizures,
police said, had perhaps foiled a' major bombing campaign.
[Facts on File, 1981, p. 701.]
...FBI agents this month arrested a Noraid trustee in New
York on a charge of conspiring to ship sub-machine guns to
the IRA. ["Does U.S. Money Finance IRA Terror?" U.S. News
and World Report , 26 October 1981, p. 5.]
Although Noraid officials say the organization has never
been formally linked to gunrunning activities, the group's
director, Flannery, has.
The link became public during the 1982 gunrunning trial
in Brooklyn, Flannery and four other Irish-Americans were
charged with conspiring to smuggle a 20-millimeter cannon, a
flame thrower, 4-7 machine guns, and 11 automatic rifles to
the IRA. (One of the defendants, Patrick Mullin, had served
as treasurer of the Flatbush branch of Noraid, in New York
City.) [Warren Richey, "On the Trail of US Funds for IRA,
The Christian Science Monitor
,
1 A. January 1985, p. 6.]
Police in the republic said Feb. 1 and 3 [1982] that
several caches of IRA arms and explosives had been found,
hidden near the border. [ Facts on File , 1982, p. 191.]
113
In February 1982, five men were arrested trying to sneak
into the United States near Buffalo. They were carrying
$10,000 in cash and what appeared to be a "shopping list" for
weapons and bomb equipment.
Among items the men were said to be shopping for in the
US: 200,000 rounds of ammunition, various remote-control
model airplanes capable of carrying 20 pounds of explosives
as far as five miles.
Benedict J. Ferro , director of the Buffalo office of the
Immigration and Naturalization Service, says that in addition
to recovering the cash and the "shopping list," federal
officials found an address book with names and. phone numbers
of contacts in the US.
It was this last item that made at least one group of New
York City-based IRA gunrunners nervous in early 1982. Among
the names in the book: Gabriel Megahey, a New York
bartender.
A few days after the five were arrested in Buffalo, the
FBI — as part of an investigation begun months before —
placed a wiretap on Megahey' s home phone in Queens, New
York. Megahey was believed to be the head of an IRA
gunrunning "cell" operating in New York.
Meanwhile, in New York City, Megahey was in the process
of being set up for a sting operation by a well-placed
informant and a host of FBI undercover agents. The agents,
posing as Latin American arms merchants, offered to sell the
IRA gunrunners five Redeye surface-to-air missiles at $10,000
each.
Megahey and Duggan were interested. According to wiretap
transcripts and transcripts compiled by the FBI from other
electronic surveillance, Duggan told undercover agents: "I
know one of the things that's super important is the SAM
missiles." He called their purchase "No. 1 priority."
He noted that the IRA wanted the missiles to shoot down
British helicopters in Northern Ireland.
At one point Megahey bragged to an undercover FBI agent
that he was the head of the IRA in the United States. He




"What we are dealing for here at the minute moneywise is
chicken feed. It's nothing," Megahey told special agent
Enrique Ghimenti speaking of the proposed $50,000 deal for
five SAM missiles.
He added, "Once we hit the first one, right, and we build
a relationship up, then we're prepared to come in with a lot
of big money."
Duggan is recorded saying that the group had "probably 10
sources" of arms in the US. [Warren Richey, "Roller Skates
and Rifles: How IRA Group Tried to Sneak Arms Out of US" The
Christian Science Monitor , 18 January 1985, p. 1.]
Police in the republic said March 22 [1982] that they had
seized about 50 radio-controlled firebombs, and arrested
seven persons in raids on IRA hide-outs in the west coast
city of Galway. [ Facts on File , 1982, p. 532.]
More than 3,000 gasoline bombs were found by police in
Belfast May 5 [1982] as Irish nationalists observed the first
anniversary of the death of hunger striker Bobby Sands.
[ Facts on File , 1982, p. 532.]
Four men were arrested in New York City June 21 [1982] in
connection with two separate federal probes into the
supplying of arms to Provisional IRA terrorists. Two days
earlier, on June 19, police in the Irish Republic had
announced the arrest of three men, including a Roman Catholic
priest who had lived in New York for 25 years, as a result of
an investigation into gun-running for republican terrorists
.
i Facts on File , 1982, p. 531.]
Two men were arrested in New York City yesterday on
charges of conspiring to purchase and export weapons and
munitions, including surface-to-air missiles, for use by the
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Provisional Irish Republican Army in Northern Ireland,
Federal authorities said.
Two other men were seized in the city, and a third was
being sought, in connection with another Federal
investigation involving the illegal shipment of weapons to
the Irish underground army.
One of the men arrested in the conspiracy case, Gabriel-
Megahey, told undercover agents posing as arms dealers that
he was the leader of the I.R.A.'s operation in the United
States and that his organization had $1 million to purchase
weapons, according to Kenneth P. Walton, deputy assistant
director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's New York
office.
"The missiles were to be used against British
helicopters," Mr. Walton said. No missiles or other weapons
were actually sold to the two men. Under Federal law, the
missiles and other weapons on a "controlled list" cannot be
exported without a State Department license.
As the result of a separate investigation by Federal
agents, Eamon Anthony Meehan, ...and his brother, Colm
Meehan . . .were arrested at their homes on charges of illegally
shipping arms and ammunition, in crates marked as roller
skates and comforters, for use against British troops in
Northern Ireland. The man being sought was identified as
Patrick McFarland. . .All three were said to be Irish
citizens.
Mr. Walton said that most of the weapons and ammunition
were seized before shipment, but that a small quantity had
been "marked" and "allowed to be shipped" to John Moloney in
Ireland. He was arrested in Dublin Friday with his brother,
the Rev. Patrick Moloney, a Melkite priest who runs Lazarus
House in New York, a home for troubled youths at 606 East
Ninth Avenue, and a third man, on charges of illegal
possession of firearms. Mr. Walton said he "knew nothing"
about the priest's role. [Leonard Buder, "F.B.I, in City
Arrests 4 in Plots to Exoort Arms to I.R.A. Units" The New
ork Times, 22 June 1982*.]
Electrical devices designed to ignite firebombs were
found inside a workshop used by republican prisoners in the
Maze, a maximum security prison near Belfast, it was revealed
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Aug. 27 [1982]. None of the devices contained explosive
material. [ Facts on File , 1982, p. 653.]
A general contractor from Flushing, Queens, was indicted
by a Federal grand jury in Brooklyn yesterday [26 August
1982] in connection with a scheme to ship 151 guns to Ireland
three years ago.
A nine count indictment against the contractor, Bernard
McKeon, charged him with numerous violations of the Arms
Export Control Act.
Thirteen of the weapons involved were machine guns, 10 of
which had had their serial numbers removed, the indictment
said. The rest of the weapons were described only as rifles,
carbines, revolvers and pistols of various makes and models.
The guns were intercepted by the Irish police, according
to John B. Lattela, an assistant United States attorney. The
charges are punishable by up to 10 years in prison.
"Contractor Faces Weapons Charges," The New York Times
,
27 August 1982, section 2, p. 8.]
Police Aug. 28 [1982] discovered over a ton of explosives
in a truck stopped at a checkpoint in county Down. It was
thought to be the largest single find of explosives in
Northern Ireland. [ Facts on File , 1982, p. 806.]
Only one courtroom in America is permanently closed to
the public.
Located in a vaultlike chamber on the sixth floor of the
Justice Department, its locked door is always guarded and it;
walls are insulated. It is regularly inspected for signs of
bugging.
But the chamber is used as a courtroom only twice a
month. And its decisions are never published, although
department records indicate that in the court's three-year
history, all its rulings have been in favor of the
Government.
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Known as the FISA court, for the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act with which Congress voted to establish it in
1978, the court has just one function: granting warrants for
electronic surveillance in cases involving foreign
intelligence
.
The bugging business has been growing. In the court's
first seven and a half months of operation, it issued 207
electronic surveillance orders; in 1980 it granted 322, and
in 1981 it issued 433.
But in the handful of cases that lead to criminal
prosecution, the evidence of electronic listening devices
comes to light at trail when the Government reveals its
evidence. One such case currently underway in the eastern
district of New York led to the first judicial opinion
upholding the constitutionality of the FISA court's
procedures
.
The defendants, accused of conspiring to smuggle arms and
equipment to the Provisional Irish Republican Army, were
informed that the Government would introduce as trial
evidence tapes of their telephone conversations that had been
secretly recorded. The defendants attempted to have the
evidence excluded on the ground that the surveillance had
violated the Constitution, but Federal District Court Judge
John M. McLaughlin disagreed. [Leslie Maitland, "A Closed
Court's One-Issue Caseload," The New York Times , 14- October
1982, section 2, p. 16.
]
Five U.S. citizens [George Harrison, Patrick Mullin,
Thomas Falvey, Michael Flannery, and Daniel Gormley] were
acquitted Nov. 5 [1982] in federal court in Brooklyn, N.Y. of
conspiring to sell weapons to the Provisional Irish
Republican Army.
During the seven-week trial, the defendants admitted
buying the arms (including a 20-millimeter cannon, a flame
thrower and 47 machine guns) from an undercover agent. The
five also acknowledged that they had planned to sell the guns
to the IRA. As a defense, the men claimed that their actions
had been sanctioned by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.
Jurors, who deliberated for two and one-half days,
apparently voted for acquittal because they believed the CIA
had been involved. "I think we firmly believed that the
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operation could not have gone on that long without government
sanction," said one juror. [ Facts on File , 1982,
pp. 878-879.]
There was a problem, however, -in the person of Federal
Judge Joseph McLaughlin, former dean of Fordham University
School of Law in Manhattan. McLaughlin permitted defendants'
lawyers to present what government officials regard as a
preposterous defense.
McLaughlin allowed the defense to turn the case into an
arena for unsubstantiated allegations about the CIA, for they
did not have a shred of evidence of a CIA link. DeMeo's
purported CIA relationship was not established as anything
more than a frequent boast. A CIA official swore the agency
had nothing to do with DeMeo or with gun shipments to
Ulster.
The jury found the men not guilty. When the verdict was
announced, friends and relatives of the defendants shouted,
"Up the Provos!" and "Up the IRA!" Addressing the jurors,
Judge McLaughlin declared, "I stand in awe of you! I salute
you!" [David Reed, "Terror in Northern Ireland: The American
Connection," Reader's Digest , April 1983, pp. 169-170.]
Security forces in Northern Ireland have seized more
than 8000 firearms and a million rounds of ammunition since
the conflict began in 1969. Some came from Palestinian
terrorists, Libya and Czechoslovakia. But the United States
is the Provos' major weapons source. Says Sir John Hermon,
head of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, "If American weapons
were not here, we'd have a great deal less of a problem."
[David Reed, "Terrorism in Northern Ireland: The American
Connection," Reader ' s Digest , April 1983, p. 166.]
In Ireland, 4- miles south of the Ulster border near the
village of Enniskeen, police Sunday uncovered a large arms
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cache believed to have belonged the outlawed Irish Republican
Army.
Army experts were called to examine the dump, which
included ammunition for rifles, a machine gun, detonators,
timing devices, fuse wire for bombs, hand grenades and a
booby-trao device, a oolice spokesman in Dublin said. [UPI,
25 April 1983.]
Four men [Gabriel Megahey, Andrew Duggan, Eamon Meehan,
and Colum Meehan] were convicted in New York yesterday [13
May 1983] of plotting to smuggle guns, explosives and
surface-to-air missiles to the Provisional Irish Republican
Army, the outlawed group battling British rule in Northern
Ireland.
A spokesman for the Federal Bureau of Investigation said
the convictions were the first to come from a series of
indictments of I.R.A. symphathizers in the last decade. Last
fall, five men were acquitted in a similar case.
The FBI spokesman, Lane Bonner, said that the F.B.I,
investigations in the last decade had led to indictments of
18 I.R.A. sympathizers on weapons or other charges in the
United States.
Mr. Bonner said nine people were awaiting trial or were
fugitives. Other I.R.A. -related prosecutions, he said, might
have resulted from investigations by other agencies, but he
did not know their results.
The C.I. A. said in affidavits that Mr. Hanratty had never
worked for it. Mr. Hanratty testified that he was a security
systems consultant and that Mr. Duggan had asked his help to
obtain detonating equipment "for use against the British in
Northern Ireland." He said he reported the request to the
authorities and then worked with them. [Joseph P. Fried,
"Four Found Guilty of Plotting to Smuggle Arms for I.R.A.,"
The New York Times
, H May 1983, p. 1.]
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Agent Stephen J. Rogers was once a rising star in the
U.S. Customs Service. Now his enemies say Rogers nearly
sabotoged a top-secret investigation into gun-smuggling by
the Irish Republican Army, that he may have endangered the
lives of Irish and British undercover agents and that he
seriously disrupted the Anglo-American effort to combat IRA
terrorism in Northern Ireland.
It all began in 1979, when Rogers was put in charge of a
special team of New York agents investigating "neutrality
cases" — alleged violations of U.S. laws restricting the
shipment of arms and military aid to foreign countries.
Gun-smuggling to Northern Ireland, organized by IRA
supporters in the United States and often funded by
contributions from well- meaning Irish-Americans, was and is
a major target for Customs investigators in New York. For
some time, however, British officials have suspected that at
least a few Irish-Americans within the Customs Service itself
are sympathetic to the IRA cause — and some Customs agents
privately agree.
In one important case, Roger's enforcement team began
investigating Bernard McKeon, a New York contractor, for
smuggling guns to Ireland. The tip came from British
intelligence, which alerted Roger's team in November 1979
that McKeon was implicated in a shipment of 151 guns and
60,000 rounds of ammunition that had been seized in
Dublin. .
.
Nearly five years after it began, the Rogers affair has
damaged morale in the Customs Service — and some say its
effectiveness. Yet the intrigue has produced only one
clear-cut result: after three separate trials, Benard McKeon
was convicted in mid-1983 of violating the U.S. Neutrality
Act by conspiring to smuggle arms to the IRA. Last month an
appeals court upheld his conviction. [Nicholas M. Horrock,
"A Feud Among U.S. Agents" Newsweek , 13 August 1984, p. 4-4-.]
Three Northern Ireland men [Gabriel Megahey, Eamon
Heehan, and Colum Meehan] and an Irish-American [Andrew
Duggan] were sentenced July 22 [1983] for their convictions
stemming from a conspiracy to smuggle weapons from the U.S.
to the outlawed Provisional Irish Republican Army. [ Facts
on File
, 1983, p. 612.]
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Federal authorities in New York City July 27 [1983]
arrested and charged eight men with conspiring to sell $2
billion worth of sophisticated weapons to Iran and $15
million worth of machine guns to the outlawed Provisional
Irish Republican Army. According to the charges, the men had
unknowingly been negotiating to sell the weapons to
undercover agents. Neither the government of Iran nor the
IRA was involved in the alleged plot.
Three of the arrested men were accused of orchestrating
the illegal deals. A.bbot van Bacher, 62 years old, Alan
Harvey, 73, and Robert Krejcik, 4.5, were charged with
planning the Iranian sale. Harvey and Krejcik were charged
in the IRA conspiracy. The other five men arrested were
machinists who allegedly manufactured the machineguns.
Undercover agents of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and
Firearms, posing as representatives of the foreign parties,
had shown the defendants $10 million in the preliminary
transactions, according to the charges.
More than 100 machine guns intended for the IRA were said
to have been seized. Authorities also said they had
confiscated an "executive assassination kit," which was a
machine gun enclosed in a briefcase with an exterior
trigger. [ Facts on File , 1983, p. 612.]
The arrests resulted from a year-long investigation by
undercover agents of the U.S. Treasury Department's Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms and New York City detectives.
Abbot Van Backer, 62, who said he was a retired South
African army general working for a weapons exporter in New
York was the mastermind of the illegal weapons operation,
Virella [prosecutor] said. His bail was set at $1 .2 million
in cash.
Alan Harvey, 73, of Haworth, N.J., a lawyer, was the
defendant who boasted he had access to a nuclear device, the
prosecutor said. Bail of 3750,000 was set. for aim.
The third major defendant, Robert Krejcik, 4-5, of
Brooklyn, president of United States Aviation Co. of
Manhattan, was held in lieu of $350,000 cash bail.
United States Aviation, where Harvey was also employed,
was described in the criminal complaint as a company
specializing in the export of new and used commercial and
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military airplanes, army trucks, armored vehicles, tanks and
airport ground support vehicles.
The five other suspects were said to be machinists,
mostly of Czech background, who copied models of fully
automatic hand-held weapons for shipment to the IRA. One
firearms expert said the models were superior in quality to
the original machine guns. [UPI, 28 July 1983.]
The Guardian newspaper said today it obtained a copy of
the Irish Republican Army's training manual, including an
outline of the IRA's constitution, organization and general
orders, one of which specifies that "treachery" is punishable
by death.
"Treachery" includes the seizure, or being party to the
seizure of "arms, ammunition or explosives which are being
held under (Irish Republican) Army control," the newspaper
said. [UPI, 28 July 1983.]
LE HAVRE, France. — Police Sunday said they have
discovered a large cache of weapons in a truckful of
electrical equipment that was destined for the Irish
Republican Army.
The truck was intercepted in Le Havre Friday while
waiting to be loaded on a ferry to Ireland.
Police said they discovered 28 handguns, 12,000
cartridges, 100 loading clips, 22 pounds explosives, 150
detonators, 4-0 yards of detonating wire and some grenades.
They found the arsenal hidden among 25 tons of
electro-mechanical equipment in the box of the truck which
bore Irish liscense plates. Officials were questioning two
Frenchmen and Irishman. [UPI, 14- August 1983.]
At Le Havre on the northern coast of France, police
Sunday seized a cache of weapons hidden in a false fuel tank
of a 32-ton Volvo truck. The vehicle was waiting for a ferry
123
to the Irish Republic port of Rossiare, about 75 miles south
of Dublin.
The shipment contained 28 pistols and revolvers, 12,000
rounds of ammunition, 100 magazines for Russian-made rifles,
22 pounds of explosives, 200 detonators and nearly 500 yards
of detonating wire.
Police, believing they may have blocked off a new IRA
gun-running route, said the truck came through France from
western Europe. [UPI, 15 August 1983.]
The outlawed Irish Republican Army is turning to the
Mafia and other underworld crime organizations in the United
States to buy arms and explosives, America's chief customs
officer said Thursday.
William von Raab, U.S. Commissioner of Customs, told
reporters the IRA was "looking for anything that might shoot
or explode" but the quest for "under the counter arms" was
becoming more difficult because of tougher action by customs
officers.
"We have reason to believe they have begun to use some
organized crime figures as middlemen to look for some of the
arms they would then obtain to export from the United States
into Northern Ireland," said von Raab, who was visiting
London to address the American Chamber of Commerce.
The IRA switch to the Mafia and other American crime
groups for weapons procurement was a "somewhat recent"
development, he said.
The IRA was in the market mainly for explosives and more
sophisticated detonating devices, von Raab said. "But I've
never known terrorists who would not happily walk away with a
missile if they could get one."
"If they can lay their hands on a hand-held missile they
will try to buy that and ship it out," he said.
The IRA's character "as criminals working with other
criminal organizations" had not been fully understood by many
people who thought of them as "ideological zealots," said von
Raab
.
He said the FBI and customs organizations are both
responsible for trying to prevent the illegal arms traffic.
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Von Raab said the U.S. Customs service was tackling the
problem in two ways by tougher inspection methods at high
risk ports of entry and with "hundreds of investigators"
involved in gathering intelligence on smugglers. [UPI,
8 September 1983.]
A 57-year-old Queens man [Bernard McKeon] was sentenced
to three years in prison and fined $10,000 yesterday [9
September 1983 J for his conviction for conspiring to smuggle
arms and ammunition to Ireland.
The 1979 shipment was seized in Dublin, but Federal
investigators have said they believe the weapons were
destined for the Irish Republican Army for use against the
British in Northern Ireland. ["Man Gets 3 Years on Arms
Charge," The New York Times , 10 September 1983, p. 27.]
Two Soviet diplomats and wife of one of them were
expelled from Ireland on Friday, and today [10 September
1983] Government sources were quoted as saying the Soviet
Embassy in Dublin was a "clearing house for a major
international spy ring."
The Mail on Sunday quoted security sources as saying Mrs.
Lipasov led a spy ring that organized the supply of Soviet
arms and ammunition to units of the outlawed Irish Republican
Army operating in Northern Ireland and England. ["Ireland
Expels Three Russians in Espionage Case," The New York
Times , 11 September 1983, p. 8.]
Two Soviet diplomats and the wife of one of them had
gotten in touch with the outlawed Irish Republican Army
apparently in an attempt to trade arms for information before
they were expelled from the Irish Republic, according to
Irish security sources.
The Foreign Ministry cited "unacceptable activities,"
which is common diplomatic language for spying, when it
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announced the expulsions of Gennadi Salin, a first secretary
and press attache; Viktor Lipasov, a second secretary, and
Mr. Lipasov' s wife, Irina, on Sept. 9.
Sources in the security and intelligence branch of the
Irish police said Saturday that the police had watched at
least one of the trio cross the border to Northern Ireland.
The sources said the diplomats, in their meetings with
I.R.A. leaders, were believed to have discussed trading
Soviet arms for information about British military bases in
Northern Ireland. ["Irish Detail Allegations in Russian
Expulsions," The New York Times , 26 September 1983, p. 3.]
The Irish Special Branch has always maintained that the
Soviets are one of the main arms suppliers to the IRA, which
seeks to oust the British from Northern Ireland.
The expulsions of the Soviet Embassy's First Secretary
Guenadi Saline and Second Secretary Viktor Lipassov, along
with Lipassov' s wife, were Ireland's first diplomatic
expulsions in history. [UPI, 24. September 1983.]
During the night troops in Cookstown, 55 miles west of
Belfast, uncovered a cache of more than 2,000 pounds of
explosives that police believe was being stored by the IRA or
their allies for a bombing offensive. [UPI, 26 September
1983.]
A jury Thursday found a former bartender innocent of
gunrunning charges for allegedly trying to buy guns and
explosives for the Provisional Irish Republican Army in
Northern Ireland.
The jury of eight women and four men in U.S. District
Court deliberated two days after a two-week trial before
acquitting Patrick McParland, 4-8, of six counts of
gunrunning.
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Four of McParland ' s alleged associates were found guilty
of similar charges May 13 and sentenced to federal prison
terms ranging from two to seven years. Their convictions are
being appealed.
The prosecution maintained McParland and others bought
firearms and explosives, including blasting caps and 26
rifles and revolvers, from undercover FBI agents in 1982.
McParland had been accused of loading a truck with boxes
of the weapons to be transported to New Jersey for shipment
to Ireland. [UPI, 17 November 1983.]
FitzGerald said the United States remains a principal
source of weapons for the IRA because arms ar more freely
available on the commercial market in America than elsewhere
in the world. During his visit, Irish and U.S. officials are
expected to discuss ways of detecting and halting the flow of
funds and guns to the IRA and similar groups.
Forty senators and 58 members of the House led by
Massachusetts Democrats Sen. Edward Kennedy and O'Neill
signed a letter Wednesday vowing to continue efforts for
peace and reconciliation in Northern Ireland.
"We renew our urgent appeal to all Americans to renounce
the path of the bomb and the bullet and to reject the pleas
of those who seek by word or deed or dollars to promote or
condone the cause of violence," the letter said. [UPI,
15 March 1984.]
Police searching the Libyan Embassy discovered two loaded
handguns and a spent cartridge case of the same caliber as
the gun that killed a policewoman outside the embassy, Home
Secretary Leon Brittan said today.
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...There was no evidence that the departing Libyans flushed
gelignite down the sewers, a police spokesman said, denying a
newspaper report.
Khadafy said in an interview with French television
broadcast Monday that he would open formal relations with the
outlawed Irish Republican Army unless Britain restores
diplomatic ties with Libya. [UPI, 1 May 1984..]
Col. Moammar Khadafy charged Britain today with
sheltering Libyan terrorists and accused British police of
planting weapons and ammunition in the Libyan Embassy in
London following a 10-day siege.
Asked about Libya's support for the outlawed Irish
Republican Army, fighting a terrorist campaign to end British
rule of Northern Ireland, Khadafy said Libya did not feel
embarrassed about supporting the "just cause" of the IRA "in
every respect."
Asked what practical steps he would take to help the IRA,
Khadafy replied: "It's urgent, we can provide the support
that they need and that we have available." [UPI, 2 May
1984.]
The IRA has been plagued in the last year by shrinking
money sources, informers and an American administration out
to cut off the supply of arms and money.
The FBI has stopped the IRA arms shipments in Europe and
"Che United States.
"The whole logistical trail has been cut off by the FBI
in the last two years," a police spokesman said. "It's a
trickle situation of arms. The really big shipments are
prevented from getting through." [UPI, 13 May 1984*]
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Ulster police May 24 [1984-1 discovered the biggest single
explosives cache ever after receiving directions from an
informer. They discovered two tons of explosives in dumps in
Tyrone County. [ Facts on File , 1984, p. 663.]
Security forces Thursday seized more than 2 tons of
homemade bombs and ammunition apparently stockpiled by the
outlawed Irish Republican Army, police said.
It was the biggest munitions cache uncovered in Northern
Ireland since the IRA's guerrilla war against British rule
began 15 years ago. A security spokesman said the seizure
will be a "serious blow" to terrorism in the area.
Officials did not publicly link the ammunition dump with
the IRA, but police sources said the dump was uncovered after
an IRA source tipped authorities that "something big" was
about to happen in the area.
More than 2 tons of homemade explosives, 1,600 rounds of
ammunition, two weapons, detonators and bomb-making equipment
were found during a police and army search of the rural
Carrickmore area of County Tyrone, 65 miles west of Belfast,
a police spokesman said.
The cache was hidden in four farm fertilizer tanks
located between two villages.
Since 1969, authorities have uncovered more than 78.3
tons of explosives, 8,936 weapons and more than 1 million
rounds of ammunition. [UPI, 24 May 1984.]
Richard Lawlor, a Noraid spokesman, said at a Belfast
press conference Monday that "every average American" has a
"moral duty" to arm the outlawed IRA, which is waging a
bloody battle to drive the British from Ulster and united the
province with Ireland.
"People often say if they (the IRA) get Soviet arms they
must be communists. If they get arms from Libya they must be
anarchists. It that is to be the case, it is a moral duty of
every average American to ensure they get American guns to
ensure democracy," Lawlor said. [UPI, 14 August 1984.]
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For anyone who might still believe that the Northern
Irish "problem" is merely "local," it might be instructive to
consider what Dublin authorities found when they boarded the
trawler Marita Anne off the western coast of County Kerry
Saturday. The list included 100 West German-made
semiautomatic rifles, submachine guns, some 20 to 30
handguns, hand grenades made in South Korea, and assorted
shotguns, rockets, and other small ammunition. ["Stemming
the High Seas Arms Flow," Christian Science Monitor
,
editorial, 2 October 1984, p. 17.]
Mr. Noonan, speaking at a news conference, asserted that
American sympathizers of the Irish Republican Army had paid
for the cache of arms. He did not say what evidence he had
that the shipment was financed by Americans
.
He said the arms included rockets, hand grenades and
submachine guns meant for use on both sides of the Irish
border
.
Mr. Noonan said the Irish government was especially
concerned about the inclusion of hand grenades in the
consignment
.
"I cannot remember an occasion when the I.R.A. used hand
grenades," he said. "Were they planning to get into a
situation of hurling hand grenades into shops, pubs and cafes
or whatever? That particular aspect has me worried."
["Dublin Says the U.S. Helped in Seizure of Arms Shipment,"
The New York Times , 1 October 1984, p. A8 .
]
Irish officials are hoping the U.S. Federal Bureau of
Investigation — using evidence provided by the Irish
authorities — can trace the origin of the shipment; and by
doing so break up or at least seriously damage the IRA
gun-running network. They also hope that in the course of
this investigation evidence may emerge to implicate members
of the New York-based Irish Northern Aid Committee (Noraid)
who collect money for the IRA but who have denied involvement
in this gun-running venture.
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Officials here say that as long as guns and ammunition
can be bought by criminals on the international arms market,
and as long as American money is available, the campaign of
the Irish Republican Army will continue in some form. [James
Downey, "Ireland Deals Blow to U.S. -IRA Connection,"
Christian Science Monitor, 4 October 1984, p. 9.]
Police and intelligence sources say there is no doubt
that the main source of weapons for the IRA is the United
States and that money from the New York-based Irish Northern
Aid Committee (Noraid) is a major factor in buying arms.
Even more money, they say, comes from bank robberies in
the north and in Ireland, and from extortion, rackets and tax
evasion.
All officials believe that the new IRA strategy is linked
closely to Noraid — and to U.S. gun dealers who take a big
chance in arranging shipments — in terms of continually
proving to its supporters that it can attack the British
while toning down the more indiscriminate bombing.
Noraid, which is openly sympathetic to the IRA, denies
U.S. and Irish government charges of gun-running and insists
that the funds it raises go solely to help the families of
IRA prisoners.
Police officials also say that while the IRA has
fraternal contacts abroad, and gets some arms in Europe and
the Middle East, these links tend to be exaggerated. The IRA
is "essentially an indigenous terror group," Ulster police
say.
The recent siezure of seven tons of IRA arms en route by
sea from the United States, and the less publicized but
significant discovery of large quantities of sophisticated
bomb timers outside Dublin two weeks ago, have dealt the IRA
serious setbacks. But the quantity of these finds also
discloses the scope of the ambitions of the organization.
[Michael Getler, "Ulster Conflict in Mew Phase:
Reorganization into Cells Makes IRA Terrorists Harder to
Catch," The Washington Post , 2 November 1984, p. A25.]
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David Conklin, chief of the Firearms Division of the U.S.
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, said that from 1970
through 1979 his agency investigated a large number of cases
involving gunrunners for the IRA. He estimated that BATF
handled eight to 10 major cases each year during that period,
most of them in cities along the northeastern coast,
particularly New York and Boston.
He said the volune of cases has dropped significantly
since 1979, partly because of the arrests of a number of IRA
leaders and partly in response to a growing new market for
illegal arms in Latin America, both for political insurgents
and for the illicit drug trade.
An increase in the number of bank robberies and
kidnappings in Ireland also indicates that the flow of arms
and funds from the United States may have decreased in recent
years.
However, Conklin said there still are generally two or
three major cases each year dealing with gunrunning for Irish
terrorist groups. He added that there was a major case last
year in which BATF agents posed as IRA gunrunners seeking to
purchase machine guns. The agency eventually seized 99 MAC10
automatic weapons equipped with silencers, as well as an
assassination kit. The 11 defendants were convicted and are
awaiting sentencing.
Conklin would not discuss current investigations, but he
said his agency cooperates closely with the Irish and British
governments and is assisting in tracing the weapons seized
from the trawler last month. [Mary Thornton, "U.S.
Investigating the Smuggling of Weapons to Irish Terrorists,"
The Washington Post , 2 November 1984, p. A28.]
Five men charged with attempting to smuggle arms to the
Provisional IRA were convicted Dec. 11 [198-4] at a special
criminal court in Dublin. The five had been arrested aboard
a ship carrying the arms after it was seized by authorities
off the coast of Ireland.
The Times of London Dec. 12 reported that a tip by a U.S
informer to the U.S. Customs Service had led to the ship's
capture. According to U.S. federal law enforcement sources,
the U.S. government was investigating suspected Irish
guerrillas and U.S. citizens involved in smuggling arms to
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the Provisional IRA and other guerrilla groups, the
Washington Post reported Nov. 2. [ Facts on File , 1984.,
p. 953.J
Since 1969, more than 8,000 weapons have been seized or
captured by security forces in Northern Ireland and the Irish
Republic.
Of these, 2,843 of the weapons seized in Northern Ireland
were believed to have been smuggled originally from the US,
and 1 ,357 of the weapons seized in the Republic were thought
to have come from America, according to the Royal Ulster
Constabulary (RUC), Northern Ireland's police force.
"There is no need to send 5,000 weapons over there. They
don't need that many. If you can keep a constant flow of
small numbers, maybe 50, 60, or 100 a year, they will have
enough to do what they want to do," says the FBI's Mr.
McGorty.
"We can always tell when they get a resupply," says an
RUC spokesman. Ballistics tests and detailed records enable
the RUC to keep track of how many different weapons were
involved in various attacks in Northern Ireland and how often
the same weapons are used.
From this the RUC has concluded that at some point last
year the Provisionals received a resupply of weapons.
"Certainly there has been one resupply — possibly from
America. It wasn't huge, but it was larger than the usual
trickle of eight," the RUC source says.
But the overall picture as related by security sources
here is that the Provisionals are beginning to feel the pinch
in terms of the American source of supply. In addition, they
say the Provisionals are strapped for money.
"When you see one firearm turning up in four, five, or
six jobs, you can be sure they are not doing well," says an
Irish official in Dublin. [Warren Richey, "How IRA Ships




SELECTED OPEN SOURCE REPORTS
IRISH REPUBLICAN ARMY
FINANCING
Gunmen staged five robberies in Ulster today [8 November
1971]. The British army said that stolen money — at least
$4., 750 from a post office in County Tyrone — almost
certainly would be used to buy weapons for the outlawed Irish
Republican Army. ["5 Ulster Robberies Staged; Explosion
Damages Shops," The New York Times
, 9 November 1971, p. 8.]
Qaddafi announced June 11 [1972] that Libya supported the
Irish Republican Army (IRA) and was supplying it with money,
arms and volunteers to fight British occupation forces in
Northern Ireland. He supplied no further details on the
nature of the aid. Qaddafi made the disclosure in a speech
marking the second anniversary of the evacuation of U.S.
forces from Wheelus Air Force Base in Libya.
Accusing Britain of handing over Palestine to the Jews in
194.8 and of permitting Iran to occupy three Persian Gulf
Islands in 1971
,
Qaddafi vowed he would pursue British
imperialism everywhere, even "in her own home." [ Facts on
File , 1972, p. 439.]
American-Irish funds, ironically, not only helped set up
the IRA's ancestor, the violently nationalistic Fenian
movement in Paris in the 1850 's, but have also nurtured the
movement ever since. Since 1 969 when the current troubles
began, about two million dollars have been collected through
the Irish Northern Aid Committee, in the guise of relief.
Department of Justice records show that in six months alone,
during 1971-72, some $200,000 in relief was sent in currency
to one Joseph Cahill in Dublin. Cahill is now serving a
three-year jail term imposed by the Eire government for
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attempted arm s -running . [Benjamin Welles, "IRA Terrorism: No
End in Sight" The New Republic , 7 December 1974., p. 17.]
But United States intelligence sources in Washington
charge that 75 percent of the money sent by the committee,
which is called Noraid for short, has gone to buy arms, and
25 percent for food, clothing and allowances for Catholic
dependants
.
The authorities in Ireland, Britain and the United States
are convinced that Noraid' s official accounting of its
fund-raising efforts is too low, and that $2 million to $3
million may actually have been raised at dances, dinners and
collections in the Bronx, Queens, Boston, Chicago, San
Francisco, Baltimore and Philadelphia.
Over the last four years, the United States Justice
Department has brought a dozen criminal cases involving the
procurement and shipment of weapons to Ireland. American
sources say that more cases are in the offing. [Bernard
Weinraub, "I.R.A. Aid Unit in the Bronx Linked to Flow of
Arms," The New York Times , 16 December 1975, p. 1.]
The New York Times July 15 [1976] quoted diplomatic
sources as saying that Libya's leader, Col. Muammar
el-Qaddafi, was financing, training and arming a widespread
network of terrorist gangs ranging from the Middle East to
Africa and Europe. [ Facts on File , 1976, p. 531.]
The Provos have indeed suffered some stunning setbacks.
An intensive anti-IRA lobbying campaign among the Irish
community in the U.S. caused American contributions to the
terrorists to fall off dramatically last year. [Allan J.
Mayer, "Northern Ireland: The IRA Reborn," Newsweek
,
27 February 1978, p. 4.0. ]
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"At that time I didn't do the robberies," McMullen said.
The mobile units carried them out. Robberies were a major
source of money for the IRA.
Later, McMullen said, he participated in nine bank and
hotel robberies in both the north and south of Ireland,
bringing in about $500,000. The receipts, he says, were
always counted in the presence of IRA officers in those days,
and "anyone caught stuffing his own pockets was in for a
kneecapping at best." [Andrew Blake, "Doubts on the IRA
Mount," The Washington Post
, 3 September 1979, p. 1.]
A major split between two Irish-American groups aligned
with the Irish Republican Army has led to a sharp reduction
of American financial support for the organization, Irish
officials said today [6 September 1979]
.
They said that American aid, which, though illegal, has
served over the past decade as the principal source of funds
for the I.R.A.'s militant Provisional wing, has declined in
the past year, now providing perhaps 25 percent of the funds
to buy weapons for the terror campaign against the British
presence in Northern Ireland.
In the mid-1 970' s funds raised at bars, dances, dinners
and parties across the United States accounted for 70 percent
of the I.R.A.'s support, it was said.
According to the Irish officials, the bulk of the
organization's funds now derive from waves of bank robberies
in the Irish Republic, as well as in the six counties of
Northern Ireland and from extortion there as well as payoffs
from the owners of illegal drinking clubs and taxi services.
Irish and British intelligence officials put the cost of
the current I.R.A. terrorist campaign, involving the purchase
of rifles, including the Soviet-made AK-4-7 , and Soviet-made
rocket-propelled grenades, at $2 million a year. [Bernard
Weinraub, "Solit Among Irish-Americans Said to Cut Funds to
I.R.A., n The" New York Times , 7 September 1979, p. 10.]
New leadership, under Gerry Adams, has regrouped the
I.R.A. into smaller cells and tightened screening against
informers. It has negotiated alliances with the Palestine
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Liberation Organization, which supplies arms, money and
training, and the Libyan government of Muammar Gaddafi,
which, McMullen says, provides loans, arms and
transportation. ["Tantalizing Tales from the I.R.A.," Time
,
17 September 1979, p. 39.]
The great majority of Irish Americans finally have
realized that many contributions to IRA "welfare" funds are
in fact used to finance killing. The Irish American
contribution reached $600,000 in 1972 (the peak year of
violence), but mercifully has now fallen to $150,000 a year.
Most of the IRA's annual budget, estimated at one million
dollars, is now obtained in Ireland from robberies of banks
and liquor stores, supplemented by protection money (such as
a "license" of $100 a day to run a hotel or two dollars a day
to drive a taxi through certain districts of Belfast.)
Most of this money is used to buy arms, sometimes from
Europe (the IRA has an active cell in Holland), sometimes
from Arab countries, sometimes from surpluses abandoned in
Vietnam, but mainly from the United States. [Richard
Clutterbuck, "Ireland's American Enemies," The New Republic
,
15 December 1979, p. 17.]
When three Irish nationalists starved themselves to death
in 1920, 100,000 angry Irish-Americans poured onto the Boston
Common. Then, and for decades since, Irish republicans have
depended on their brethern across the sea for moral support
— and for guns and money. But in recent years, the ties
have worn thin. Assimilation into U.S. society and revulsion
at IRA terrorism have discouraged many Irish-Americans from
active support for the cause. Last week, when Bobby Sands
died, a protest outside the home of the British consul
general in Boston drew barely 100 people.
Noraid's own financial records are one indication of
flagging support among Irish-Americans. Last year, the group
says, it received $195,180, less than half the amount
recorded in 1972. Gun traffic across the Atlantic also is
down. U.S. officials say they have virtually no active cases
of arms smuggling to Ulster — and in fact haven't picked up
any IRA-related gun activity in more than a year.
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The turning point in American support for the IRA may
have come on the eve of St. Patrick's Day 1977, when Senators
Edward Kennedy and Daniel Patrick Moynihan, House Speaker
Thomas P. (Tip) O'Niell and New York Governor Hugh Carey —
known in Irish-American circles as "The "Four Horsemen" —
broke a political tradition of silence about IRA terrorism.
They urged Americans not to support violence in Northern
Ireland and set about trying to move public opinion toward a
moderate position. Other politicians have followed their
lead, balancing criticism of British policy in Ulster with
strong condemnations of terrorism. They have helped make
support for the IRA less fashionable — and have forced
Irish-Americans to consider the bloody uses of their guns and
money. [John Brecher, "The IRA's Angels," Newsweek , 18 May
1981, p. 53.1
. . .Noraid officials said donations reached $250,000 during
the seven-month hunger strike in which 10 inmates died at
Ulster's Maze Prison.
The U.S. government joins Thatcher in claiming that not
all of Noraid 's money goes to feed women and children. The
Justice Department, calling Noraid a "collection agent" for
the guerrillas, won a court order directing it to register as
the IRA's foreign agent.
In addition, FBI agents this month arrested a Noraid
trustee in New York on a charge of conspiring to ship
sub-machine guns to the IRA. ["Does U.S. Money Finance IRA
Terror?" U.S. News and World Report , 26 October 1981, p. 5.]
...Finance is raised on a regular basis both in the Irish
community in the USA, and through bank raids in Ireland
itself. [Andrew Wheatcroft, The World Atlas of Revolutions ,
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983;, p. 191 • J
Most Provos come from the slums of West Belfast.
Operating Mafia-style protection rackets, the Provos force
138
taxi drivers, pubkeepers and store owners in Catholic areas
to come up with weekly payments. When more funds are needed,
they rob banks. [David Reed, "Terror in Northern Ireland:
The American Connection," Reader's Digest , April 1983,
p. 166.]
Money restrictions used to combat organized crime and
drug dealers are now being used against U.S. groups
supporting Irish terrorists, according to Charles Price, the
American ambassador to Britain.
The campaign uses a U.S. regulation under which people
entering or leaving the country must declare to customs
officials amounts of cash in excess of $5,000, Price said
Friday.
"Recently, the United States has started applying this
act to those who would cause violence in Northern Ireland,"
Price said.
Sympathizers of the outlawed Irish Republican Army have
been targeted for special attention, he said. The IRA is
fighting to oust the British from Northern Ireland and to
unify the two Irelands.
"We started by digging out the records of known American
couriers, financiers and organizers, such as Noraid (a New
York-based group that raises funds for the IRA)," the
ambassador said. "We have now identified others who were
previously unknown."
"Tens of millions of dollars have been confiscated in the
narcotics area. We are now working to do the same thing with
terrorist money. We want to confiscate it, thereby drying up
the funds to buy arms," Price said. [UPI, 25 February 1984-.]
FitzGerald told a group of reporters at a breakfast
meeting that statistics about aid coming from the United
States to the outlawed Irish Republican Army are, by the
nature of terroist organizations, unreliable and difficult to
gather. But he said, "I have the impression that the flow
has diminished."
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One clue, he said, is that the IRA has recently gone into
kidnapping people for large ransoms, a sign that money from
American contributors may be drying up. Irish officials have
put the level of aid from Americans to the IRA at "something
under $10 million a year."
FitzGerald said the United States remains a principal
source of weapons for the IRA because arms ar more freely
available on the commercial market in America than elsewhere
in the world. During his visit
,
Irish and U.S. officials
are expected to discuss ways of detecting and halting the
flow of funds and guns to the IRA and similar groups.
Forty senators and 58 members of the House led by
Massachusetts Democrats Sen. Edward Kennedy and O'Neill
signed a letter Wednesday vowing to continue efforts for
peace and reconciliation in Northern Ireland.
"We renew our urgent appeal to all Americans to renounce
the path of the bomb and the bullet and to reject the pleas
of those who seek by word or deed or dollars to promote or
condone the cause of violence," the letter said. [UPI,
15 March 1984.
]
Qaddafi also reinerated earlier threats that Libya would
increase aid to the Provisional Irish Republican Army in
Northern Ireland in retaliation for the harassment of Libyans
in Britain. [ Facts on File , 1984, p. 3H»]
But the flow of money from the U.S. fluctuates according
to the political situation in Northern Ireland. Upturns, in
the words of a senior Irish official, "reflect policy
disasters by the British government."
Before the hunger strikes by Provisional IRA prisoners in
1981, which claimed 10 lives, the American contribution may
have fallen as low as $250,000.
The present figure is thought to be at least $2 million
annually, and could be much higher.
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Officials here say that as long as guns and ammunition
can be bought by criminals on the international arms market,
and as long as American money is available, the campaign of
the Irish Republican Army will continue in some form. [James
Downey, "Ireland Deals Blow to U.S. -IRA Connection,"
Christian Science Monitor, 4 October 1984, p. 9.]
Police and intelligence sources say there is no doubt
that the main source of weapons for the IRA is the United
States and that money from the New York-based Irish Northern
Aid Committee (Noraid) is a major factor in buying arms.
Even more money, they say, comes from bank robberies in
the north and in Ireland, and from extortion, rackets and tax
evasion.
All officials believe that the new IRA strategy is linked
closely to Noraid — and to U.S. gun dealers who take a big
chance in arranging shipments — in terms of continually
proving to its supporters that it can attack the British
while toning down the more indiscriminate bombing.
Noraid, which is openly sympathetic to the IRA, denies
U.S. and Irish government charges of gun-running and insists
that the funds it raises go solely to help the families of
IRA prisoners.
Police officials also say that while the IRA has
fraternal contacts abroad, and gets some arms in Europe and
the Middle East, these links tend to be exaggerated. The IRA
is "essentially an indigenous terror group," Ulster police
say.
The recent siezure of seven tons of IRA arms en route by
sea from the United States, and the less publicized but
significant discovery of large quantities of sophisticated
bomb timers outside Dublin two weeks ago, have dealt the IRA
serious setbacks. But the quantity of these finds also
discloses the scope of the ambitions of the organization.
[Michael Getler , "Ulster Conflict in New Phase:
Reorganization into Cells Makes IRA Terrorists Harder to
Catch," The fesnington Post , 2 November 1984, p. A25.J
An increase in the number of bank robberies and
kidnappings in Ireland also indicates that the flow of arms
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and funds from the United States may have decreased in recent
years. [Mary Thornton, "U.S. Investigating the Smuggling of
Weapons to Irish Terrorists," The Washington Post , 2 November
1984, p. A28.]
In May 1981, US District Court Judge Charles S. Haight,
Jr. in New York ruled in a Justice Department suit against
Noraid that the organization was acting in America as an arm
of the Provisional IRA. Judge Haight wrote in his decision:
"The uncontroverted evidence is that [Noraid] is an agent of
the IRA, providing money and services for other than relief
purposes." Flannery objected. Noraid lawyers appealed the
decision but lost.
"At least half of what is raised in America stays in the
US for the purchase of weapons," says a spokesman in Belfast
for the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), the police force in
Northern Ireland.
An Irish security official in Dublin says: "It is
difficult to know if all their funds are channeled in this
direction [relief efforts]. We think that surplus funds may
be channeled to the purchase of bombs and bullets."
"Our feeling," says a British security official in
Northern Ireland, "is that most of the money that is raised
in America is never declared — it is simply used for the
purchase of weapons."
"There is no way we can check on their money-laundering
operation, because you never know how much they collect,"
says Donald J. McGorty, head of the division at the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in New York that handles
international terrorism.
He adds: "There's no way we can tell if they collected
$100,000 or $5 million. Now, whether all that money is sent
to Ireland, who's to say? But in any scenario you can think
of about the money, there is a probability against all other
scenarios that it has been used." [Warren Richey, "On the
Trail of US Funds for IRA," Christian Science Monitor
,
14 January 1985, p. 6.]
According to security officials, most of the IRA's
funding has historically come from bank robberies, extortion,
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protection rackets, and kidnappings in Northern Ireland and
the Irish Republic. In 1983, police say, IRA-sanctioned bank
robberies in Northern Ireland netted some 300,000 British
pounds. [Warren Richey, "How the IRA Ships Arms into
Ulster," Christian Science Monitor , 15 January 1985, p. 6.
There is no Justice Department audit of Noraid's books,
according to Justice officials. Nor are they able,
government officials say, to confirm, with the sparse
information Noraid discloses, the accuracy of Noraid's
financial reports. One source says Justice Department
officials take the reports they receive from Noraid "at face
value.
"
"There are penalties for making misstatements, but
basically it's an honor system," says an official with the
Justice Department's Internal Security Section, which
oversees the registration of foreign agents in the US.
Donald J. McGorty, who heads the international terrorism
section of the Federal Bureau of Investigation office in New
York, has his own theory on why there are no independent
audits at Noraid: "It would pinpoint exactly how much money
they are actually collecting, and maybe they don't want that
known .
Because Noraid uses a variety of means to transfer its
funds to Ireland — including couriers — it is extremely
difficult, if not impossible, for US or Irish law-enforcement
officials to verify that $93,000 was, in fact, received in
Ireland or was, in fact, ever sent to Ireland in 1984.
"Their books consist of a torn envelope, a piece of paper
here, the back of a newspaper there," says the FBI's McGorty.
"It's not your regular double-entry bookkeeping, a set of
books you would expect if you went to the Ford Foundation or
some charitable organisation.
"The situation is very difficult because you don't know
if they collect $1 or $1 million. If you are doing business
by cash, it is very difficult to keep track of." [Warren
Richey, "Noraid Fund-Raisers Elude Compliance with US Laws,"
Christian Science Monitor , 16 January 1985, p. 4.]
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"We're never without something to excite the people
here," says Flannery. "When the hunger strike was over, it
started up again with the St. Patrick's Day Parade." He
ticks off a list of controversial events beginning with the
1981 fatal hunger strike of Bobby Sands and nine other
Republican prisoners in Northern Ireland. His list ends with
the September death of a Belfast man who had been shot by
Northern Ireland security forces with a plastic bullet. The
man was killed as police attempted to arrest Noraid publicity
director Martin Galvin. Mr. Galvin appeared at a pro-IRA
political rally in Belfast, though Northern Ireland officials
had forbidden him to enter the country. "All this excites
the people. Right away they rally," Flannery says. "During
the hunger strike, for instance, we took in more money in two
months than we did for a whole year before. It was almost
$300,000 taken in."
There have been indications, according to Irish and
British government officials, that as IRA military operations
in Northern Ireland and England have fallen off, funds
contributed to Noraid in the US have fallen off as well. The
reverse may also be true. In certain extremist Irish-
American circles in the US the IRA's bombing last October of
a Brighton, England, hotel where Prime Minister Thatcher and
most of her cabinet were meeting was seen as a victory for
the IRA and as a potential boost to pro-IRA fund-raising
efforts in America. It was seen as a demonstration of the
IRA's ability to carry out sophisticated bombing attacks in
England at the very heart of the British establishment. Such
high-visibility bombings keep the IRA's struggle against
Britain in the American public eye through widespread press
coverage. It is seen in part as helping keep potential
American contributors and supporters aware that the IRA's
struggle continues. This is the public-relations dimension
of guerrilla warfare.
Hal Erbe, a spokesman for the Fenian Society, said in a
telephone interview that the group raised less tha $5,000
last year. [Warren Richey, "British, Irish Officials Advise
Against Donations to Noraid," Christian Science Monitor
,
21 January 1985, po . 7,9.
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APPENDIX C
SELECTED OPEN SOURCE REPORTS
IRISH REPUBLICAN ARMY
LINKS TO INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
Qaddafi announced June 11 [1972] that Libya supported the
Irish Republican Army (IRA) and was supplying it with money,
arms and volunteers to fight British occupation forces in
Northern Ireland. He supplied no further details on the
nature of the aid. Qaddafi made the disclosure in a speech
marking the second anniversary of the evacuation of U.S.
forces from Wheelus Air Force Base in Libya.
Accusing Britain of handing over Palestine to the Jews in
1948 and of permitting Iran to occupy three Persian Gulf
Islands in 1971 , Qaddafi vowed he would pursue British
imperialism everywhere, even "in her own home." [ Facts on
File , 1972, p. 439.]
. . .Walder [Swiss Attorney General] denied a New York Times
report, based on information from the Central Intelligence
Agency and other Western intelligence services, that foreign
revolutionary groups had opened a central coordinating office
in Zurich in 1971. The intelligence data had also allegedl
indicated that terrorist groups such as the Red Army of
Japan, the Tupamaros of Uruguay and the Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine maintained an international
revolutionary network through agents and "safe houses" in
Beirut, Lebanon and other Middle Eastern countries, in Europe
and in Tokyo. The alleged network was said to have arranged
secret talks between foreign guerrilla groups and the Irish
Republican Army in Dublin May 26 and 28 [1972]. [ Facts on
File , 1972, p. 562.]
British military sources , as reported by the United Press
International Aug. 2 [1972], claimed that secret papers
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seized during searches of the rebel areas of Londonderry and
Belfast had revealed links between the IRA and such foreign
guerrilla and anarchist movements as the U.S. Black Panthers,
the Maoist Red Star Army of Japan, the Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine and the Fourth International in
Brussels. The latter had staged pro-IRA demonstrations in
several European cities, according to the Washington Post
Aug. 3. Revolutionary groups in Cuba, France, the
Netherlands, Scandanavia and parts of Africa were also
reportedly mentioned in the documents. [ Facts on File ,
1972, p. 598.]
The Lebanese daily newspaper Al Liwa had indicated that
Palestinian guerrillas and the IRA had agreed on joint
terrorist acts in Britain, it was reported Jan. 3 [1974-].
[ Facts on File , 1974, p. 13-]
According to the London Times Jan. 8 [1975]. . .The Times
report also said the militants [from the protestant
paramilitary Ulster Defense Association (UDA) ] disapproved of
a visit to Libya by a delegation of Protestants, including
Tommy Lyttle, a West Belfast UDA leader, who talked to IRA
representatives there. [ Facts on File , 1975, p. 5.]
Sixteen members of the Dail (lower house of parliament)
had held four days of talks with senior Libyan government
officials in Tripoli but failed to receive assurances that
Col. Muammar el-Qaddaf
i
T s government would halt its weapons
aid to the IRA, it was reported April 20 [1975]. Qaddafi was
believed to have provided the IRA with Soviet rocket
launchers and other weapons, according to a London Times
report April 20. [ Facts on 'File , 1975, p. 54.9-1
The New York Times July 15 [1976] quoted diplomatic
sources as saying that Libya's leader, Col. Muammar
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el-Qaddafi, was financing, training and arming a widespread




T s drive was said to stretch far beyond the Middle
East. He was believed to have dispatched Soviet-made weapons
to the Irish Republican Army in Northern Ireland, to Moslem
guerrillas in the Philippines and Thailand and to insurgents
in Chad and Ethiopia. [ Facts on File , 1976, p. 531.]
But the terrorist professionals also supply equipment,
manpower, or both to groups like the IRA, operating in
Northern Ireland and England...
...At least three Palestinian advisers serve with the IRA in
Ireland today. In Benghazi, Libya, a punishing, systematic,
two-month course in commando training is available to all
comers
.
...A Basque lawyer named Jose Echebarrietta flew to Dublin in
November, 1974* After enlisting the active help of top IRA
personnel, including explosives expert Patrick Young, his
group was able to pull off a series of killings, bank
robberies and raids on military bases. [Walter W. Howard,
"Terrorists: How They Operate a Worldwide Network," The
Washington Post , 18 January 1976, Parade, p. M+.
The Madrid weekly El Pais said Jan. 28 [1979] that ETA
[the left-wing Basque terrorist group] was working closely
with the Irish Republican Army. The two terrorist groups
reportedly exchanged men, arms and explosives and trained
together in an unspecified Middle Eastern country. [ Facts
on File
, 1979, p. 100.]
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Little was known about INLA [Irish National Liberation
Army] or its potential for troublemaking . It is the military
wing of the Irish Republican Socialist Party, a Marxist
faction that broke away from the IRA four years ago. British
security officials believe that INLA has no more than 50
members, but the group is said to have close ties with the
Palestine Liberation Organization and Italy's Red Brigades.
They have been well trained, possibly abroad. [Raymond
Carroll and Tony Clifton, "The IRA's Lethal New Look,"
Newsweek
, 16 April 1979, p. 63.]
New leadership, under Gerry Adams, has regrouped the
I.R.A. into smaller cells and tightened screening against
informers. It has negotiated alliances with the Palestine
Liberation Organization, which supplies arms, money and
training, and the Libyan government of Muammar Gaddafi,
which, McMullen says, provides loans, arms and
transportation. ["Tantalizing Tales from the I.R.A.," Time
,
17 September 1979, p. 39.]
Guasco [Italian prosecutor in the Aldo Moro kidnapping
and murder case] also claimed, without giving details, that
evidence had been found linking Italian terrorist groups,
such as the Red Brigades, with "extreme leftist Americans"
and with the Red Army Faction in West Germany, the Irish
Republican Army and the Basque separatists in Spain. [ Facts
on File , 1980, p. 20.]
...The six-page leaflet from the [Red] Brigades was found in
a garbage can near the Rome railway station after a newspaper
received an anonymous phone call telling where to look for
it . . .
Backing was expressed for the West German terrorist
group, the Red Army Faction. That group and the Brigades,
the communique said, were "standing together in the forefront
of the attack against the war schemes incarnated by NATO."
The Brigades also offered an "outstretched hand" to other
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terrorist groups, such as the Irish Republican Army in
Northern Ireland and the Basque separatist group ETA in
Spain. Those two groups, the document said, "could find the
possibility of a qualitative jump if only they could get out
of the suffocating optic of nationalism and insert themselves
into the wider context of the war against imperialism
according to the strategic principle that the only possible
revolution is an international revolution." [ Facts on File ,
1981, p. 959.]
Qaddafi also reinerated earlier threats that Libya would
increase aid to the Provisional Irish Republican Army in
Northern Ireland in retaliation for the harassment of Libyans
in Britain. [ Facts on File , 1984, p. 3K-]
Police searching the Libyan Embassy discovered two loaded
handguns and a spent cartridge case of the same caliber as
the gun that killed a policewoman outside the embassy, Home
Secretary Leon Brittan said today.
...There was no evidence that the departing Libyans flushed
gelignite down the sewers, a police spokesman said, denying a
newspaper report.
Khadafy said in an interview with French television
broadcast Monday that he would open formal relations with the
outlawed Irish Republican Army unless Britain restores
diplomatic ties with Libya. [UPI, May 1, 1984-.]
Col. Moammar Khadafy charged Britain today with
sheltering Libyan terrorists and accused British police of
planting weapons and ammunition in the Libyan Embassy in
London following a 10-day siege.
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Asked about Libya's support for the outlawed Irish
Republican Army, fighting a terrorist campaign to end British
rule of Northern Ireland, Khadafy said Libya did not feel
embarrassed about supporting the "just cause" of the IRA "in
every respect."
Asked what practical steps he would take to help the IRA,
Khadafy replied: "It's urgent, we can provide the support









II. The Basic Data Record
The basic arms transfer event is comprised of the
following variables. (Section III of this handbook discusses








The date of the event
The originator of the transfer or
transaction. Actors (and targets)




organization or group within the
actor country who is primarily
responsible for the action.
An interaction that describes the
relationship between the originator
of an arms transfer event and the
target or recipient of the event





organization or group within the
target country who is the object or










The object or recipient of an actor's
action
.
Any discrete event may be concerned
with one or more issues, such as
training, coproduction, etc.
Specified payment procedures,
financial agreements, and assistance
plans are indicated here, e.g., gift,
loan, cash, sale, etc.
Specified weapons systems, types of
hardware, and equipment are entered
in these fields.
For each discrete event, up to five
lines of text can be entered. The
purpose is to describe in narrative
form, the arms transfer event,
including details, such as quantity
of arms, value of the transaction,
etc. Key word searches can be
conducted using this portion of the
data field.
The coder's initials and the date of
entry are included in each record.
The source code(s) of the
publication(s ) used to generate the




Countries do many different types of things to one
another regarding arms transfers. Besides actually
transferring arms they engage in such activities as meeting
to discuss the terms of arms aid; they applaud or criticize
each others' arms transfer policies; they promise equipment
and personnel; they withdraw equipment and so on. The arms
transfer interaction variable permits defining the discrete

















Coding an arms transfer event requires the selection of a
two-digit event code from the above list. The twelve basic
categories of arms transfer events are mutually exclusive.
The coder must select one code to describe each event
contained in a report.
JOINT-ACTIONS
Many events are joint-actions and must be coded as two
discrete events.
EXAMPLE: The Mexican Defense minister visited France for the
purpose of discussing the purchase of the VBL scout car.
This event is coded as two discrete events.
Actor Country Event Code Target Country
Event 1 MEX 51 FRN
Event 2 FRN 51 MEX
This approach achieves several objectives. First, if the
user focuses on a single country, double coding is the only
way to ensure that the picture of arms transfer activity is
complete. In the above example, it is not clear whether the
initiative lies with France or with Mexico.
51 CONSULT/MEET/VISIT
This category includes the exchange of notes, messages
and information, as well as the physical meetings between
personnel from at least two countries. If reference is made
to consideration or evaluation of a particular piece of
hardware, or to negotiations over terms of the transfer, the
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event is coded as a 54> not as a 51 . The overall purpose of
putting events in this category is to capture those instances
where two countries actually meet regarding an arms transfer
issue
.
A typical sequence may find Turkey announcing a need for
a transport aircraft (70 Comment); various countries visit
Turkey with the specifics of their aircraft (51 Consult/
Meet/Visit); Turkey evaluates the offers and negotiates with
the suppliers (54 Evaluate/Consider/Negotiate); selects the
supplier and eventually orders the aircraft (56 Order/
Deliver)
.
Bilateral meetings are reciprocal in the sense that if
Country A meets with country B, then Country B must also be
meeting with Country A. Consequently, bilateral meetings are
doublecoded: A meets B; and B meets A. Meetings involving
more than two countries are not to be doublecoded. If the
meeting is of a general nature (i.e., a weapons show or
demonstration), it is "coded as 51 with the target country as
"NSC". If it is a meeting or an organized group, such as
NATO or the Gulf Cooperation Council, the target country is a
nongovernmental actor. On the other hand, if five countries
meet to discuss the joint development of a tank or fighter
aircraft, this event is coded as five events. Each country
interacts with an "MLG" , since the "group" of five exists
only in regard to that event: the development of the tank or
aircraft.
All reports of future meetings and visits will not be
coded in this category. They will be coded either as 70
Comment or, if the report views the visit as a positive
event, 71 (or 72, if negative).
If, as a result of a meeting or consultation the outcome
is negative (55 Reject) or positive (56 Order), these
latter codes (55, 56) should be used, not 51 Meet.
52 PROPOSE/OFFER/URGE
In a typical arms transfer sequence, the supplier country
will offer or propose that the recipient country buy a
particular weapon system, or accept a certain training or
support package. This event is used when the initiative is
with the supplier.
For example, when the U.S. State Department notifies the
Congress of an impending sale, this system has at this stage
been offered to the country in question. In another
example, Short Brothers of the U.K. and Embraer of Brazil are
cooperating in the manufacture and marketing or the Tucano
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turboprop trainer. It is one of two aircraft to have bid for
the contract for the U.K.'s R.A.F In this sense, Short/
Embraer is offering their aircraft to the U.K. Marketing
then becomes a key word in this event category.
53 REQUEST
Events in this category put the emphasis on the recipient
of equipment, training and/or support. In the typical arms
transfer, a visit (51) during which an F-16A is demonstrated
is followed by either an offer (52) or a request (53) for a
squadron of F-16As. If the interaction is clearly one
initiated and sustained by the recipient, code 53 should be
used. If, on the other hand, the supplier is actively
countering the request with the offer of an alternative
aircraft, such as the F-20, then this event should be coded
52.
54 EVALUATE/CONSIDER/NEGOTIATE
This event code is used for those reports which indicate
that a country is in the process of considering the
acquisition or supply of hardware or training. Often an
extensive period of time elapses between an offer and a
decision to order. For example, if the U.S. Congress does
not veto a proposed sale of F-16A aircraft to Kuwait, Kuwait
then has a fixed period of time to accept the offer. News
sources may report "Kuwait has still not decided to buy the
F-16" or similar language. The fact that it has been
reported indicates interest in the transfer and qualifies it
as an event.
Evaluations can also be conducted by supplier countries
who are considering requests by other countries. These
instances may become events if an anxious recipient decides
to put pressure on the supplier by reminding them publicly
that they are still waiting for a response. Two separate
codes will be entered in this case since a single report may
include both an urging (52) on the part of the prospective
recipient and evaluation (54-) on the part of the supplier.
Often, the first time a transfer is made public is when a
recipient or supplier reports that two or three aircraft are
being evaluated for sale or purchase. In this case, code 54
will not have been preceded by either an offer (52) or a
request (53). Since it is not appropriate to reconstruct
the dates of the offer/request, 54 is used and the transfer
tracked from that date. When an article tracks the history
of an arms transfer, each element will be coded.
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EXAMPLE: The Finnish Ministry of Defense is evaluating the
Swedish J35 Drakens as a possible aircraft for the Finnish
Air Force. The two nations met in October of 1983. This
meeting was immediately followed by a Swedish proposal on
December 12, 1983. There still has been no final decision
from the Finnish government.
There are three events here: the meeting 51 which would
be dated as 10/99/83, the proposal 52 on 12/12/83, and the
evaluation which would be dated, unless otherwise specified,
the same as the date of the report.
55 REJECT/REFUSE
This category captures a common type of event in which a
supplier or recipient reacts negatively to a request or
offer. For example, Jordan's rejection of U.S. air defense
missiles would be coded as 55, as would the U.S. rejection of
Singapore's request for F-16A aircraft. Continuous state-
ments of a rejection, even if it concerns the same request or
offer, will be recorded as discrete events. Companies
("IND") that lose bids must be recorded as the domestic
target (object) of 55 Reject, and the names of these
companies must be included in the summary.
56 ORDER/ACCEPT/CONTRACT
This category is used only when the report clearly
indicates the signing or awarding of a contract, a signed
agreement or in some cases "plans" to either purchase, buy,
or coproduce. Considering an order is code 54-. Endorsing or
approving the concept of ordering is code 71 . Meeting to
discuss an order is either 51
, 54-, or 71 .
Orders between a government and an arms industrial firm
within that country will not be recorded, since it is assumed
that such a contract is a domestic event.
57 DELIVERY
This type of event may include the actual delivery of a
weapon system or support package, a weapon system becoming
operational after an overhaul/upgrade by an external
supplier, or the entry into service or equipment manufactured
under the terms of licensed coproduction or coproduction.
If equipment or hardware has been shipped to a
destination (target country) but is waiting in a third
country, it is coded as an Order 56, if the coder is certain
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that the equipment has in fact been ordered by that country.
For example, the U.S. reports that Nicaragua has ordered
MiG-21 aircraft from the U.S.S.R., but they never got beyond
delivery to Cuba. Nicaragua has publicly complained that
Cuba won't give her the MiG-21 s, though Cuba is storing, not
using the aircraft. This event remains an order 56. The key
action which classifies a transfer as a delivery, beyond an




Events included in this category are decisions to resume
a delivery previously halted, reduce a sanction, or
supplement a previous order or agreement. In the latter type
of event, code 58 is used only when the additional equipment
or support is clearly supplemental and/or incremental. For
example, an agreement by France to supply submarines to
Pakistan is coded as 56. If subsequent to agreement the
quantity is changed from 4- to 5 , code 58 would be used. If,
on the other hand, France agrees to upgrade the deal with a
new. more capable torpedo, a separate event for the torpedoes
(56) would be used.
Also coded in this category are those events which
indicate a step-up in the production or in the progression of
the arms transfer event, which signal an improvement in the
relations between the interacting countries.
NOTE: A difference should be noted between a 70 Comment,
which reports the normal progression of an arms transfer
event, and this category, where some incremental change must
be suggested.
59 REDUCE/WITHDRAW/CANCEL
Events in this category are the most negative that can
occur. Included in this category are decisions to reduce the
number or quality of weapons/hardware, to withdraw an offer,
to slow down production, or to cancel an agreement.
EXAMPLE: The U.S. cancelled the delivery of twelve fighter
Jets to Jordan following a series of hostile remarks by Xing
Hussein.
70 COMMENT
The comment category identifies statements emanating from
a country concerning arms transfers. In order for a
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statement to be recorded as a comment it must be made by a
specifically" identified governmental official or agency, or a
person or group considered to be influential in effecting
arms transfer decisions. In addition, comments must be
public statements and not reports of comments which may not
have been intended for public consumption. (Consequently,
"comments" are the arms transfer events which are never coded
as "rumored".)
There are various types of comments.
^Decline to comment.
*Explain policy: interpreting their own country's
policy or explaining future actions.
*Status report on an arms transfer when the transfer is
progressing as scheduled: delivery situation,
development, production.
^Statement of need/threat assessment: only when linked




A British MOD spokesman confirmed that although
diplomatic relations between Libya and Britain have now been
severed following the London 'embassy' siege, exports of
military equipment to Libya will continue because of long-
standing contracts which cannot be broken.
Gen. Sankoy has confirmed that some 200 Saron [sic] APCs
have been sold to seven countries with production currently
running at about 70 vehicles a year.
The Salvadorean President-elect, Jose Napolean Duarte,
claimed in Washington that the Salvadorean Army has
sufficient supplies of small arms ammunition on hand for only
three month's consumption.
71 APPROVE/ENDORSE/ ASSURE/PROMISE/CONFIRM/ AGREE
This category of event is intended for those actions or
comments which indicate supportive or affirmative attitudes
and/or policies, but are not quite specific enough for
categories 51-59* For example, France approving or endorsing
(71 ) the concept of a Gulf Cooperation Council policy of
coordinating arms purchases is a positive interaction with
the GCC, but not specific enough to qualify as Consultation
(52), Urge (53) or Order (57).
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If the coder is unable to determine the tone of the
interaction, the Comment category should be used. An
announcement by Kuwait that the USSR will visit in two weeks
to sign an arms agreement will be coded as 71 if in the
context of the report Kuwait views this event as a step
toward better relations between the USSR and Kuwait.
Conversely, a U.S. announcement that in a week the U.S. will
confer with Greece about the U.S. denial of F-5 aircraft will
likely be coded as code 72, the negative equivalent of code
71. If, on the other hand, an announcement is made that a
meeting will be held next week between France and the FRG to
discuss the joint development of a tank, this is coded 70
Comment since the statement is neutral.
If the interaction involves a specific promise to deliver
equipment or support at some future time, it should be coded
either as 53 Propose, or, if specific enough, 56 Order.
Similarly, meetings at which promises of general support are
made should be coded as 51 Consult, not 71
.
72 ACCUSE/CRITICIZE/PROTEST/THREATEN
This category is the counterpoint to the affirmative
actions described in category 71 . Events in the 72 category
are not specific enough to be categorized as 56 Reject or 59
Reduce/Withdraw. Nevertheless, they indicate an unsupportive
orientation towards some aspect of arms transfers.
An arms recipient's unhappiness regarding delivery time
or quality of equipment would fit this category. Also,
threats to alter the arms transfer relationship by reduction
or withdrawal are coded as 72. As with category 71, if the
coder is unable to determine the tone of the interaction, the
event should be coded as 70 Comment.
ISSUES
Once the relevant actor, target, and interaction have
been identified for an arms transfer event, assigning an
issue code to the event requires answering the question "What
is Country A interacting with Country B about?" Coders will
record the relevant issues for each event. Up to five issues
can be recorded for each discrete event.
EXAMPLE: Singapore has accepted a letter of offer for 8
F-16/J-79 fighter aircraft. The Pentagon estimated the cost
of the sale with spares, support and training at $280
million.
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Issues in the above example include training, equipment
transfers, and spares.
On the other hand, if a source reports the transfer of
pilot training and the upgrading of I-Hawk air defense
missiles to Kuwait, these are two discrete events, not one
event involving two issues (training, overhaul/upgrade). The
two keys to determining the number of discrete events are
time — an appropriate interval — and the hardware or
support involved.
01 TRAINING
One of the arms transfer issues about which nations
interact is training in which the country providing military
aid trains the personnel of its client. Training may involve
client personnel traveling to the country supplying the
training. Training may also involve countries supplying
training to their clients in the form of advisors. This
category will include all training of a military nature.
Technicians are coded under "Technical Assistance." If the
coder cannot distinguish between "training" and "technical
assistance," code it as training. The key aspect of the
event being captured is the presence of supplier or recipient
personnel as part of the transfer.
Care must be taken not to confuse training and advice
with the stationing of forces from the supplier country in
the recipient country.
Based on the U.S. model, training is defined as "formal
or informal instruction of foreign students in the United
States or overseas by officers or employees of the U.S.,
contract technicians, or by correspondence courses,
technical, educational, or information publications and media
of all kinds, training aids, orientation, training exercise,
and military advice to foreign military units and forces."
Foreign students attend U.S. courses in the following
categories: professional military education, flying
training, maintenance and skill level training, JT
,
orientation training tours.
Training which is exported by the U.S. includes: Mobile
training teams — used for 1 ) specific in-country training
requirements beyond the use of permanent U.S. personnel in
country; 2) training associated with equipment transfer; or
3) conduct surveys and assessments of training requirements.
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02 TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE
This category is used when the supplier country's advice
and/or training is clearly technical. It includes those
instances where technical advice accompanies an equipment
transfer, as well as the transfer of pure technology.
03 C0PR0DUCTI0N
This category is used if the transfer involves equipment
which has been coproduced. For the purposes of this data
set, the term "coproduce" can mean any of the following:
Co-assembly t all of the components of a weapon system
are manufactured in the supplier country but some of the
assembly is conducted in the recipient country.
Coproduction of Components : some of the parts for the
weapons system are manufactured in the recipient country
Dual-production : a weapon system is wholly produced in
two or more countries. An example is the AIM-9L AAM, a
U.S. missile manufactured in both the U.S. and the F.R.G
04 LICENSED PRODUCTION
Licensed Production involves agreements made by
commercial firms with international organizations, foreign
governments, or foreign commercial firms. Involvement on the
part of the government of the producer is limited to the
licensing process.
05 OFFSETS
A transaction in which a company selling military
equipment is required by the buyer government, as a condition
of sale, to assist in, or arrange for marketing of products
produced in the buying country, to "offset" the hard currency
drain resulting from the purchase.
There are several types of offsets:
Coproduction : Government to government agreement
permitting a foreign government or producer to acquire
the technology and know-how to manufacture all or part of
an item.
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Direct Licensed Production ; Foreign firm provides
technical information and know-how to a foreign firm or
government to produce item of equipment.
Subcontractor Production : Direct commercial arrangement
in which a foreign company produces a component or part
for a U.S. firm without the transfer of technology or
know-how.
Direct Investment : Capital invested in a foreign
country to establish a subsidiary or joint venture.
Counter trade : Direct purchase and subsequent sale of
civilian or military goods and services, not related to
the arms involved, from the buyer country by the U.S.,
U.S. contracts, the contractors' suppliers, or by third
parties
.
Technology Transfer : Government to government agreement
permitting the recipient country to acquire technology
from the supplier country, so that the recipient may
eventually produce the equipment or item.
06 EQUIPMENT TRANSFERS
Any stage of a transaction which pertains to, plans, or
carries out a change in the ownership or possession of
weapons and/or hardware.
EXAMPLE: The Danish Air Force ordered 12 F-16s from General
Dynamics last week following the Danish Government allocation
of DK 1 ,700 million to this department.
07 MILITARY ACCESS
Refers to the relationship between the supplier and the
recipient, which specifies the supplier's accessibility to
facilities, and rights of passage, and the presence of
support vessels within the recipient's boundaries. Military
access ranges from low to high.
now:
^Aircraft overflight privileges
^Landing rights and refueling of aircraft
*Port access for fishing and merchant vessels
*Port visits of naval ships
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Moderate:
*A11 of the above
*ASW monitoring
*Naval repair, replenishment, refueling, and





^Permanent presence of support ships
^Training areas
^Intelligence , surveillance, and common
facilities
^Staging of arms, personnel, aircraft, and
spare parts
High:
*A11 of the above
*Arms supplier controls facilities
08 FINANCIAL SUPPORT
An agreement between a supplier and a recipient whereby
the supplier gives the recipient cash for a specified
purpose: the acquisition of defense articles and services.
09 SPARES/LOGISTICS
Arms transfer agreements which include arrangements
wherein spare parts and/or continued support is provided to a
foreign government after the completed transfer.
10 MILITARY ASSISTANCE
An agreement between a supplier and a recipient, whereby
the supplier gives the recipient cash in order to purchase





Involves a commitment on the part of the supplier country




Involves remodeling, renovation, or major changes in
existing equipment. Overhauls are often viewed as a
relatively inexpensive means of updating and upgrading major
equipment.
TERMS
The terms or means of payment for the acquired weapons/
hardware provide valuable information and insight into the
relationship between nations involved in an arms transfer
event. When this information is available, it is imperative
that it is included in both the narrative summary and in the
analytical field. The summary should discuss the monetary
value and the various elements of the transfer (i.e.,
training, supplies, support systems, etc.). In the
analytical field, the coder is given a choice of 10 terms,
ranging from 21 UNKNOWN to 30 NOT APPLICABLE. A discussion
of each follows.
21 UNKNOWN
Often, in arms transfer events, the terms of the transfer
or the method or payment are not disclosed. Enter 21 when
either there is no reference to payment, or the value of the
equipment/training, etc. is given, but the terms are not
explicitly stated.
Example: Two initial contracts have been signed with the US
Navy for air-to-air missiles for the Royal Australian Air
Force's new F/A-18 Hornet aircraft. The Australian Minister
of Defense said the contracts totaled an estimated $A26
million.
22 RECIPIENT PAIS CASH
To enter 22, the text must state that in exchange for the
weapons/hardware, the recipient paid a certain sum in cash.
23 THIRD COUNTRY PAIS
A nation may contract and pay to provide another nation
with certain weapons/hardware. A 23 should not be entered
unless this is clearly the case. Often such arrangements are
implied or rumored, but should not be assumed.
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An example of this type of covert, but unofficial relation-
ship exists between the U.S.S.R., Cuba, and Nicaragua.
24 CREDIT/LOAN
For various economic, political, or strategic reasons,
sales may involve credit terms or loan agreements. This
classification includes those transfers involving cash down
payments. When these terms are provided in the text, 24 is
entered.
25 GIFT/GRANT
When a supplier agrees to give or grant weapons/hardware
to the recipient, the terms of the transfer should be entered
as 25.
26 BARTER
When an exchange or trade is suggested as a component of
an arms transfer, 26 qualifies as the term of payment.
EXAMPLE: Libya agreed to make a partial payment of $25
million in cash and deliver $40 million in oil to Turkey as
payment for the Turkish exports she received last year.
27 CAPTURE
When weapons/hardware are seized during an act of war, by
force, or by surprise and new ownership or possession is
established, 27 is entered.
EXAMPLE: Iraq claimed it downed an Iranian fighter jet that
violated Iraqi airspace. The fighter was confiscated, and
the pilot and copilot were imprisoned.
28 RENT/LEASE
When a program involving the lease or rental of equipment
is outlined or described, 28 is entered.
EXAMPLE: Zambia accepted its first McDonnell Douglas DC-10
in ceremonies at the company's Long Beach facility on July
30. It is being leased to Zambia over a 15-year term with
Zambia having the option to buy at any time during the lease
period at a price based on its stipulated loss value.
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29 OTHER
When an alternative plan is discussed with regard to
terms of payment, 29 is entered. Details of these terms
should be included in the summary.
30 NOT APPLICABLE
When the terms of an agreement are not relevant to the
event being coded, 30 is entered. This rule will apply most
often with those events coded as 70 Comment, 71 Approval,
or 72 Criticism.
SYSTEMS
The type(s) of weapons or hardware involved in the
transfer are recorded in this field. If an article refers to
more than one event and more than one weapon type, enter in
the systems field only the weapon(s ) /hardware which directly
pertains to the event code. Include all information in the
summary.
Since there will be no fixed-format code, the coder
enters the type of weapon or hardware as specified in the
source of reference. There will always be varying degrees of
precision in the designation of the weapons system as well as
different ways of referring to the same weapon type.
Weapons systems usually have both a DoD designation and a
NATO code name.
EXAMPLE: AIM-9L Sidewinder AAM
In this case, the 'proper' designation of this weapon is
AIM-9L, which is an air-to-air missile (AAM). The AIM-9L is
also commonly referred to as the Sidewinder, its NATO code
name
.
The convention will be to record the weapon designation
followed by its NATO code name and the weapon description
(AAM) as shown in the example above. The weapon description
contains the weapon system's 'primary mission'. See Appendix
E for a list of commonly used abbreviations and acronyms Lnot
included]
.
To accommodate those arms transfers involving various
weapon systems and/or equipment, six fields are provided on
the screen. One type of weapon/ hardware is entered in each
field. If more than six weapon types are discussed, include
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all information in the summary, and create another record for
the event, where the additional weapons/hardware may be
entered.
In order to conserve space as well as maintain consist-
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